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This thesis investigates Schopenhauer’s Spinozism in relation to the topics of the self 
and ethics. It aims to show that a recognition of the parallels between the two 
philosophers is illuminating in terms of understanding and interpreting 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Such a recognition brings to the fore philosophical 
resources in his system which are otherwise under-exploited, helps to solve 
interpretive puzzles and provides a new vocabulary with which to more adequately 
delineate key Schopenhauerian concepts.  
  Chapters one and two address the metaphysics of the self in the philosophies of 
Schopenhauer and Spinoza, arguing that neither thinker accepts the Cartesian dogma 
that the self is to be identified with the mind; each insists upon the self’s embodiment 
and its integration into reality at large. Each, too, offers an explanation of how, in 
spite of this, individuals can be picked out both physically (within the spatio-temporal 
realm) and in virtue of their possession of an eternal nature or essence. A comparative 
analysis of these explanations forms the basis of the second chapter. 
  The thesis then turns to the subject of ethics and salvation. Chapter three shows that 
their shared determinism bequeaths Schopenhauer and Spinoza a common problem 
regarding the viability of practical ethics. It demonstrates that Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy boasts the resources for an ethics along the lines of Spinoza’s and that his
rejection of them generates explanatory and metaphysical puzzles for the 
Schopenhauerian. Both systems culminate in an account of blessedness or salvation. 
The final chapter proposes that the differences between these accounts are best 
understood in the light of Schopenhauer’s epistemological and metaphysical 
pessimism – and again, enumerates some of the challenges that result for an
interpreter of his philosophy. 
  The thesis concludes with an indication of further work which could usefully be 
performed both in terms of interpreting Schopenhauer’s philosophy and of situating it 
with reference to established philosophical traditions. 
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Introduction 
 
 
1. RATIONALE 
 
 Spinoza was a major, though ambiguous, influence on Schopenhauer and there 
are profound similarities between the philosophical systems of the two. Both thinkers 
are monists, both see individuals as defined by striving, both insist upon a deep-rooted 
connection between ethics and metaphysical insight. Schopenhauer’s Spinozism, 
however, has attracted comparatively little attention: his philosophy has much more 
often been read in terms of its Kantianism or Platonism. Arguably even the influences 
of Buddhist and Hindu thought and of British empiricism on Schopenhauer are better 
understood than that of Spinoza.1 
It therefore seems worthwhile to investigate the impact of Spinozism on 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy, and I will argue that it is both deep and far-reaching. 
Nevertheless, it is not the primary aim of this thesis to assess the extent of 
Schopenhauer’s Spinozism or to compare it to that of other sources. Instead, I hope to 
show that reading Schopenhauer as a Spinozist can be fruitful in terms of 
understanding his own thought: that it can bring to the fore philosophical resources in 
his system which are otherwise under-exploited, help to solve interpretive puzzles and 
provide a new vocabulary with which to more adequately delineate key 
Schopenhauerian concepts. I will also offer some assessment of how successfully 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy incorporates Spinozist tropes. I try to identify, for 
instance, where Schopenhauer’s Spinozism comes into conflict with his Kantianism 
and, on the other hand, where it is his departures from Spinoza which threaten the 
cogency of Schopenhauer’s thought, indicating that he should, perhaps, have been a 
more thoroughgoing Spinozist. 
                                                 
1
 Henry Walter Brann in ‘Schopenhauer and Spinoza’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 10, no. 2 
(1972): 181-196, notes the fundamental commonality between the two thinkers (181) – systematic 
monism – and that Schopenhauer made a painstaking study of Spinoza’s philosophy (182). He 
helpfully details the very many references Schopenhauer makes to Spinoza both in published work and 
notes, comments that ‘Arthur Schopenhauer’s attitude toward Spinoza is rather ambivalent, with a 
strong slant in the positive direction’(182) and remarks that Schopenhauer’s Spinozism has been little-
investigated. Bela Egyed, too, points out that ‘his preoccupation with Spinozism is evident throughout 
his writings’ and highlights Schopenhauer’s ambivalence towards Spinoza. Bela Egyed, ‘Spinoza, 
Schopenhauer and the Standpoint of Affirmation’, PhaenEx 2, no. 1 (2007):110-131, 110 and 111. 
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2. TOPIC 
 
I focus on the topics of self and ethics. The first two chapters of this thesis 
address the metaphysics of the self in the philosophies of Schopenhauer and Spinoza.  
I argue that neither thinker accepts the Cartesian dogma that the self is to be identified 
with the mind; each insists upon the self’s embodiment and its integration into reality 
at large. Each, too, offers an explanation of how, in spite of this, individuals can be 
picked out both physically (within the spatio-temporal realm) and in virtue of their 
possession of an eternal nature or essence. A comparative analysis of these 
explanations forms the basis of the second chapter. 
I then turn to the subject of ethics and salvation. In chapter three I show that 
their shared determinism bequeaths Schopenhauer and Spinoza a common problem 
regarding the viability of practical ethics. I demonstrate that Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy boasts the resources for an ethics along the lines of Spinoza’s and that his 
rejection of them generates explanatory and metaphysical puzzles for the 
Schopenhauerian. Both systems culminate in an account of blessedness or salvation. 
In the final chapter I propose that the differences between these accounts are best 
understood in the light of Schopenhauer’s epistemological and metaphysical 
pessimism – and again, enumerate some of the challenges that result for an interpreter 
of his philosophy. 
There are a number of reasons to investigate these two topics in particular. 
They seem to me to highlight the surprising congruences between Schopenhauer’s 
thought and that of Spinoza. These two aspects of their thought are closely bound 
together and, in my view, offer significant insights into the character of 
Schopenhauer’s Spinozism and the adequacy of his philosophy more generally. The 
World as Will and Representation, like Spinoza’s Ethics, is crowned by an ethical 
theory which grows out of the metaphysics which precedes it, but particularly out of 
the account of the embeddedness and individuation of the human self. 
The clearest similarities between the two systems probably lie in the area of 
metaphysics: monism, determinism, the notion that striving constitutes the essence of 
individuals, the distinction between finite individuals and eternal essences. The 
differences between Schopenhauer and Spinoza are most obvious when considering 
their philosophical methods and theories of knowledge, with Spinoza’s realism and 
rationalism confronting Schopenhauer’s transcendental idealism and empiricism. In 
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chapters one and two we will see that Schopenhauer’s theory of the self stands as a 
microcosm of the relationship between his philosophy and Spinoza’s. Exploring the 
nature of the self as understood by each reveals much about the Spinozism of 
Schopenhauer’s metaphysics more generally, and also demands an analysis of his 
methodology, in the process of which I suggest an amendment to the way in which it 
is usually understood. 
The metaphysical doctrines which I clarify and assess in the first two chapters 
set the terms for the ethical theories examined in the second half of the thesis. For one 
thing, Schopenhauer and Spinoza’s moral philosophies are profoundly shaped by their 
determinism. For another, the fact of the self’s embeddedness in nature and 
knowledge of this fact play a crucial role in each of their ethics. Third, individuation 
in terms of the Platonic Ideas is a central but troublesome element of Schopenhauer’s 
practical philosophy and helps bring to light the stark differences between his 
epistemology and that of Spinoza. As regards the theory of salvation, there are 
remarkable parallels between the two bodies of work. We will see that it is once more 
Schopenhauer’s pessimistic epistemology which divides them, but analysing his 
theory of salvation also requires a return, in the final sections of the thesis, to 
metaphysics, by which stage Schopenhauer’s pessimistic slants on monism, 
dynamism and the nature of the self can be brought into sharper focus. 
 
3. CONTRIBUTION 
 
In the first place, I intend this study of Schopenhauer’s Spinozism concerning 
self and ethics to contribute to the understanding and interpretation of Schopenhauer’s 
– and, to some extent, Spinoza’s – philosophy. In particular, it offers a sustained 
analysis of the following Schopenhauerian topics:  the nature of the self, the status of 
the Platonic Ideas and their relationship to phenomenal individuals, the connections 
between ethics and epistemology and the metaphysical pessimism which underpins – 
perhaps threatens to undermine – his theory of salvation. Examining the Spinozist 
character of these elements of Schopenhauer’s philosophy offers, I believe, several 
advantages. In some cases, it highlights strengths of his system which generally 
receive little attention – his model of an ethics of self-fulfilment within determinism, 
for instance. In others, it provides the tools to analyse Schopenhauerian concepts in a 
more thorough and adequate way, as – I argue – is the situation with the theory of the 
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Platonic Ideas. In other cases, it helps to cast new light on or underscore problematic 
aspects of Schopenhauer’s thought, including the issue of the differentiation of 
intelligible characters and the notion of the abolition of the will. 
I hope too, to bring out philosophical theories common to the two thinkers 
which are of more general interest. In particular, I argue that Schopenhauer and 
Spinoza offer a philosophy of the self which provides a valuable alternative to the 
Cartesian model; an account of ethics which, in contrast to those of Schopenhauer’s 
forerunners Kant and Hume, centres on the power of knowledge; and a fascinating 
picture of salvation without making any appeal to a transcendent God or the promise 
of a heavenly reward. Finally, I submit that an analysis of Schopenhauer’s Spinozism 
contributes to the broader project of establishing whether and how a reconciliation 
might be managed between naturalism and (rationalist) metaphysics on the one hand, 
and Kantian philosophy on the other. This might be of particular interest to scholars 
of Hegelianism, the German Idealist tradition and Nietzsche, among others, but also 
to those working on contemporary post-Kantian metaphysics and epistemology. 
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The Embedded Self 
 
 
It has been suggested that Schopenhauer was groundbreaking in his refusal to 
equate the human self with the intellect alone. Gunther Zöller, for instance, writes that 
‘[t]he basic disagreement between Schopenhauer and the philosophical tradition on 
the self concerns the standard identification of the self, as the core of the human 
being, with the intellect’.2 In particular, it is Schopenhauer’s insistence on the 
embodied nature of the self that is taken to set him apart. Thus, in his own attempt to 
effect ‘an indissoluble wedding of these twin partners [mind and body] that were, had 
we only known, destined from birth for one another’ and ‘trace already existent a 
priori-given links between… mind, body, will’ (‘the one sure way of healing splits of 
the kind endorsed by Cartesians’) it is Schopenhauer whom Brian O’Shaughnessy 
takes as a paradigm.3 In this chapter I shall argue that Spinoza had previously offered 
a model of the human self that attempted to heal these Cartesian splits, characterising 
it as both embodied and thoroughly integrated into nature or reality as a whole.4 I will 
attempt to delineate this ‘embedded-self’ thesis in Spinoza’s work and claim that it is 
also something to which Schopenhauer subscribes. The comments of Zöller et al 
notwithstanding, I suggest that this is a surprising fact given Schopenhauer’s 
professed allegiance to Kantian idealism. 
 
1. SPINOZA’S EMBEDDEDNESS THESIS 
 
1.1 The Cartesian Self 
 
In order to clarify by way of contrast, I start by rehearsing the key features of 
Descartes’ picture of the self. Not only is Descartes the standard-bearer for what one 
                                                 
2
 Günter Zöller, ‘Schopenhauer on the Self’, in The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer, ed. 
Christopher Janaway (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1999), 19. Similarly, John Atwell’s 
assessment is that Schopenhauer ‘deposes the mind from the throne of philosophical investigation and 
installs in its place – the place the mind has occupied since at least the time of Descartes – the body’. 
John E. Atwell, Schopenhauer on the Character of the World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1995), 81. 
3
 Brian O’Shaughnessy, The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1980), 357 and 349. 
4
 I am taking the terms nature and reality to be synonymous in Spinoza and Schopenhauer and using 
nature for the deterministic realm in Descartes (so that Cartesian reality consists of nature plus human 
minds and God). 
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might call the traditional substantial or non-embedded self camp, but it is surely 
highly plausible that Spinoza’s theory of the self is offered precisely as an alternative 
to the Cartesian model.5 For one thing, Descartes was Spinoza’s most influential 
predecessor. More specifically, it is his early writings on Descartes in which 
Spinoza’s own alternative views on aspects of the self (regarding the freedom of the 
will, for instance) first appear.6 Thus I hope that the distinctiveness and radicalism of 
Spinoza’s theory of the self will emerge on the basis of an examination of that to 
which it forms a response.7 
Henry Allison reminds us (in a chapter devoted to the historical context of 
Spinoza’s philosophy) that Spinoza’s age saw the Medieval Judaeo-Christian 
cosmology effectively replaced by a modern scientific conception of nature. As 
Allison notes, the former, a synthesis of Aristotelian and Biblical doctrines, affirmed 
the Biblical picture of the world as ‘created by God, largely for the benefit man, who 
was “made in His own image”’, while following Aristotle in ‘conceiving it as 
composed of distinct types of substances, falling into fixed genera, or “natural kinds,” 
each obeying its own set of laws.’8 Thus nature was presented as ordered but 
discontinuous, comprising multiple substances and kinds of beings each obeying their 
own laws, and with an external and pre-existent God. This discontinuity was 
underscored by the emphasis orthodoxy placed on final causes: if the behaviour of 
each substance was, as Allison indicates, to be explained primarily in terms of its 
individual function,9 then differences between substances would inevitably appear 
even more striking. And while nature as a whole was not to be understood as uniform, 
the anomalous nature of humans – occupying the unique position of being created in 
God’s image – was particularly emphasised. 
                                                 
5
 In what follows I will investigate whether any differences must be inherent in their respective 
embedded-self theses given that Spinoza is responding to Descartes and Schopenhauer primarily to 
Kant (although Zöller and others suggest he too is reacting to the Cartesian dogma). 
6
 See, for instance, the letter to Oldenburg (Ep 2), and Lodewijk Meyer’s comments on Spinoza’s 
divergence from Descartes in his preface to Spinoza’s first published work Principles of Cartesian 
Philosophy with Metaphysical Thoughts, ed. Steven Barbone and Lee Rice, trans. Samuel Shirley 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998), 5-6. 
7
 Edwin Curley, of course, devotes an entire book to the project of showing ‘how some of the most 
distinctive features of Spinoza’s philosophy arose from internal tensions within the Cartesian system.’ 
Edwin Curley, Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinoza’s Ethics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1988), 4. 
8
 Henry E. Allison, Benedict de Spinoza: An Introduction Revised Edition (New Haven: Yale, 1987), 
25. 
9
 Allison, Benedict de Spinoza, 26. 
 21 
All this, however, had already been challenged by the new science, 
figureheaded by Descartes, so that this – in Allison’s words – was the conception of 
nature that Spinoza inherited: ‘the modern universe is infinite, mechanically ordered, 
and governed by a single set of universal laws that apply to all phenomena’.10 Nature, 
then, was taken to comprise a single substance and explanations of its phenomena no 
longer appealed to diverse final causes but to unvarying mechanical laws.11 
The position of humans in this system remained problematic, however. Central 
Christian tenets, such as free will and the immortality of the soul, required – in 
Descartes’ view – that an exception be made for human selves. Rendered necessary 
by his desire to preserve Christian doctrine, this exemption of humankind was 
rendered possible by Descartes’ metaphysical dualism, which differentiates nature, or 
extended substance, from the thinking substance, mind.12 In Descartes’ system, then, 
the human mind or soul held a unique metaphysical position: it alone belonged to a 
different substance than the rest of reality, was a thinking rather than an extended 
thing.13 And man’s exceptionality was heightened by an asymmetry between the two 
substances: while the physical world consisted of one extended substance with myriad 
modifications,14 ‘each individual mind… constitute[d] a distinct thinking substance.’15 
Every human individual, then, was the possessor of a mind or soul – indeed, most 
properly was that soul – in virtue of which he was capable of free action (and 
therefore impossible to understand in a thoroughgoingly mechanistic, law-governed 
way). 
 
1.2 The Spinozan Self 
 
If it is on the basis of his substance dualism that Descartes divorces the human 
self from the rest of reality, it is Spinoza’s monism that underpins his picture of the 
                                                 
10
 Allison, Benedict de Spinoza, 27. 
11
 Again, I refer to nature in Descartes’ sense, which I understand more narrowly than Spinoza’s Deus 
sive natura (reality as such). 
12
 Charles Taylor suggests that, for Descartes, ‘[c]oming to a full realization of one’s being as 
immaterial involves perceiving distinctly the ontological cleft between [the soul and the material]’. 
Charles Taylor, Sources of The Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 145. 
13
 Or at least, alone save the mind of God. 
14
 Curley points out (in a footnote to BTGM p141-2) that Descartes vacillates on this, the Descartes of 
the Meditations, in particular, seeming to hold ‘that such ordinary items as stones (AT VII, 44) and 
pieces of wax (AT VII, 360) are material substances’. 
15
 Allison, Benedict de Spinoza, 30. 
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self as embedded in reality at large: his metaphysical system makes it impossible for 
human selves to be ontologically aberrant as they were for Descartes. Because for 
Spinoza there is only one substance, the mind can’t be singled out as substantially 
different to everything else. And while thought and extension constitute different 
attributes of substance, each attribute applies uniformly across all of substance’s 
modes. Every existent mode, then, is mental as well as physical; every body is 
correlated with a mind.16 This both precludes the possibility of human selves claiming 
distinctiveness in terms of their being mental as well as physical (everything else is, 
too!) and indicates that for Spinoza the human self is not essentially a mind but a 
mode. Thus Spinoza affirms the identity of mind and body – as parallel expressions of 
the same event of substance. A human mind and its body represent the same mode of 
substance viewed under the attributes of thought and extension respectively. 
Spinoza, then, rejected both the thesis that human individuals are to be 
identified primarily with their minds and the claim that mind constitutes a separate 
substance. And in their very unity, human selves are consonant with reality at large. 
As Stuart Hampshire writes ‘[t]he union of individual human minds with individual 
human bodies is for Spinoza only a special case of the general identity of the order or 
connection of causes in nature; what he has proved refers no more to man than to 
other individual things’.17 In a human self, mind and body are inseparable, just as are 
the mental and physical aspects of substance as such and so of the whole of reality. 
This in turn means that human freedom can no longer be taken to involve non-
compliance with the mechanistic laws that govern the rest of nature – all elements of 
nature, including humans, are to be ‘understood in terms of their logical, lawful 
relationships to each other’.18 Thus Spinoza universalised the mathematical method 
that the new science used to explain nature in general so that it also comprehended 
human individuals (including their minds). The Preface to Part III of the Ethics, for 
instance, promises to ‘consider human actions and appetites just as if it were a 
question of lines, planes, and bodies.’19 One major theme of that preface, in fact, is 
precisely the consistency and law-governed character of nature. Introducing this very 
                                                 
16
 Although the notion that every Spinozan idea has an associated body has been disputed by, for 
instance, Steven Nadler, I take what I say here to be the standard interpretation. See Steven Nadler, 
Spinoza’s ‘Ethics’: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
17
 Stuart Hampshire, Spinoza and Spinozism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 59.  
18
 Allison, Benedict de Spinoza, 38. 
19
 Unless otherwise stated, all citations of Spinoza’s Ethics refer to Edwin Curley, A Spinoza Reader 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
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topic of the geometrical analysis of human behaviour, Spinoza writes ‘[n]ature is 
always the same… the laws and rules of Nature… are always and everywhere the 
same. So the way of understanding the nature of anything, of whatever kind, must 
also be the same, namely, through the universal laws and rules of nature.’ Nature is 
consistent throughout, law-governed throughout and, throughout, explicable in the 
same way – human beings are no exception.  
Thus for Spinoza, in contrast to Descartes, human selves are thoroughly 
integrated into reality as a whole. We can be understood in exactly the same 
(mathematical) way as everything else because we are comprehended by the same 
deterministic system. Like everything else, human selves are modes of the one 
substance. And rather than identifying the self with the mind, Spinoza insists that the 
human self is a mode which can be viewed as mind under the attribute of thought or 
as body under that of extension.20 
 
1.3 Embeddedness Without Materialism 
 
Spinoza’s embedded-self thesis does not commit him to a species of the 
materialism that perhaps constituted Cartesian dualism’s foremost contemporary rival. 
The position, most commonly identified as Hobbesian, that matter exhausts reality is 
clearly amenable to an embedded-self theory. If the only substance is physical, and if, 
as a corollary, human beings are nothing but bodies, then it becomes natural to 
conceive of the human self as one more cog in a mechanistic system – neither 
ontologically distinct from the rest of nature, nor exempt from its laws, nor requiring 
any special kind of explanation. Materialism, then, is the natural ally of the 
embedded-self thesis. 
It has recently been argued that a reductive materialist stance is, in fact, 
improperly ascribed to Hobbes. (Stewart Duncan, for instance, has characterised him 
as what one could call an epistemological and Robert Arp as a methodological – 
rather, in each case, than an ontological – materialist).21 Nonetheless the view that 
mind is reducible to matter was an available alterative to Cartesianism and shared 
                                                 
20
 I intend take this to presuppose no particular answer to the debate concerning the reality or otherwise 
and objectivity or subjectivity of attributes. 
21
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with Spinoza’s philosophy a commitment to substance monism and to universalising 
mechanistic explanation, along with the ability to accommodate the embedded-self 
thesis. It is not, however, Spinoza’s position – the autonomy of the intellect is 
preserved in Spinoza’s system. This may not be immediately apparent: Spinoza 
contends, after all, that there is only one substance and that everything that occurs in 
the mind has a physical correlate: ‘[t]hought cannot produce ideas for which there are 
no nonmental correlates’, as Genevieve Lloyd puts it.22 Proposition 7 of Part II of the 
Ethics tells us that ‘[t]he order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and 
connection of things’, inviting speculation that physical reality determines our 
thoughts about it. In the Scholium to that proposition Spinoza concurs with those 
Hebrew thinkers who ‘maintained that God, God’s intellect, and the things understood 
by him are one and the same.’ Here one might be tempted to think that Spinoza goes 
further still by apparently suggesting that a thought is nothing other than the object of 
which it is a thought. Given that the human mind is defined as the idea of the body 
(Part II P13), one might conclude that, in Spinoza’s view, the mind is reducible to the 
body and its thoughts to brain activity or other bodily events. 
Lloyd explains, however, that for Spinoza 
 
the mind, as idea of the body, is not a mere passive reflection of bodily states… thought, 
of which the mind is a mode, is an attribute relating directly to substance – an alternative 
expression of substance, mapping that of matter. So, although it has the body as its object, 
the mind also belongs in a totality of thought that relates directly to substance.23 
 
 So while everything in the mind has a physical correlate for Spinoza, this is not 
materialism – thought remains autonomous. Thus the Demonstration of Proposition 6 
of Part II tells us that ‘each attribute is conceived through itself without any other (by 
IP10). So the modes of each attribute involve the concept of their own attribute, but 
not of another one’ and the Scholium to Part I’s Proposition 10 that ‘one may be 
conceived without the aid of the other’. The attribute of thought itself, then, (like that 
of extension) is a self-sufficient and adequate expression of substance. Likewise the 
modes of thought, that is, minds, far from being reducible to brain states as certain 
kinds of materialist might have it, are explicable purely with reference to thought. 
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 Spinoza’s is not a materialist philosophy,24 then, but neither is it dualist: 
thought and extension are two expressions of the same set of events. Admittedly it is 
true that attributes are causally independent: a bodily event is caused by substance as 
extended, a mental one by substance under the attribute of thought (IIP9D ‘the cause 
of one singular idea is another idea’). Also, each attribute constitutes an essence of 
substance and thus cannot be explained away in terms of any other attribute. 
Nonetheless everything that happens within substance finds an expression in every 
attribute, every mode is both physical and mental. There can, then, be no purely 
mental events: each thought has a physical correlate. And this is because mind is not a 
free-floating substance but one among an infinite number of ways of looking at or 
describing the one substance. Perhaps, then, one should say that there aren’t really any 
mental events at all, just events of substance that can be described either physically or 
mentally. Thus Spinoza’s parallelism steers a course between materialism and 
dualism, characterising the human subject as bodily as well as mental, and both body 
and mind as continuous with the rest of nature as well as bound by its laws, while 
nonetheless preserving the integrity of the intellect. 
 
1.4 Advantages over the Cartesian Model 
 
1.4.1 
While my primary aim in this first part of the chapter has simply been to offer 
a characterisation of Spinoza’s embedded-self thesis, I intend in this section to 
explore a number of advantages that I take it to hold over its Cartesian rival. The 
embodied nature of the mind – and the continuity of the human self with nature more 
generally – is frequently stressed in contemporary philosophy. This is perhaps true of 
feminist thought above all, and Spinoza’s role as a trail-blazer in this arena has been 
acknowledged by feminist philosophers. Thus in an interview with the journal 
Women’s Philosophy Review, Genevieve Lloyd explains to Susan James that she ‘first 
became interested in the relation between Spinoza and the feminist questions partly 
because he offers an alternative to Cartesian ways of thinking about the body and its 
                                                 
24
 Hampshire comments in his introduction that ‘[a]ny philosopher who questions what has been called 
the official Two-world doctrine formulated by Descartes is liable to be classified as a materialist, even 
if he is simply rejecting the conception of minds and bodies as constituting two independent systems, 
each a realm in itself. Spinoza was certainly not a materialist in the other and cruder sense’. Hampshire, 
Spinoza and Spinozism, 70. 
 26 
relation to the mind.’25 An endorsement of Spinoza is surely intended, too, when in 
Part of Nature Lloyd writes that while the ‘Cartesian self is fated to the hopeless 
attempt to insert itself back into a world from which it has been metaphysically 
separated’, Spinoza’s self, ‘in contrast, is immersed in the whole of nature’.26 
It is, indeed, often Descartes who modern philosophers of embodiment invoke 
more or less explicitly as the chief propagator of a dominant but damaging model of 
the self to which they seek an alternative. ‘Feminists have been critical of dualism’, 
writes Naomi Scheman, for its ‘privileging of the mind over the body and for the 
misunderstanding of each that results from their being prised apart.’ Scheman’s piece 
is subtitled ‘Against physicalism’; she goes on to explain that this more currently 
respectable descendent of materialism ‘has seemed to many an unpalatable alternative 
[to dualism], in large measure because the sort of attention to bodies that, for 
example, [Susan] James encourages is not the attention of the scientist to an object of 
study, but the attention of a subject to her or his own experience’.27 
Later in this chapter we will see that Schopenhauer makes an appeal to the 
distinction between the scientific and the subjective or experiential attitude to the 
body central to his account of the self – indeed, he takes the latter kind of relation to 
provide the key to understanding the world as a whole. Though it is far less trumpeted 
in Spinoza’s philosophy, I think one could make the case for a similar kind of 
attention to the body there – particularly when his view of matter and the body is 
contrasted with that of Descartes. Charles Taylor takes this contrast as a theme in his 
Sources of the Self: he suggests that ‘the Cartesian discovers and affirms his 
immaterial nature by objectifying the bodily’ – by doing ‘violence to our ordinary, 
embodied way of experiencing.’28 In order to understand one’s nature as immaterial 
soul, one must recognise the ‘ontological cleft’ between soul and matter.29 Because 
our bodies are part of the material world we must, for Taylor’s Descartes, ‘disengage 
from our usual embodied perspective’. I must objectify my own body, as I must 
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everything else in the world I wish to understand, seeing it ‘mechanistically and 
functionally, in the same way that an uninvolved external observer would.’30 
Spinoza, by contrast, according to Taylor, emerged for Goethe’s generation as 
‘a forerunner of that great quasi-pantheistic sense of a cosmic spirit running through 
the whole of nature and coming to expression in mankind’.31 One could make too 
much of this: Taylor himself notes that Spinoza ‘would have been rather astonished to 
hear the doctrines for which he was admired.’32 The quotation mentioned nonetheless 
makes plain Spinoza’s difference, as diagnosed by Taylor, from Descartes, the latter 
philosopher being taken to have 1) instituted a paradigm of ‘rational mastery’, of 
reason as instrumental; 2) to have done this in part by ‘disenchanting’ nature – 
characterising it as ‘devoid of any spiritual essence or expressive dimension’ and 3) to 
have insisted upon the unique exemption of mankind from nature.33 As mentioned, it 
may be objected that the implied interpretation of Spinoza is unreliable – even if not, 
Spinoza’s account might not necessarily be seen as an improvement over its 
forerunner. It is surely plausible, though, that Spinoza’s conception of the role of 
reason differed considerably from that of Descartes, and that Descartes’ rational 
programme involved the adoption of an objective, scientific stance towards the body. 
If even this much is granted to Taylor, Spinoza must at least emerge as a more 
attractive resource for the kind of contemporary philosopher of the body Scheman 
describes. 
 
1.4.2 
The resonance with (and indebtedness of) contemporary philosophies of 
embodiment aside, I would identify two specific features of Spinoza’s account of the 
self that could be said to represent advances over that of his predecessor, both 
stemming from his rejection of dualism. First, and most obviously, replacing dualism 
with parallelism allowed Spinoza to avoid the interactionist problems that beset 
Descartes’ thinking. The issue of uniting, as Henry Allison puts it, ‘his completely 
mechanistic physiology… with his conception of an immaterial, independent, and 
immortal soul, or thinking substance’ was probably the most intractable problem 
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resulting from Descartes’ attempt to integrate Christian tenets with the new science.34 
The question of how interaction between mental and material substance is possible 
becomes particularly pressing in the case of humans, given that they are composed of 
embodied mind. Descartes’ notorious ‘pineal gland’ solution to this conundrum was 
mocked by Spinoza, who also rejected the entire metaphysical set-up that necessitated 
it. It is, of course, parallelism that provides Spinoza’s alternative model. If the 
challenge for Descartes is to explain how a mental event like a decision can cause a 
physical one like raising the hand, Spinoza’s response is to deny outright that such a 
thing is possible. 
 This might appear to put Spinoza – rather than Descartes – at the disadvantage, 
because, as Hampshire notes ‘one naturally thinks of events in my mind causing 
events in my body’.35 But the substance dualism offered by Descartes is incapable of 
supporting this pre-theoretical assumption: ‘to conceive thought and extension as two 
substances is logically to preclude the possibility of strictly causal interaction between 
them’.36 And for Spinoza, as we have seen, the appearance of two radically 
incommensurable types of event masks the reality of one set of events expressing 
itself in two ways. We take the act of will to be different from the act of arm-raising – 
to borrow Steven Nadler’s example – because we consider it ‘now under the attribute 
of thought, now under the attribute of extension’.37 As Nadler writes, Spinoza’s 
parallelism ‘suffices to account for the correlation between states of the mind and 
states of the body in a human being without causal interaction’.38 ‘There is a 
correlation between… volition and arm-rising’ Nadler continues, ‘just because they 
are one and the same event’39– prefiguring  Schopenhauer’s assertion of the identity 
between willing and acting which is later taken up by Nietzsche. Thus Hampshire 
judges that ‘Spinoza drastically overcomes’ the difficulties of mind/body interaction 
which ‘are shown very clearly in the embarrassed history of Cartesianism after 
Descartes’.40 
As a codicil to this, I would point to two further features of Descartes’ picture 
of the self – each again stemming from his substance dualism – which could be 
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accounted confusions or embarrassments cleared-up or avoided by Spinoza. First, 
there is the previously-mentioned asymmetry between Descartes’ two created 
substances, thought and extension. That it countenances multiple individual minds but 
just one extended substance might of itself be taken as a weakness of Descartes’ 
metaphysics. And the claimed substantial union between the mind and body of each 
person is perhaps made still harder to fathom by the fact that one of these constituents 
is apparently an individual substance while the other is presumably one modification 
or accident of an infinitely large substance. 
Second, for Descartes, mind and matter constitute different substances – God 
aside, the only two substances there are. One should, then, presumably be able to 
expect clarity concerning to which substance any particular thing belongs. Clear 
distinctions, however, don’t necessarily always seem to be forthcoming. Are such 
things as emotions, perceptions and sensations mental or physical phenomena? If our 
intuition is that they are a bit of both, then Spinoza will easily be able to 
accommodate that intuition – ‘he will always think of perceptions as processes which 
have two aspects’, writes Hampshire; and again, ‘Spinoza is arguing against Descartes 
in his survey of the emotions [which] … discourages a sharp and traditional contrast 
between analytical reason, on the one hand, and the passive emotions, on the other.’41 
Descartes, by contrast, owes us an account of the side of the mind/body divide on 
which each of these phenomena falls. Perhaps anything that is not unambiguously 
mental should be classified as physical.42 Hampshire, in the quotation above, suggests 
that the emotions fall on the opposite side of the divide to thought. Lloyd makes a 
similar point regarding perception: ‘[t]he operation of the senses, rather than being 
seen as a function of the human soul, rejoins the material world’.43 But if, as Lloyd 
claims, everything non-rational is part of the body, her diagnosis of the Cartesian 
self’s status as ‘metaphysically separated’ from the rest of the world looks even more 
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bleak. Those things from which it is ontologically separated include its own emotions 
and perceptions – things which we might normally take to be aspects of the self. 
 
1.4.3 
Spinoza, then, has no need to posit an asymmetry between the mental and the 
material, or to view the self as internally divided (or alternatively to leave it 
ambiguous as to whether certain phenomena are mental or bodily). I have suggested 
these two drawbacks of Descartes’ metaphysics are corollaries to his difficulties 
regarding the possibility of interaction between mind and matter. We will see that 
those very difficulties are also intimately connected to what I would hold to be the 
other main attraction this aspect of Spinoza’s philosophy offers compared to that of 
his predecessor: the completeness of his commitment to rationalism. 
This is a comparison that Stuart Hampshire makes. ‘If Descartes was a 
rationalist, in the sense that he advocated the solution of all problems of natural 
knowledge by the application of the mathematical method of pure reasoning,’ he 
writes, ‘Spinoza was doubly a rationalist in this sense’.44 While, as we saw in section 
1.2, Spinoza universalized the mathematical method, Descartes ‘laid emphasis on’ the 
distinction between the physical and mental ‘in order to mark as clearly as possible 
the limits of the new mathematical science’. On the Cartesian picture ‘Nature was 
therefore divided into Extension, the system described in mathematical physics, and 
the realm of thought, which cannot be so described.’45  The crucial difference for 
Hampshire is that ‘Spinoza, unlike Descartes, designed a single system of concepts to 
apply over the whole range of the natural world; he did not think of knowledge as 
divisible into unrelated compartments.’46 
1.4.3 a) 
Descartes and Spinoza, then, disagree over the kinds of thing that are 
susceptible to mathematical explanation – but perhaps this is a value-neutral 
difference. Two considerations suggest that it is not. Possibly the less persuasive of 
the two is the notion that Descartes failed on his own terms: that his philosophy falls 
short of providing a universal – and univocal – explanation towards which he took 
himself to be striving. Steven Nadler makes a suggestion along these lines, noting that 
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‘Descartes claims, rather optimistically, there is “no phenomenon of nature” which he 
has not explained in his treatise [Principia Philosophiae] by the principles 
enumerated, namely, the various sizes, shapes, and motions which are found in all 
bodies.’47 
Nadler insists that Descartes includes in this claim ‘not just the properties and 
operations of physical bodies among themselves, but also their effects in the human 
mind – in particular, sensations.’48 He records that contemporary critics such as 
Gassendi were quick to argue that Descartes had here stumbled into ‘a domain in 
which mechanistic explanation breaks down, in spite of Descartes’ attempts to explain 
everything (motivated, perhaps, by his desire to replace the Peripatetic philosophy as 
a complete and comprehensive system).’49 
I hesitate to endorse this assessment whole-heartedly: it is surely implausible 
that Descartes ever meant to claim an ability to explain thought in terms of the 
principles ‘which are found in all bodies’. He might well have believed that he could 
explain sensations in these terms, but if so that might be because he took sensations to 
fall on the physical side of the mind/matter divide50 – not because he took mind to be 
encompassed by mechanically explicable nature. 
Nadler’s suggestion that Descartes’ proscription of the scope of mechanistic 
explanation represents a failure on his own terms is, then, unconvincing. Hampshire 
perhaps makes a more plausible case for a similar thesis: that Descartes and Spinoza 
were engaged in a common project, but that Spinoza managed to take it further than 
his predecessor. Hampshire writes: 
 
[a]fter Descartes had taken the first great step within natural philosophy towards a unitary 
physics by breaking down the Aristotelian division of the world into natural kinds, 
Spinoza took an equally large step towards the project of a single system of organized 
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knowledge when he challenged the last remaining division of reality into two irreducibly 
separate compartments.51 
 
This is troublesomely ambiguous: are the quest for a unitary physics and that for a 
single system of knowledge supposed to be one and the same project? If not, is 
Descartes nonetheless presumed to subscribe to the latter? One might question, too, 
whether a ‘single system of organised knowledge’ would be obliged to offer only a 
single type of explanation – mathematical or mechanical – for all phenomena. 
Nonetheless, Henry Allison gives (perhaps slightly tentative) support for the view that 
Descartes did hold the ambition of producing a single system of knowledge, and one 
with a single explanatory principle – and did fail to achieve that: ‘the dream of a 
unified science, which would include a science of man in one universally applicable 
system of explanation, which was already at least suggested by Descartes’s idea of a 
universal mathematics, remained unfulfilled.’52 Again, I suspect that a defender could 
plausibly respond that Descartes never intended to offer a univocal explanation for 
both thought and extension. 
1.4.3 b) 
In my view, the limited nature of Descartes’ commitment to rationalism is 
indicated not so much by his failure to subsume all of reality under a single 
explanatory principle as by his failure to offer any real explanation at all for certain 
aspects of reality. In particular, Descartes fails through his inability to explain the 
relationship between mind and matter. Hampshire writes that, for Descartes ‘[i]t is a 
fact that changes in the world of thought produce, or lead to, changes in extended 
things… [b]ut… the connection between the two realms remains… impenetrable to 
our reason.’53 Hampshire goes on to note that Descartes met the difficulty of apparent 
causal interaction between two distinct substances ‘partly by a rather lame appeal to a 
special hypothesis in physiology, partly by accepting the causal relation between the 
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world of thought and the world of extended things as a mystery which cannot in 
principle be made entirely intelligible to human reason.’54 Descartes leaves us with an 
unhappy combination of the perhaps rather half-hearted, and certainly unconvincing, 
‘pineal gland’ solution and a shrinking from offering any solution at all. 
Allison makes a similar assessment to Hampshire, pointing out that Descartes 
had, indeed, a more general tendency ‘to resolve any conflicts between faith and 
science or philosophy by assigning them to different realms and claiming that the 
sacred truths of the former are beyond the capacity of human reason’.55 This was, of 
course, anathema to Spinoza, a crusading rationalist and debunker of (religious) 
superstition. Allison concurs: ‘in opposition to the Cartesian appeal to the limits of 
knowledge, an appeal that was undoubtedly motivated by theological considerations, 
Spinoza affirms an absolute rationalism.’56 Hampshire draws a parallel contrast 
between the scope of Spinoza’s rationalism and that of Descartes: ‘Spinoza, a 
rationalist without reservation, allowed no appeals to God’s inscrutable will or to 
theological mysteries in the design of his metaphysics.’57 
 Thus one can perhaps level a general criticism – supported by the particular 
case of inter-substance causality – at Descartes: that his rationalist project, unlike 
Spinoza’s, is constrained by his inability or refusal to offer an explanation for certain 
aspects of our experience, referring the reader instead to faith or the inscrutable will 
of God. This seems to have been a criticism that Spinoza himself felt to be apposite, 
his friend Meyer stressing, in his preface to Spinoza’s Principles of Cartesian 
Philosophy, the contrast between the two philosophers on this point: 
 
that this or that surpasses human understanding, must be taken… as giving only Descartes’ 
opinion. This must not be regarded as expressing our Author’s own view. All such things, 
he holds, and many others even more sublime and subtle, can not only be conceived by us 
clearly and distinctly but can also be explained quite satisfactorily.58 
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We have seen, then, that Spinoza offers what I have called an ‘embedded-self’ 
account of human beings, characterising them as being physical as much as they are 
mental creatures and as thoroughly integrated into reality at large. He does this by 
rejecting Descartes’ dualism, while nonetheless eschewing materialism. I have 
argued, too, that his approach holds a number of advantages over its Cartesian 
predecessor – in particular, it allows him to avoid the problem of interaction and its 
corollaries and to present a more complete and consistent explanation of reality, in 
accordance with his thoroughgoing rationalism.  
 
2. SCHOPENHAUER’S EMBEDDEDNESS THESIS 
 
2.1 The Schopenhauerian Self 
 
If parallelism and materialism do indeed constitute two distinct alternatives to 
Cartesian dualism, surely the most celebrated fourth option is idealism. And it is 
precisely Schopenhauer’s claimed allegiance to Kantian transcendental idealism that 
seems to preclude his being an embedded-self theorist. 
Schopenhauer holds that the world of objects is governed by the principle of 
sufficient reason and that this is supplied by the knowing subject. He writes in The 
World As Will and Representation that ‘the essential, and hence universal, forms of 
every object, namely space, time, and causality… reside a priori in our 
consciousness.’59 The objective world is unvaryingly law-governed: ‘[t]he whole 
content of nature, the sum-total of her phenomena, is absolutely necessary’,60 and this 
invariancy ‘follows from the unrestricted and absolute validity of the principle of 
sufficient reason’.61 But the forms of this principle, to repeat, reside in the mind of the 
subject, so that the knowing self is not subject to but the provider of that law. 
Moreover, Schopenhauer’s idealist position – that ‘[e]verything that in any way 
belongs and can belong to the world… exists only for the subject’ which ‘is 
accordingly the supporter of the world’62 – seems to suggest a self that is external to 
the world. Schopenhauer, then, appears to uphold two of the claims for human minds 
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rejected by Spinoza: that they are immune to the laws that govern the rest of nature 
and that they differ from it at a fundamental metaphysical level. 
Schopenhauer’s subject, then, must at least be exceptional – it is ‘[t]hat which 
knows all things and is known by none’63 – but also appears to be ontologically 
divided from and prior to the rest of nature. I will argue, however, that he nonetheless 
shares Spinoza’s embeddedness thesis. For one thing, the human individual is not 
identical with the knowing subject (we have been considering the latter until now). 
Like Spinoza, Schopenhauer insists that we are body as much as mind, and the human 
body – like any other object – is utterly bound by the forms of the principle of 
sufficient reason (‘this body is nevertheless an object among objects, consequently is 
liable to the laws of this objective corporeal world.’).64 
 That the human individual is continuous with the remainder of reality 
according to Schopenhauer’s philosophy remains unproven, however. The knowing 
subject may not exhaust the human self, but unless it is shown to abide by the same 
laws and exist in the same metaphysical realm as nature more generally then any 
individual of which it is a part remains aberrant. 
The suggestion that, for Schopenhauer, the knowing subject is ontologically 
prior to the objective world can, at least, be quashed. As Günter Zöller argues, ‘the 
relation between the subject and any and all of the objects which are subject to the 
principle [of sufficient reason] is not a relationship of one-sided dependence but a 
correlation in which none of the members can be what it is without the other ones.’65 
Schopenhauer’s claim is that subject and object are equiprimordial poles of the world 
as representation: ‘these halves are inseparable even in thought,’ he writes, ‘each 
exists with the other and vanishes with it.’66 But is the self as knowing subject 
ontologically homogenous, as it is for Spinoza? 
For Schopenhauer, the world in itself is will, from which the knowing subject 
is derived and to which it is subservient.67 In §27 of The World as Will and 
Representation we discover that ‘knowledge… proceeds originally from the will’ and 
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that ‘destined originally to serve the will for the achievement of its aims, knowledge 
remains almost throughout entirely subordinate to its service’.68 The will’s character 
is of striving, it ‘always strives, because striving is its sole nature’.69 In the context of 
a discussion of striving as the nature of the will, Schopenhauer lists various capacities 
which constitute means for the will’s phenomena to pursue such goals as nutrition and 
the continuation of the species; among these, ‘knowledge enters as an expedient’.70  
So the knowledge with whose appearance ‘the world as representation now stands out 
at one stroke’71 – that is, the knowing subject – is nonetheless both an instantiation of 
the Will and one more instrument of its striving. 
 This aspect of the human self too is, then, ultimately part of nature and bound 
by its ‘laws’. It is not included among the phenomena of the world as representation 
but rather is its necessary correlate, and is not subject to its laws. It does, however, 
seem to be one among many instantiations of the will, which is the world in itself,72 
and to conform to its striving nature. 
Indeed, for Schopenhauer the essence of the world – that is, the endlessly 
striving will – is recognised by extrapolating from ourselves as willing beings. In 
explaining this, Schopenhauer employs the kind of distinction between a scientific 
and a subjective attention to one’s own body that we saw Naomi Scheman identify as 
key to the work of certain contemporary feminist philosophers. According to 
Schopenhauer, when an individual considers himself as representation – his body as 
just one more object – he sees ‘his conduct follow on presented motives with the 
constancy of a law of nature’ but can have no understanding of how those motives are 
able to influence him.73 For Schopenhauer, ‘the answer to the riddle is given to the 
subject of knowledge appearing as individual, and this answer is given in the word 
Will. This and this alone gives him the key to his own phenomenon’.74 Because 
‘[e]very true act of his will is also at once and inevitably a movement of his body’, the 
subject has an insight into the ‘inner mechanism of… his actions, his movements’ 
which he would otherwise be aware of only as representation.75  
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The rest of nature is equally mysterious: ‘even the most perfect etiological 
explanation of the whole of nature would never be more in reality than a record of 
inexplicable forces… the inner nature of… [which] was always bound to be left 
unexplained by etiology, which had to stop at the phenomenon’.76 According to 
Schopenhauer, this problem can only be resolved by using ‘the double knowledge 
which we have of the nature and action of our own body… as a key to the inner being 
of every phenomenon in nature’.77 In fact, if other objects are to have any reality at all 
– beyond ‘their existence as the subject’s representation’ – then it must be as 
instantiations of will, because ‘[b]esides the will and the representation, there is 
absolutely nothing known or conceivable for us.’78 Thus to render the rest of nature 
explicable, and even to grant its existence independent of our representations, we 
must assume that its inner nature is the same as our own – after all, other than 
representations, will is the only thing of which we are aware. 
For Schopenhauer, then, everything that exists is an instantiation of the will. 
Far from comprising exceptions to this, humans represent the paradigm case on the 
basis of which alone we can recognise will as the essence of everything else. Thus he 
writes: 
 
the will is thing-in-itself… the innermost essence, the kernel, of every particular 
thing and also of the whole. It appears in every blindly acting force of nature, and 
also in the deliberate conduct of man, and the great difference between the two 
concerns only the degree of the manifestation, not the inner nature of what is 
manifested.79 
 
 Schopenhauer’s position can be summarised as follows. Human selves are bodily 
as much as they are mental, and our bodies are bound by the forms governing all 
phenomena. The intellect, like phenomena, emerges from and serves the will. I 
am, in essence, a willing being and as such a microcosm of the world whose 
essence is also will. Schopenhauer, then, is an embedded-self theorist. 
 
2.2 Materialism Avoided 
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 Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, like Spinoza’s, may invite a materialist 
misreading. For one thing, he writes that there is no substance other than matter.80 For 
another, as we have seen, Schopenhauer holds that the intellect is emergent from and 
subservient to the will: ‘as a rule, knowledge remains subordinate to the service of the 
will, as indeed it came into being for this service; in fact, it sprang from the will, so to 
speak, as the head from the trunk.’81 And again, he holds that that it is via our 
embodiment that we recognise our own inner nature, and – by inference – that of 
everything else, as will. It is the body that Schopenhauer says is given to us as will – 
the body is concretized will. It seems, then, that my will is to be identified with my 
body: ‘[t]his body itself is only concrete willing’, Schopenhauer insists, ‘[t]he act of 
will and the action of the body… are one and the same thing’.82 
Nonetheless, Schopenhauer, explicitly rejects materialism, referring to its 
‘fundamental absurdity’.83 In Christopher Janaway’s gloss on Schopenhauer’s 
pronouncement ‘materialism starts by removing conscious subjectivity from its 
picture and can never work its way back to including it.’84 How, then, are we to 
understand the claims about matter, mind, will and body cited above? As regards the 
first, Schopenhauer’s statement about matter being the only substance is in fact 
intended only to make an anti-dualist point. The concept of substance, he suggests, is 
abstracted from that of matter because it gives the impression of being a more general 
term, purely in order that ‘the second ungenuine subspecies’ immaterial substance can 
be ‘surreptitiously’ introduced: the ‘concept was formed solely to take up this 
secondary species.’85 To call matter a substance adds nothing to our concept of it. 
‘Strictly speaking,’ indeed, ‘the concept of substance must be entirely rejected, and 
that of matter be everywhere put in its place.’86 Schopenhauer, then, is not making 
any positive point in calling matter the only substance – certainly not that matter 
exhausts reality or that ultimate metaphysical reality is material. 
But if my will and body are identical, is it then my body from which my mind 
emerges and to which it is subservient? Clearly not: matter, for Schopenhauer, is 
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causality and arises through the combination of time and space.87 Matter, then, 
presupposes the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, which are provided by the 
knowing subject; ‘all causality, hence all matter… is only for the understanding, 
through the understanding, in the understanding.’88 Thus there can be no matter 
without intellect, and  
 
the fundamental absurdity of materialism consists in the fact that it starts from the 
objective… in order to let organic nature and finally the knowing subject emerge from it, 
and thus completely to explain these; whereas in truth everything objective is already 
conditioned as such in manifold ways by the knowing subject with the forms of its 
knowing, and presupposes these forms; consequently it wholly disappears when the 
subject is thought away.89 
 
It is therefore clear that it cannot be my body (considered as a material object) 
from which my intellect springs. While it is true that my will is objectified (precisely 
by my intellect!) as my body, in as much as it is that from which my intellect 
emerges, my will must be something ontologically prior to matter as well as mind. In 
fact the materiality of my body is precisely that which differentiates it from my will’s 
inner nature: body is concretized, objectified will ‘i.e., will that has become 
representation.’90 
In this my own will is utterly continuous with the will itself: just as mind and 
matter emerge from the will, my body and mind instantiate the striving of my will. At 
the level of the willing self, then, I am fully embedded in reality as a whole. (And it is 
surely not matter but the ontologically prior will – as ultimate metaphysical reality of 
which mind and matter are expressions, and outside of which there is nothing – that 
best bears comparison with Spinoza’s substance). 
 
2.3 Ethics and the Embedded Self 
 
I have argued that Schopenhauer and Spinoza share an embedded-self thesis 
without, in either case, subscribing to materialism. The thesis plays an equivalent 
systematic role in the philosophy of each thinker, emerging out of a monist 
metaphysics and bearing fruit in a similar ethics. Indeed I would suggest that the 
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concordance between Schopenhauer and Spinoza which I have been discussing is to a 
surprising extent carried over into their respective ethical positions. One might 
otherwise have expected these to diverge radically due to the weight Schopenhauer 
assigns to Kantian noumenal freedom – a notion that is clearly unavailable to Spinoza. 
For both philosophers, however, right actions are informed by an understanding of 
one’s status as thoroughly intertwined with the world as such. Thus Spinoza contends 
that when we recognise that a person who has injured us is not a free agent in the 
Cartesian sense but one link in a causal chain, our hatred of them will be replaced by a 
sense of understanding. Similarly, the realisation that, as finite modes, we are 
dependent on other modes of like nature for the achievement of our own ends – and in 
particular the recognition of our being situated in a social network of other human 
beings – will lead us to cooperate and display benevolence. As for Schopenhauer, the 
three basic elements of character, on his view, are malice, egoism and compassion. In 
those for whom compassion dominates, it does so on the basis of an innate 
understanding of reality that is more adequate than the world-view possessed by those 
who are predominantly malicious or self-seeking. The compassionate person 
recognises that the distinction between individuals is merely phenomenal; at the level 
of ultimate reality self is utterly indistinguishable: I am really as much you as I am 
me. But if perpetrator and victim are, in reality, one, then to hurt another is to hurt 
myself. Compassion, then, is the enactment of a world-view that sees through 
phenomenal individuation to the undifferentiated Will. 
 Just as strikingly, for each philosopher knowledge of the unity of nature and 
one’s own embeddedness is crucial to the greatest good that an individual can 
achieve. In Spinoza’s case, our highest blessedness – the intellectual love of God – 
just consists in the pleasure emergent from understanding the structure of substance as 
it really is (including, necessarily, our own place within it). The one mode of being 
that Schopenhauer ranks more highly than compassion is asceticism. Like 
compassion, asceticism is premised on seeing through the world as representation to 
the will in itself, the difference being that for the ascetic the knowledge that 
individuation is alien to ultimate reality is supplemented by an awareness that 
suffering is essential to life. 
 
2.4 Differences from Kant 
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 I have suggested that Spinoza’s account of the self as embodied and embedded 
was forged in response to the comparatively isolated self envisioned by Descartes. 
While Schopenhauer, too, is taken by Zöller and others to be offering an alternative to 
a Cartesian picture of the self, it is not so much Descartes’ philosophical legacy as 
that of Kant that makes Schopenhauer’s embeddedness thesis remarkable. His 
subscription to this thesis is one indication that Schopenhauer is a Kantian only to a 
certain point. 
Kant’s critical project puts epistemology centre-stage: philosophy is merely 
dogmatic where it fails to investigate the tools on which it relies – reason, in 
particular. With this much, Schopenhauer is in accord. What he seems to dispute is 
the scope of the prohibition which Kant’s investigations in the Critique of Pure 
Reason impose upon metaphysics. For Kant, all transcendent metaphysics is 
demonstrably illegitimate, the ‘antinomies’ indicating the fate of reason when it 
attempts to overreach its bounds (which coincide with the limits of experience – 
Sebastian Gardner comments that Kant indicates in the Preface that the Critique’s 
‘verdict will be, simply, that reason is competent to know things lying within the 
bounds of experience, but not to know anything lying outside them.’).91 
Schopenhauer, however, is to be found maintaining – to take three examples – that the 
world in itself is will, that there exist Platonic Ideas of which all individual things are 
manifestations and that each human self is the possessor of an intelligible character, a 
free act of will outside of time. Each of these is a claim to knowledge that exceeds the 
limits of possible experience as understood by Kant: that which comes to us in the 
spatio-temporal forms of intuition and is organised by the categories. 
It is precisely Schopenhauer’s transgression of the limits set for knowledge by 
the Critique of Pure Reason which allows him to offer an embedded-self theory in the 
style of Spinoza. In so far as he remains faithful to (his own understanding of) Kant’s 
picture, Schopenhauer can offer the following account of the self. 1. My self as 
experienced as one phenomenon among many – my body viewed objectively – is 
perfectly continuous with other objects of experience. 2. The knowing self which 
transcendental philosophy reveals me to be, though, the subject who organises such 
experience under the principle of sufficient reason, is necessarily other to its 
phenomenal objects. But for Schopenhauer, nonetheless, human selves are continuous 
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with reality at large – because we are willing selves and the world in itself is will.  
Thus Schopenhauer’s embedded-self thesis depends on his metaphysical claims about 
the ultimate, perhaps the noumenal, natures of self and world. It is, then, the return to 
metaphysics in Schopenhauer’s philosophy – that most often remarked of his 
departures from Kant – that makes possible his commitment to the embedded-self 
thesis. 
What warrants this departure? If Schopenhauer is taken to be more 
metaphysically ambitious than Kant – perhaps even to claim to know the character of 
the thing-in-itself – then one might well imagine that this is due to a return to 
rationalism in his philosophy. Rationalist confidence in the ability of reason to discern 
the structures of reality – in the human mind’s attunement to those structures – might 
even seem to be a prerequisite for a metaphysician. Systems of metaphysics are, of 
course, largely associated with rationalist philosophy – not least by Kant, who 
comments that ‘metaphysics is a completely isolated speculative science of reason, 
which… rests on concepts alone’92 Loosely, metaphysics concerns that which 
transcends experience, so one should not expect one’s empirical findings to be able to 
furnish a metaphysics. A little more technically, Kantian experience is structured by a 
priori forms, so we cannot expect experience to be able to elucidate the character of 
the reality behind those structures – rationalism, then, may seem to be the only 
possible route via which to come by a metaphysics. 
So there’s a reason to think a metaphysician would be a rationalist – can there 
be any reason to believe Schopenhauer could be plausibly characterised as such? 
Possibly so, picking up on a hint from Frederick Beiser, who suggests that the return 
to metaphysics in much of post-Kantian German Idealism might be founded precisely 
on a Spinozist brand of rationalism. Beiser’s contention is that the more 
metaphysically-inclined Absolute Idealist successors of Kant differ crucially from 
him in what they understand by the term ‘idealism’: not that reality is dependent on a 
knowing subject but that it is a manifestation of the ideal, conforming to a rational 
archetype. This, then, is a model of idealism which is compatible not only with 
rationalism but also with realism – in this spirit, Schlegel is able to name Spinoza, 
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both a rationalist and a realist, ‘the highest idealist’.93 Schopenhauer’s own idealism 
is, surely, circumscribed in a way that Kant wouldn’t countenance.94 Refusing to stop 
at the claim ‘the world is my idea’ he proceeds to inform us that the world in itself is 
will, within which the self – which supports the world as idea – is embedded. In other 
words, like the Absolute Idealist followers of Spinoza cited by Beiser, Schopenhauer 
posits a reality which is ontologically prior to the idealist structure which he, 
following Kant, identifies. One might, therefore, be tempted to make a case for 
Schopenhauer’s confidence in positing a world as will underlying representation as 
being similarly grounded in a return to a Spinozist rationalism. 
I am committed to the claim that Schopenhauer, like Spinoza, insists that the 
human self is thoroughly integrated into reality at large. I have also argued that his 
subscription to this embedded-self thesis depends on Schopenhauer’s comparative 
metaphysical boldness, his transgression of the Kantian limits on knowledge. I am 
not, however, convinced that this re-emergence of metaphysics is explained by a 
return to rationalism in his thought. It might seem plausible that if Schopenhauer 
differs from Kant in subscribing to a Spinozan thesis, that would be explained by his 
adopting a more Spinozist method than Kant. Equally, that if Schopenhauer mirrors 
his near-contemporaries and compatriots the Absolute Idealists in being more 
metaphysically bold than Kant, that would be explained in his case too by a return to a 
Spinozist style of rationalism. But Schopenhauer, of course, would strongly object to 
being lumped together with his fellow post-Kantian thinkers, and while he might 
share their realism – something that Zöller attributes to Schopenhauer in common 
with Fichte and Schelling – it would be a mistake to think that he shares the 
rationalism that Beiser sees in them.95 His own realism has a different underpinning. 
In fact, Paul Guyer has convincingly demonstrated that it is specifically an empiricist 
twist that Kantian transcendental philosophy receives in Schopenhauer’s work.96 
Guyer points out that Schopenhauer rejects transcendental argumentation as a 
methodology, claiming instead that we discover space, time and causality to be 
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universal features of experience through direct scrutiny. And more generally, that 
philosophy, for Schopenhauer, ‘begins in perception, and essentially consists in 
giving abstract and ‘contracted’ expression to the most salient features of 
perception.’97 Borrowing a term from Merleau-Ponty, Guyer judges that ‘the 
“primacy of perception” is the basis for Schopenhauer’s positive philosophy as well 
as his critique of Kant.’98 
It is this empiricism, I would suggest, which presents Schopenhauer with 
options unavailable to Kant, sanctioning his transgression of the First Critique’s 
epistemological limits. We can, I think, identify three reasons for Schopenhauer’s 
faith in perception’s ability to offer metaphysical insight. First, and this is a point 
which Guyer emphasises, Schopenhauer contends that with his insistence that there 
can be no experience where the understanding is not involved, Kant ‘has burdened the 
understanding with an impossibility merely in order to have less need of sensibility’.99 
But if unaided sensibility or perception does more work than Kant gives it credit for, 
we can have a greater degree of confidence than Kant does in the informative nature 
of straightforwardly perceptual experiences (aesthetic experiences, for instance, being 
metaphysically informative despite being non-conceptual).100 
Second, for Kant, experience comes in spatio-temporal form but is also 
subsumed under concepts by the understanding. For Schopenhauer, concepts are not 
part of the furniture of experience but subsequent abstractions drawn from it by 
reason. Schopenhauerian experience is therefore subject to less a priori clutter than its 
Kantian counterpart, offering an account of reality comparatively free from moulding 
by subjective forms. Again, this alternative account of conceptualisation is one of 
Schopenhauer’s empiricist divergences from Kant which Guyer lists – I would simply 
add that it might well play a role in accounting for Schopenhauer’s comparative 
enthusiasm towards metaphysics. If experience is less veiled by subjective forms than 
Kant took it to be, we can put greater faith in its ability to tell us about the true nature 
of reality. 
Third, one could perhaps argue that, with his description of immediate bodily 
awareness of oneself as willing in Book 2, Schopenhauer indicates an entirely new 
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source of knowledge – itself perceptual – which is not recognised by Kant. If so, he 
can avoid the previously mentioned dilemma of either remaining within the 
knowledge internal to spatio-temporally and conceptually formed experience (never 
being able to make any substantive claims about that which underlies representation) 
or falling back on a rationalist faith in some kind of congruence between the structure 
of reality itself and that of reason. In other words, one could make metaphysical 
claims about self and world without transgressing the experiential limits Kant sets for 
knowledge. On this reading of Schopenhauer, reason and phenomenal experience are 
not the only sources of knowledge: there is also inner experience – direct, bodily 
awareness which is not moulded according to the a priori forms and can thus be relied 
upon to reveal things as they are in themselves.101 
One might deny that inner experience is supposed to constitute a wholly new 
kind of knowledge which is entirely free from what I referred to as the clutter of a 
priori forms – one might, for instance, as Sandra Shapshay does, take the view that it 
remains temporal. But nonetheless there are types of experience for Schopenhauer 
(aesthetic experience alongside inner intuition) which, in comparison to ordinary 
phenomenal experience are relatively uncontaminated by subjective forms of 
experience and thus able to present a less veiled picture of reality.102 This, then, is the 
third reason I would adduce for Schopenhauer’s faith in empiricism as a conduit for 
the return of metaphysics. 
 
2.5 Embeddedness: Differences in Routes and Detail 
 
Before finishing by indicating one or two differences in detail between 
Schopenhauer’s embedded-self thesis and that of Spinoza, it is worthwhile to draw 
out one consequence of the preceding discussion which may also tempt one to query 
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whether it can really be quite the same thesis to which the two are subscribing. This 
worry concerns the different – indeed opposite – routes by which each reaches the 
thesis. One might say Spinoza derives the self from his monist metaphysics. In 
starting by defining substance and ascertaining that it must be unique, Spinoza cannot 
but conclude – when he moves on to investigate the human self – that it must be 
embedded in the world at large. By contrast, it is the bodily awareness of oneself as a 
willing being that Schopenhauer takes as his starting point and he uses this as a key to 
understand reality as a whole. Again, it is inevitable that the human self will be 
consonant with the rest of nature, but the direction of explanation is reversed. 
Perhaps this contrast is inevitable given the one’s rationalism and the other’s 
empiricism, but I do think the point that, in formulating their views of the self, 
Spinoza is responding primarily to Descartes, Schopenhauer to Kant, can be 
overstated. As I have noted, such commentators as Günther Zöller and Severin 
Schroeder claim Schopenhauer’s philosophy as the first real alternative to the 
Cartesian theory of self. While I have disputed that in this chapter, citing Spinoza as 
an earlier deviator, it does at least suggest that Schopenhauer too may well have had 
Descartes in mind as an opponent. But there is a specifically Kantian challenge for 
Schopenhauer in arriving at an embedded-self thesis: the restriction placed on the 
scope of knowledge by the Critique of Pure Reason. Schopenhauer is able to offer an 
embedded-self thesis because he is willing to make the kind of metaphysical claims 
about self and world that Kant disallows himself. (The early Schopenhauer 
embedding the idealist structure he inherits from Kant itself into a picture of reality as 
such as will).103 Attributing this metaphysical confidence, in Schopenhauer’s case, to 
the kind of return to a Spinozist rationalism that Beiser sees in some of 
Schopenhauer’s contemporaries strikes me as implausible. A more credible defence, I 
think, can be built on Guyer’s characterisation of Schopenhauer as a thorough-going 
empiricist: as having more faith than Kant does in what experience can tell us. If 
Schopenhauer was persuaded, for the reasons adduced in the previous section, that 
there were at least forms of experience which could convey metaphysical truths, then 
he could make those claims about self and world which ground his embeddedness 
thesis without appealing to any non-experiential source of knowledge. All knowledge 
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comes through experience, yes; all experience is moulded by the forms of intuition 
and the categories, no. Ordinary experience is non-conceptual; aesthetic experience 
and inner bodily awareness are subject to fewer forms still and so are more 
informative about reality as such. It is, perhaps ironically, his being – as Guyer has 
argued – a more enthusiastic empiricist than Kant that ultimately allows 
Schopenhauer to subscribe to a Spinozist-style embedded-self thesis. 
 Spinoza and Schopenhauer, then, differ regarding the route by which each 
arrives at the embedded-self thesis. Spinoza is reacting against the Cartesian image of 
the self as a kingdom within a kingdom – Schopenhauer may well be doing the same, 
but he must also be reneging somewhat on Kant’s idealist picture of the self. Spinoza 
is a rationalist for whom the self’s embeddedness follows from the uniformity of (the 
laws of) nature, Schopenhauer an empiricist for whom we identify the inner nature of 
the world via an immediate awareness of the self’s inner nature. But there are 
differences, too, in terms of the precise content of the embedded-self thesis to which 
each subscribes. The similarities between Schopenhauer and Spinoza here can be 
summarized as follows. Individual minds and bodies are expressions of an underlying 
metaphysical reality. Because of this, human individuals as body and mind are 
consonant with the rest of reality.104 Dualism is rejected while avoiding reductive 
materialism. However, differences remain. While Spinoza’s attributes are ubiquitous 
and eternal, mind and matter appear to be more patchy for Schopenhauer in two ways. 
First, there is an asymmetry between intellect and matter. While every physical thing, 
as object, requires a mental pole, not everything expressed physically also has a 
mental expression – just one mind is sufficient to establish the entire objective world, 
and in fact there are far fewer minds than bodies in reality. Schopenhauer, then, does 
not subscribe to panpsychism. 
The second departure looks more problematic for Schopenhauer. His 
evolutionary account suggests that the world as representation emerges at a particular 
time: once the will expresses itself as a creature with knowledge, the whole world of 
individuated bodies appears at a stroke. If creatures with minds evolved, they must 
have had predecessors. But time, as one of the forms of the principle of sufficient 
reason, only appears with the first intellect, the will in itself being atemporal. Equally, 
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the evolutionary account seems to presuppose the existence of individuals prior to any 
knowing subject, even though individuation is supposedly foreign to the will in itself. 
Schopenhauer addresses this seeming inconsistency in Section 7 of The World as Will 
and Representation, explaining that ‘time with its whole infinity in both directions is 
also present in the first knowledge’ and that ‘the phenomenon filling this first present 
appears as the effect of previous states filling [the] past according to the law of 
causality.’105 The elusive, and perhaps ultimately unsatisfactory claim is that the 
individuals from which the first knowing beings emerged – to which they were of 
course causally connected – along with the past that houses them were retrospectively 
brought into being with the first instance of knowledge. 
To conclude briefly, Schopenhauer follows Spinoza in offering an embedded-
self thesis according to which human beings are material as much as they are mental 
and are enmeshed in reality as such. This picture has definite advantages over the 
(Cartesian) standard model of the human self and can be maintained whilst rejecting 
materialism. It is not, however, a return to Spinozan rationalism which allows 
Schopenhauer to uphold this thesis in the face of his professed Kantianism, but rather 
his own unique brand of empiricism. Indeed, the routes by which Schopenhauer and 
Spinoza reach the embedded-self thesis are quite different, and there are, too, some 
differences in the precise nature of the embedded-self thesis to which the two thinkers 
subscribe. Both, though, are left with a common problem: how to account for 
individuation in a way that is compatible with monism and the embedded-self thesis. I 
turn to this in the next chapter, arguing that the two thinkers tackle the problem in 
parallel ways and that there are resources within Spinoza’s philosophy and its 
attendant scholarship which can help us to read Schopenhauer’s own solution in a 
more careful and charitable way. 
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Individuation 
 
 
For Spinoza, reality is substance; for Schopenhauer, it is will. For each, any 
human being is thoroughly enmeshed in that metaphysical stuff (and the possession of 
a mind doesn’t alter that). This raises the question of what it is that is distinctive of 
human beings such that we can distinguish them from other kinds of thing. More 
generally, how can we identify different species or types of thing? Most generally of 
all, Schopenhauer and Spinoza may seem to owe us an explanation of individuation as 
such – of what it is that refracts univocal being into separate entities. 
Given embeddedness, then, the challenge of individuation arises. In this chapter 
I will investigate the solutions Schopenhauer and Spinoza offer to this shared 
challenge. I will set out Schopenhauer’s account of individuation and the key 
problems it may be said to face, before turning to examine Spinoza’s alternative 
model. Finally, I will investigate the extent of commonalities between the two and 
argue that Spinoza’s theory of individuation offers resources upon which a 
Schopenhauerian could draw in order to counter some of the criticisms raised against 
Schopenhauer’s own account. 
  
1. INDIVIDUATION IN SCHOPENHAUER 
 
1.1 Individuation of the Phenomenal 
 
At the level of phenomena, individuation is easily explained for Schopenhauer. 
The phenomenal is precisely the realm of the individual. Phenomena are, by 
definition, subject to the principium individuationis – it is the forms of that principle 
which produce them. 
Of the world as representation, Schopenhauer tells us in §2 of WWR, ‘one half 
is the object, whose forms are space and time, and through these plurality.’106 
Schopenhauer reiterates this point – that plurality is a function of space and time – 
when discussing the principle of sufficient reason in §23: ‘time and space belong to 
this principle, and consequently plurality as well, which exists and has become 
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possible only through them.’107 It is through the forms of space and time that a 
monistic reality can become a plurality of entities. And this is to say, it is through 
space and time that individuation is possible. ‘In this last respect’, Schopenhauer 
continues, ‘I shall call time and space the principium individuationis’.108 
The world as representation is one of a plurality of phenomenal individuals as a 
result of the workings of the forms of the principle of sufficient reason – space and 
time in particular. Space and time allow for plurality, Schopenhauer explains, because 
they make coexistence and succession possible. This needs both time and space 
together, and their products causation and matter: ‘countless objects coexist, because 
Substance, i.e. Matter, remains permanent in spite of the ceaseless flow of Time, and 
because its states change in spite of the rigid immobility of Space’.109 
For Schopenhauer, then, ‘plurality of the homogeneous becomes possible only 
through time and space’110. Because of the principium individuationis, monism is 
compatible with the multiplicity of the world as we experience it. The will which is 
one appears as innumerable individuals thanks to the imposition by the knowing 
subject of the forms of space and time. The correlative of this is that the Will itself is 
foreign to individuation, as Schopenhauer makes clear in Volume II: ‘beyond the 
phenomenon, in the true being-in-itself of all things… time and space, and therefore 
plurality, must be foreign’111 and reiterates a little later ‘the plurality of things has its 
root in the subject’s manner of knowledge, but is foreign to the thing-in-itself, to the 
inner primary force manifesting itself in things’112. 
This second formulation foregrounds the debt to Kantian transcendental 
idealism in Schopenhauer’s account of individuation. Individual objects are not to be 
found ‘out there’ but instead are produced by knowing subjects. The world of objects 
‘cannot walk into our brain from outside all ready cut and dried through the senses 
and the openings of their organs.’113 Compare Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason 
taking raindrops as an example ‘not only these drops are mere appearances, but even 
their round form, indeed even the space through which they fall are nothing in 
                                                 
107
 Schopenhauer, WWR I, 112. 
108
 Schopenhauer, WWR I, 112. 
109
 Schopenhauer, FR, 33. 
110
 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation Volume II trans. Eric F.J. Payne 
(Toronto: Dover, 1966), 274. 
111
 Schopenhauer, WWR II, 275. 
112
 Schopenhauer, WWR II, 322. 
113
 Schopenhauer, FR, 61. 
 51 
themselves, but only mere modifications… of our sensible intuition’.114 For Kant and 
Schopenhauer alike, the knowing subject is active in producing the objects it 
perceives. One central feature of this Copernican Revolution in philosophy is that the 
structures which individuate objects – space and time and, for Kant, concepts – are 
organisational tools of the knowing subject. 
 Individuation, therefore, is explained by the idealist Schopenhauer as the 
product of the forms of the principle of sufficient reason – specifically, space and time 
– working together. It is, then, the world as representation which is divided up into 
different individuals. The world in itself is foreign to plurality because it is not 
subordinate to the forms of the principle of sufficient reason. When taken together 
with Schopenhauer’s comments on the dream-like and illusory nature of phenomenal 
experience, this may suggest that he believes our common understanding of the world 
as being populated both by separate individuals and by different kinds or species of 
beings to be simply false. ‘[T]here is really only one being’, he writes, ‘the illusion of 
plurality (Maya), resulting from the forms of external, objective apprehension’115. 
This impression may be furthered by the ethical theory of part IV, with Schopenhauer 
depicting the world-view that sees through individuation as more adequate. In fact, 
however, this is not Schopenhauer’s final word on the subject of individuation – there 
is, for him, a way of distinguishing individuals that is truer to and more informative 
about reality. 
 
1.2 Platonic Ideas 
 
Schopenhauer does believe that there is a more adequate way of distinguishing 
types of thing. Human individuals are not merely illusory phenomena and nor are 
species-types. We can distinguish different kinds of things at a more metaphysically 
profound level in virtue of the Platonic Ideas. 
Schopenhauer’s term ‘Platonic Ideas’ refers to ‘[t]hose different grades of the 
will’s objectification, expressed in innumerable individuals, [which] exist as the 
unattained patterns of these, or as the eternal forms of things’116. For Schopenhauer as 
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for Plato, there is an archetype ‘cat’ which is instantiated in the millions of individual 
cats we can experience: this archetype is the Platonic Idea. There is, then, such a thing 
as feline nature – a cat is really different from a dog because each participates in a 
different form or Idea. 
The Platonic Ideas boast a greater degree of reality than phenomenal 
individuals, they more adequately reflect the mind-independent reality of the Will. 
Whilst technically remaining part of the world as representation – they are objects 
known by subjects – they are obscured by fewer mental filters. The forms of space 
and time do not apply to them. 
Schopenhauer’s Platonic Ideas correspond to species rather than to specific 
individuals. The archetypes of species are (at least relatively) real; phenomenal 
creatures are instantiations of them resulting from the imposition of the forms of the 
principle of sufficient reason. Because of this, individuals do not possess the eternity 
and universality of Platonic Ideas and are less adequate objectifications of reality. As 
Hilde Hein puts it in her article ‘Schopenhauer and Platonic Ideas’: ‘only the Idea 
which is depicted in the animal has true being... The individual features, as well as the 
position in space and time of the animal, are of no account.’ So for Hein. ‘while Ideas 
are eminently real, phenomena cannot be claimed to exist fully.’117 
There is one exception to the rule that Platonic Ideas correspond to species 
rather than individuals.118  Each human being, Schopenhauer says, has his or her own 
unique Platonic Idea in the form of an intelligible character.119 This means that by 
adopting (and adapting) the theory of Platonic Ideas, Schopenhauer is able to explain 
how kinds of things differ from each other, how human beings differ from all other 
kinds of things as such and how human beings differ from one another. With regard to 
the first, cats are different from dogs because individual cats partake in or express a 
different Platonic Idea to individual dogs. Human beings differ from other kinds of 
thing because, rather than simply partaking in a species-Idea, each individual 
corresponds to its own Idea. And this in turn grounds a real distinction between one 
human individual and another. The distinction between one cat and another is merely 
phenomenal – a function of space and time. But those between different species kinds, 
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between the species human and all other species taken together and between different 
human individuals are more adequate reflections of reality. 
Platonic Ideas, then, are expressions of species rather than individuals (except in 
the case of human beings). They are not subject to space and time and so are eternal 
and unchanging. Because of this, they are more real than phenomenal individuals – 
they are obscured by fewer forms. Nonetheless, they remain within the form ‘object 
for a subject’ and so are ultimately part of the world as representation rather than the 
world as will.120 
Schopenhauer, then, has a two-level account of individuation. The forms of 
space and time, imposed by the knowing subject, operate as a principium 
individuationis, dividing the phenomenal realm into distinguishable things. But at a 
more profound metaphysical level – in a way that is more truly reflective of the nature 
of reality in itself – beings are individuated in virtue of the Platonic Ideas of which 
they are instantiations. 
 
1.3 Problems with the Platonic Ideas 
 
Schopenhauer’s theory of the Platonic Ideas is one of the most criticised aspects 
of his thought. I turn now to explore some of the problems commentators have 
identified, and the extent to which they can be successfully addressed on 
Schopenhauer’s behalf. 
One point to be considered is whether Schopenhauer’s account of Platonic Ideas 
is able to escape the problems said to afflict Plato’s own version. Most pressing, 
perhaps, is the complaint – dating back to Aristotle – that with the theory of the Forms 
Plato posits a second world which does not help to explain the actual one we inhabit. 
The salient charge, here, is of inventing an excessive ontological category. Hilde Hein 
argues that Schopenhauer can indeed rebut this charge, even if Plato cannot. 
Schopenhauer’s account of Platonic Ideas constitutes a ‘radical departure’ from the 
metaphysical dualism of Plato’s version, according to Hein.121 For Schopenhauer, 
Hein argues, will, Ideas and phenomena are in fact metaphysically the same: ‘[t]here 
are no entities called Ideas, which are metaphysically apart from other aspects of 
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reality.’122 Instead Ideas stand between the other two categories (will and phenomena) 
epistemologically. Hein positions Schopenhauer as closer to his other great 
philosophical influence, Kant, in this respect. Kant’s ‘noumenal and phenomenal 
realms are distinguished only epistemologically’, she contends, ‘Schopenhauer, in his 
concept of the Platonic Idea, adheres to the Kantian monism.’123 This, of course, 
depends on a dual-aspect reading of Kant’s transcendental idealism along the lines of 
that offered by Henry Allison (as opposed to the ‘two-worlds’ account preferred by 
Strawson and Paul Guyer). But if we accept that for Schopenhauer and Kant even the 
noumenal and the phenomenal are not metaphysically discrete entities, then of course 
we cannot characterise Schopenhauer’s Ideas as a third ontological category. 
Is this reading of Schopenhauer’s Platonic Ideas as an epistemological rather 
than an ontological category convincing? Two influential commentators, Christopher 
Janaway and Julian Young, are divided on the subject. Janaway asserts that 
‘Schopenhauer follows Plato in claiming that Ideas exist in reality, independently of 
the subject’ and that ‘Ideas are parts of nature awaiting discovery.’124  On the other 
hand, Young argues that unlike Plato ‘Schopenhauer does not, in fact, treat them as 
things at all.’125 The artist doesn’t perceive ‘the Idea instead of the individual, but 
rather perceives the individual as Idea.’ Indeed, ‘all that is to be found in the world as 
representation are individuals. So, ontologically speaking, the Ideas can only be 
normal individuals.’126 
If we do accept that the Platonic Ideas are only epistemologically, not 
metaphysically, distinct from other representations then we must see any talk of them 
as more real than individual phenomena as misleading. On this model, it is better to 
think of them as more adequate ways of knowing reality – and Schopenhauer does 
indeed describe them as the immediate, adequate objectivity of the will. This 
formulation reemphasises that the world as representation is a manifestation of – not 
distinct from – the will; the Platonic Ideas, too, are ways the will appears to us and 
differ from phenomenal reality in terms of the adequacy of the perspective they give 
on it. 
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Schopenhauer gives us further detail as to their nature when he describes the 
Platonic Ideas as representing different grades of distinctness of the will’s 
manifestation. The idea that they form a hierarchy might itself seem implausible – 
Dale Jacquette calls it ‘reminiscent of pre-Darwinian conceptions of the animal 
kingdom.’127 But a more profound problem concerns how this notion of ‘grades of 
distinctness’ is to be fleshed out. Schopenhauer makes it clear that he does not claim 
that one Idea manifests more will than another: ‘[i]t is not a case of there being a 
smaller part of will in the stone and a larger part in man’,128 in fact ‘the inner being 
itself is present whole and undivided in everything in nature’.129 What he cites is ‘a 
higher degree of this objectification’ and different ‘degrees of visibility’.130 Again, 
this seems to be more of an epistemological than a metaphysical distinction. Just as 
the Platonic Ideas reveal to us more about the inner nature of reality than do ordinary 
phenomena, so the Platonic Idea of man is more revelatory of the will’s character than 
the Idea of a stone. However, with the distinction between phenomena and Platonic 
Ideas in general, this is explained by the fact that the former are obscured by more 
forms than the latter. It isn’t clear that there is an equivalent difference between one 
Idea and another to underpin Schopenhauer’s distinction between them: every Idea is 
subject only to the form object-for-subject. 
Another very familiar criticism of Schopenhauer’s Platonic Ideas is that their 
appearance in his system is merely ad hoc. It may be said that his introduction of the 
Platonic Ideas is more plausibly explained by Schopenhauer’s avowed desire to 
reconcile the thought of his two heroes Kant and Plato than by any philosophical 
necessity. Alternatively, that the Platonic Ideas act as a kind of deus ex machina, 
winched into the World as Will and Representation to cover over gaps or solve 
problems that can’t be resolved by resources proper to the system. 
Both James D. Chansky in ‘Schopenhauer and Platonic Ideas: a Groundwork for 
an Aesthetic Metaphysics’ and G. Steven Neeley in ‘Schopenhauer and the Platonic 
Ideas’131 enumerate commentators who have levelled versions of this criticism at 
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Schopenhauer. Bryan Magee, both note, doubts that the Ideas are necessary to 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy and suggests that they were introduced as an ad hoc 
solution to one particular difficulty that simply ‘got out of hand’.132 D.W. Hamlyn had 
earlier described their introduction into the system as sudden and surprising and as a 
necessary but failed attempt to link the phenomena and the will.133 Each quotes Hilde 
Hein’s assessment that ‘[t]he Ideas play by no means as fundamental a role in the 
philosophy of Schopenhauer as in that of Plato.’134 Finally, Neeley points out Michael 
Fox’s judgement that Schopenhauer’s introduction of the Platonic Ideas is ‘arbitrary 
at best’ and ‘to a large degree responsible for giving his system the appearance of 
being a hybrid that suffers from an inexcusably careless job of grafting.’135 
Christopher Janaway judges that such assessments aren’t entirely fair, pointing 
out that ‘the Ideas were one of the earliest parts of the system to fall into place.’136 
Neeley’s own response to the objections he outlines highlights the different and 
complementary functions of science and philosophy according to Schopenhauer’s 
world-view. Far from being inconsistent with the remainder of his system, ‘Ideas are 
necessary if Schopenhauer is to complete the scientific image of the world’.137 While 
causal scientific explanations must ultimately end in the brute fact of some particular 
inexplicable natural force, philosophy’s aim is to grasp the meaning of these forces. It 
is precisely the job of the Platonic Ideas to ‘describe the action and being of natural 
forces in a manner not open to the sciences’.138 Without them, ‘Schopenhauer could 
not have rendered a full understanding of the world.’139 
Neeley’s emphasis is on the epistemological function of the Ideas. He notes that 
they alone are ‘capable of rendering immanent metaphysical insight’, differentiating 
them from both ordinary empirical and from a priori transcendental sources of 
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knowledge.140 For Neeley, many of the objections to the Ideas fall away when you 
recognise what they are not: ‘[t]he Ideas are neither a metaphysical “half-way house,” 
a “feed-pipe between the noumenon and the world of phenomena,” nor a third 
separate construct of reality’141 (citing the characterisations of Copleston, Magee and 
Magee again respectively). He answers Christopher Janaway’s concern that the Ideas 
‘are supposed to be real, existing in nature prior to perception... the Ideas are thus 
required to repose somewhere between appearance and thing in itself, and it is deeply 
uncertain whether there is any such location for them to occupy’142 by remarking that 
because the Ideas are not spatio-temporal, there can be no genuine question as to 
‘where’ they exist. While this does not seem to me to adequately resolve the question 
of what kind or degree of metaphysical reality pertains to the Platonic Ideas in 
Schopenhauer’s system, it is worth noting that, like Hein as discussed above, Neeley 
offers a deflationary account of the metaphysical role of the Ideas. 
In his attempt to defend Schopenhauer against the criticisms both he and Neeley 
list, James D. Chansky argues that the Platonic Ideas are pivotal to Schopenhauer’s 
system as ‘the proper objects of metaphysical knowledge’.143 In describing the Ideas 
as objects of metaphysical knowledge rather than simply as acts of knowing, it may 
sound as though Chansky pictures them as more metaphysically substantial than Hein 
or Neeley would admit. Nonetheless Neeley is probably right to gloss Chansky’s 
defence of the Ideas as similarly dependent on characterising them as epistemological 
rather than metaphysical cogs in Schopenhauer’s machinery. He writes that 
‘Chansky’s argument… serves to doubly underscore the central importance of the 
Platonic Ideas in Schopenhauer’s philosophy by concentrating somewhat more 
heavily upon the epistemological function they play’.144 What Chansky claims is that 
the Ideas can be seen as naturally arising in Schopenhauer’s project when that project 
is understood to be a ‘subversion of reason and rational metaphysics’ which itself 
emerges from his ‘fusion’ of transcendental idealism with empirical realism.145 
Chansky, I would argue, convinces on the vital contribution of the Platonic 
Ideas to Schopenhauer’s project. As he says, they are fundamental in resolving the 
problem of how we can have a metaphysics that offers genuine insight, going beyond 
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what ordinary experience tells us, but which remains immanent – neither transcendent 
nor even transcendental. This might recall the argument developed in the previous 
chapter, starting from Paul Guyer’s insisentence on the strikingly empiricist twist 
which Schopenhauer puts on transcendental idealism. If Kant has debarred 
transcendent metaphysics and if transcendental idealism can offer no insight into the 
inner essence of things, the only hope is an alternative kind of experience less veiled 
by forms than ordinary phenomenal representation. This is, as I argued there, what 
inner awareness of the self as will offers but also what we gain from aesthetic 
experience. In recognising Platonic Ideas through art works or natural beauties we 
grasp, perceptually rather than conceptually, the essence of things outside (most of) 
the forms of ordinary experience. 
The Ideas do, then, play a crucial role in Schopenhauer’s project when it is 
understood in this way, but Chansky’s response to the other part of the ‘ad hoc’ 
objection is perhaps less clear. Schopenhauer needs the Platonic Ideas, but is he 
entitled to them – are they genuinely immanent to his system or effectively a deus ex 
machina? All Chansky says is that  
 
Schopenhauer is brought quite directly to his way of considering the world 
metaphysically by means of the Ideas by, prior to their introduction into his system, 
having brought about the subversion of reason and rational metaphysics… through 
his fusion of an intensified transcendental idealism with an empirical realism or 
materialism.146 
 
Chansky sees this as distinct from the claim that they allow Schopenhauer to offer a 
new kind of metaphysics. For me, however, it too explains only why the Ideas are 
necessary to Schopenhauer’s project – that is, because rationalist metaphysics must be 
abandoned – and doesn’t give an independent reason to accept their reality. Perhaps 
the focus of the second half of Chansky’s chapter on aesthetic experience hints 
towards one possible answer. Arguably, the evidence for Platonic Ideas as a mode of 
metaphysical insight is empirical. We can be sure that things – individuals, natural 
forces – have graspable essences because we have in fact grasped them in our 
aesthetic experiences. What Schopenhauer says in §37 may well seem to fit with this: 
anyone who couldn’t perceive Ideas at all ‘would have no susceptibility at all to the 
beautiful and the sublime’. Again, ‘[w]e must therefore assume as existing in all men 
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that power of recognizing in things their Ideas... unless indeed there are some who are 
not capable of any aesthetic pleasure at all.’147 
Even if we accept that the Platonic Ideas are not entirely ad hoc, there remains a 
set of questions as to whether Schopenhauer’s picture of them really makes sense on 
his own terms. There may seem to be inconsistencies in his account. In the first place 
Schopenhauer talks of a multiplicity of Ideas but describes them as innocent of the 
forms space and time. The problem, then, is of explaining how there can be a plurality 
of individuals without reference to the principium individuationis. If any given Idea is 
subject only to the form of being object for subject, what differentiates one from 
another?  
A second seeming paradox affects the Platonic Ideas of individual human 
beings in particular. It is crucial to Schopenhauer’s ethical theory that each person has 
an intelligible character, which is, he says, a ‘free act’ of the person concerned. In 
§28, Schopenhauer identifies a person’s specific intelligible character with a Platonic 
Idea.148 One problem may seem to be that it is difficult to see how a Platonic Idea 
could be the sort of thing that could act. Equally, as Christopher Janaway notes, 
Schopenhauer calls a person’s intelligible character ‘a ‘free act’ occurring in the realm 
of the ‘in itself’’, which sounds incompatible with the intelligible character being a 
Platonic Idea – Ideas, after all, being objects. The problem here is both about whether 
a Platonic Idea could be expected to act at all, and about what something which exists 
as a representational object is doing acting in the noumenal realm. In fact, 
Schopenhauer can be defended against this. After stating that ‘the intelligible 
character coincides with the Idea’ he goes on to amend this ‘or more properly with the 
original act of will that reveals itself in the Idea.’149 Nonetheless, the act revealed by 
that Idea remains troublesome. As Janaway argues it is difficult to see how such an 
atemporal act of will can be seen as the act of a particular individual person.150 This 
renders problematic Schopenhauer’s ethical claim that people can be held responsible 
for their acts because they are responsible for their intelligible characters. Equally, 
given that the will is beyond plurality, can Schopenhauer legitimately claim that each 
intelligible character is or reveals a distinct act of will? And yet he maintains that each 
person has his or her own intelligible character and that the Platonic Idea of each 
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species and force of nature is the manifestation ‘of an indivisible act of will that is 
outside of time.’151  
 Hilde Hein points to a third incongruity.152 For Schopenhauer, will is goalless 
– that its striving remains unsatisfied is inherent to it, nature must be imperfect.153 
Schopenhauer, though, seems occasionally to get caught up by the common, non-
technical meaning of ‘ideal’ as betokening perfection, as when he suggests Ideas are 
‘objectives which nature vainly seeks to realize.’154 
Aside from the criticisms that can be levelled at Schopenhauer’s picture of the 
Platonic Ideas, it is worth considering whether or not it really offers what we would 
want from a theory of individuation. One point to note is that while Schopenhauer 
claims that there is a distinct Platonic Idea corresponding to each human individual, 
the same is not true of other things. For everything else, there is only a species-Idea. 
And (unlike Plato) Schopenhauer is explicit that only natural kinds have Ideas. This 
means, then, that particular nonhuman creatures or forces have no individuality at this 
level and nor do manufactured things or even kinds of manufactured things. A 
Schopenhauerian must be satisfied with the distinctions between one cat and another 
and between castles and lipsticks as such being merely phenomenal. Another 
consideration, of course, is that even those distinctions which are founded on Platonic 
Ideas do not pertain to the ultimate level of reality but remain dependent on a 
knowing subject, since – despite what Schopenhauer says about the intelligible 
character – Ideas are objects not will. 
 The Platonic Ideas, then, are central to Schopenhauer’s account of 
individuation but remain a somewhat troublesome element of his system. I believe it 
can indeed be shown that they are crucial to Schopenhauer’s philosophical project. It 
is true, too, that some apparent absurdities melt away when the Ideas are given a more 
epistemological spin, downplaying any claims for them to be a substantial component 
of Schopenhauer’s metaphysical structure. He need not be seen as inventing an, 
excessive, third ontological category when he introduces the Platonic Ideas. This does 
though, in my view, prompt the question as to what precisely the nature and status of 
Platonic Ideas as Schopenhauer conceives them are. It may be that we should see 
them as abstract objects. They are, after all, free from the forms of space and time. 
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Janaway seems to understand them as having at least this degree of reality, but for 
him this leaves Schopenhauer owing an explanation of where they belong 
metaphysically. On the other hand, Young seems to take a nominalist position: an 
Idea is, he says, ‘a merely nominal object’.155 This notion of a ‘nominal object’ may 
seem somewhat contradictory. Possibly what Young is arguing here is not anti-
realism about Platonic Ideas but that they exist in rather than separately to the 
individuals which instantiate them. In other words, he seems to be rejecting a reading 
of Schopenhauer’s Ideas as abstract objects. However, if the Ideas do indeed exist in 
their instantiations that may seem to leave them as concrete entities existing in space 
and time. 
Thus, worries remain and it is not entirely clear how Schopenhauer himself 
means us to understand the Ideas. As discussed, he writes of them as grades of 
distinctness of the will’s objectification, specifying that this does not mean a higher 
grade contains a larger part of the will.156 The question of how we are to flesh out 
what differentiates these grades is perhaps a special case of the general problem of 
how one Platonic Idea is to be distinguished from another given that they are not 
subject to the principium individuationis. And this in turn is one of several puzzles – 
set out above – relating to the exact status Schopenhauer envisages for these vital 
constituents of his account of individuation. With this in mind, I turn now to Spinoza 
to see whether he can offer a more propitious explanation of individuation, before 
offering a comparative analysis of the two accounts. 
 
2. INDIVIDUATION IN SPINOZA 
 
2.1 The Reality of Spinozan Individuals 
 
The one substance, for Spinoza, is divided into different modes. These are 
individuated in virtue of the pattern of motion and rest among parts that is 
characteristic of each. In the light of his embedded-self thesis, the question with 
which I am most concerned here – one that has preoccupied readers of Spinoza from 
the beginning – is that of the degree of reality which he grants to individuals as such. 
It has often been alleged that individuals are effectively swallowed up by substance in 
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Spinoza’s system: that substance is real and modes merely illusory. In this section I 
will argue against the view that modes are simply products of imaginative 
‘knowledge’ – the view that we err in attributing real existence to them. I will suggest 
that recognising that Spinoza has a metaphysical – as well as a physical – account of 
how modes are individuated allows us to explain and understand this. I will also 
briefly address the question of whether Spinoza has an adequate account of personal 
identity in particular. 
According to Lee Rice, ‘Joachim provided perhaps the least ambiguous 
statement of the claim that there is no room for individuals in Spinozism because 
there is but one substance. Individuals, or modes, are thus absorbed; and to speak of 
an individual is to speak from a radically subjective viewpoint.’157 The charge that 
Spinoza’s system is unable to account for real individuation has a pedigree. Yitzhak 
Melamed lists some of the thinkers who have levelled it at Spinoza.158 He quotes 
Maimon’s assertion that ‘[i]n Spinoza’s system the unity is real while the diversity is 
merely ideal’ and notes that Hegel follows Leibniz in identifying Spinoza’s 
metaphysical picture with Eleatic monism in which individuality disappears.159 The 
German Idealists, he reminds us, thought of Spinoza’s attributes as merely subjective, 
time as unreal and modes as fictions – in Hegel’s case, because they (modes) have no 
independent reality. ‘Hence,’ Melamed writes, ‘in the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel 
claims that Spinoza’s substance is a “dark shapeless abyss, so to speak, in which all 
determinate content is swallowed up as radically null and void”.’160 Melamed himself, 
although as we shall see he goes on to defend Spinozan individuals as non-illusory, 
judges that ‘Spinoza’s criteria for the individuality of finite things are indeed very 
weak’.161 
Marx Wartofsky also remarks the long history of the objection that Spinoza has 
difficulty in providing a true account of individuation. He notes that correspondents 
such as Tschirnhausen and Oldenburg raised it with Spinoza himself. For Wartofsky 
and the contemporaries of Spinoza he cites, the problem is posed as one of a 
contradiction between the simplicity and indivisibility of substance and the claimed 
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real existence of finite individuals.162 In ‘Spinoza’s metaphysics’ Jonathan Bennett 
reminds us that ordinary finite bodies are not parts but modes of substance, for 
Spinoza.163 His extremely influential take on the nature of modes arguably gives more 
bite to the criticism that individuals have no real existence in Spinoza’s system. 
Bennett takes a blush as his paradigm example of a mode – something that is not so 
much a thing in its own right as a quality of something else. For Bennett’s Spinoza, 
individuals are not the primary units of explanation. Rather than saying that a pebble 
exists in a certain region of space (and has spatial relationships with other bodies), 
one should instead say that a certain region (temporarily) has a ‘pebbly’ quality.164 
Thus substance is the primary entity of Spinoza’s metaphysics, substance is 
indivisible, any finite existents are merely qualities of some particular region of that 
substance. 
The line of criticism under discussion most obviously develops as a response to 
some of Spinoza’s claims in the first part of the Ethics, in particular on this question 
of modes and the divisibility of substance. At IP15S, he writes that parts of matter 
‘are distinguished only modally, but not really’ and that Nature’s parts ‘cannot be 
really distinguished, that is, that corporeal substance, insofar as it is a substance, 
cannot be divided.’ (This is based on IP13 which states that ‘[a] substance which is 
absolutely infinite is indivisible.’) It is worth noting, though, that in talking of a ‘real’ 
distinction, Spinoza uses the same language as does Descartes in discussing the real 
distinction between mind and matter.165 In other words, by a ‘real’ distinction he 
means ‘a distinction of substance’ rather than, say, ‘a non-illusory distinction’. Modal 
distinction does, of course, differ from substantial distinction – it does not inevitably 
follow that any distinction between modes is unreal in the sense of being illusory, 
false or meaningless. So the question remaining to be answered is, given that 
substance cannot be divided, what kind and degree of differentiation can there be 
between one mode and another? 
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Some have concluded that modes only exist for the imagination or senses – the 
kind of knowledge which, for Spinoza ‘is the only cause of falsity’166 and which, 
unlike the other two kinds of knowledge, cannot teach us ‘to distinguish the true from 
the false.’167 Such a view might seem to be supported by Spinoza’s claim in IP15S 
that ‘if we attend to quantity as it is in the imagination… it will be found to be finite, 
divisible, and composed of parts; but if we attend to it as it is in the intellect, and 
conceive it insofar as it is a substance… it will be found to be infinite, unique and 
indivisible.’ The second part of this formula, with its qualification ‘and conceive it 
insofar as it is a substance’ again need imply no more than that the intellect will find 
no substantial distinctions within substance as such. The first part, however, does 
seem to suggest that such distinctions as there are – that is, modal distinctions – exist 
for the imagination (alone?). As Viljanen glosses it in ‘Field Metaphysic, Power, and 
Individuation in Spinoza’ ‘[h]e claims that those who are inclined to divide extension 
attend to it only superficially, as it appears to our senses.’168 Viljanen concludes, 
nonetheless, that ‘although extended substance cannot strictly speaking be divided, it 
is not altogether without distinctions’.169 Genevieve Lloyd argues interestingly that 
singularity is real even though it is constructed through operations of the imagination. 
Drawing on the interpretation offered by Antonio Negri in The Savage Anomaly, she 
posits that the imagination does not simply distort reality but is involved in its 
construction. On her picture, duration and individuality are not objects of adequate 
knowledge, but nonetheless ‘are not illusory but real’.170 I share the view that 
Spinoza’s modes are individuated not merely superficially but would contend, further, 
that individuation is not only in the imagination of observers. 
The distinction between modes could be subjective without depending upon the 
first kind of knowledge. In other words, modes could be relative to a knower without 
being merely imaginative. There is a serious strand of Spinoza scholarship that 
envisages a status of this kind for the attributes. Spinoza defines an attribute in ID4 as 
‘what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence.’ For those who 
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read the attributes as having a subjective existence – that is, as being dependent upon 
an intellect – it certainly does not follow that they are consigned to the first kind of 
knowledge. There may be good reason to believe that even if modes are individuated 
only from the point of view of some intellect, this individuation too can be the object 
of some more adequate kind of knowledge than imagination. In IIP40S2 Spinoza 
defines the third kind of knowledge as that which ‘proceeds from an adequate idea of 
the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the 
essence of things.’ In Part V he reminds us of this, and establishes that to achieve the 
third kind of knowledge is the mind’s greatest virtue. It is a kind of knowledge which 
is necessarily true and adequate. VP22 tells us that ‘in God there is necessarily an idea 
that expresses the essence of this or that human body, under a species of eternity.’ For 
Spinoza, then, there exist true, non-illusory ideas of the essences of finite things. 
Melamed captures this thought in ‘Acosmism or Weak Individuals? Hegel, Spinoza, 
and the Reality of the Finite’ 
 
Spinoza’s discussion of the third kind of knowledge in part five of the Ethics makes 
clear that it pertains to the knowledge of finite modes—such as our bodies and 
minds—as well (see, for example, E 5p22 and E 5p31). But if the finite modes are 
mere illusions, why would they be the objects of the adequate third kind of 
knowledge?171 
 
There is, then, the prospect of a Spinozan account of how things are individuated 
within substance that would allow such individuals to be the objects of adequate 
knowledge. I now turn to review briefly the most propitious models of how Spinoza’s 
theory of individuation might work, in order to draw out such an account. 
 
2.2 Physical Individuation 
 
At first sight, Spinoza seems to account for individuation in material terms. In 
IIL1 he tells us that ‘[b]odies are distinguished from one another by reason of motion 
and rest, speed and slowness’. The full definition of an individual follows at IIA2”: 
 
When a number of bodies, whether of the same or of different size, are so constrained by 
other bodies that they lie upon one another, or if they do so move… that they 
communicate their motions to each other in a certain fixed manner, we shall say that those 
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bodies are untied with one another and that they all together compose one body or 
Individual, which is distinguished from the others by this union of bodies. 
 
In my view, the two readings of Spinoza’s theory of individuation which stick most 
closely to this physics-based, mechanistic starting point are those offered by Steven 
Barbone in ‘What Counts as an Individual for Spinoza’ and by Don Garrett in 
‘Spinoza’s Theory of Metaphysical Individuation’.172  
Don Garrett claims that he reads Spinoza as offering a metaphysical account of 
individuation. The distinction he draws, however, is between a metaphysical account 
explaining what constitutes an individual and an epistemological account which 
would ‘explain how one knows something to be an individual thing’.173 Garrett’s 
model is not metaphysical as opposed to physical, it focuses squarely on ratio of 
motion and rest as the key marker of the individual. Garrett interestingly fleshes out 
two crucial aspects of this model. First, he clarifies what the relevant ratio is of: 
motion and rest are ‘dual quantities of force… distributed differentially throughout… 
extended substance.’174 This remains a physicalist account, though a subtle one. More 
significantly for our purposes, Garrett then tries to establish what the individuating 
ratio itself is. He argues that the phrase ‘fixed ratio of motion and rest’ should not be 
understood too restrictively, and quotes approvingly Bennett’s alternative formula, 
‘coherence of organisation’.175 For Garrett, there are two minimal conditions required 
for a thing to count as sufficiently organised in terms of motion and rest to constitute 
an individual. First, the quantity of motion and rest belonging to any part must not 
vary ‘entirely independently’ of that of the remaining parts. Second, and intriguingly, 
‘the manner in which the motion and rest of these parts is interrelated must conform 
to some enduring pattern’.176 Garrett himself says no more on the matter here, but the 
notion of an ‘enduring pattern’ perhaps hints at something more than a mechanistic 
account of individuation. This thought is developed further in Garrett’s ‘Spinoza on 
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the Essence of the Human Body and the Part of the Mind that is Eternal’, to which I 
will return shortly. 
 Barbone’s explicit intention is to argue for a purely physicalist account of 
Spinozan individuation, and he is admiring of the influential interpretation set out by 
Alexandre Matheron in Individual and Community in Spinoza.177 Thus Barbone writes 
that we ‘can follow Matheron in employing a physical model to understand Spinoza’s 
theory of individuals’ and holds, following Matheron, that ‘the individual “boils down 
to”… a mathematical equation describing the physical activities, that is, the 
operations, of that individual.’178 Nonetheless, Barbone also appeals to a notion of 
‘form’ and of an individual’s essence as a blueprint, a ‘relation that could be 
expressed mathematically.’179 Even Matheron himself distinguishes material from 
formal elements of the individual which, Barbone remarks, accords with common 
sense in as much as material parts of an individual can be changed while the 
individual remains as long as the pattern characterising it is constant. In order to 
differentiate Spinozan individuals from mere aggregates, Matheron and Barbone state 
the need for a formal element organising the material element: a pattern which is the 
source of the individual’s operations. This, on Matheron and Barbone’s reading of 
Spinoza, is the individual’s conatus. ‘The defining character of each individual, then, 
is its singular conatus, which is its power to exist and to operate as that individual.’180 
 Garrett and Barbone, then, point to a pair of Spinozan concepts (conatus and 
form) which may seem to take us beyond an account of what constitutes the 
individual relying on pattern of motion and rest alone. Concepts, in other words, 
which indicate something beyond the mechanistic account of individuation offered in 
Part II of the Ethics. The first of these, then, is the concept of conatus. IIIP6 states that 
‘[e]ach thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being’ and 
IIIP7 that ‘[t]he striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is 
nothing but the actual essence of the thing.’ As Garrett puts it ‘nothing can be an 
individual thing unless it tends to persevere in its own existence.’181 For Spinoza, 
then, to be an individual is to have a particular organisation or pattern of motion and 
rest, and to strive to continue in existence by maintaining this ratio. This striving – 
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conatus – constitutes an individual’s actual essence. More significant still for 
Spinoza’s metaphysical account of individuation, though, is his notion of an 
individual’s formal (as opposed to actual) essence. This notion will be play a crucial 
role in what I take to be the most promising accounts of Spinozan individuation, as 
discussed below. Before outlining these, I clarify why such alternative accounts are 
needed. 
It is as well that his account has these additional resources, since if the 
mechanistic model was all Spinoza had to say on the subject of individuation, his 
account would have two troublesome weaknesses. First, Spinoza would still owe us 
an explanation of the nature and method of distinguishing individual ideas or minds. 
This is a worry that Ruth Saw and Stephen Nadler raise in rather different contexts. 
For Saw, by the end of Part I Spinoza has given us ‘an account of the unity of man as 
a bodily being, and nothing whatever of his unity as a thinking being.’182 Nadler 
suggests that what he calls Spinoza’s ‘explanatory materialism’ whereby mental 
functioning is understood in terms of physical functioning breaches Spinoza’s own 
axiom [IA5] that ‘[t]hings that have nothing in common with one another cannot be 
understood through one another.’183 Garrett’s response that while individuals are 
defined as bodies ‘it is not difficult to infer’ a parallel theory for the individuation of 
minds may well be right, but it is also true to say that Spinoza’s account of 
individuation is not restricted to the discussion of bodies in Parts I and II.184 
Second, any straightforwardly mechanistic model of individuation does seem to 
me to expose Spinoza to the criticism that finite things exist only for the imagination 
– for the inadequate first kind of knowledge. In the first place, IIL1 tells us that bodies 
are to be distinguished in terms of motion and speed – features which would seem to 
be relative to an observing body. It is, for Spinoza, the imagination that gives us 
perspectival, sensory knowledge. Again, when something is known under the third 
kind of knowledge it is known ‘sub specie aeternitatis’. What we have from Parts I 
and II is a picture of bodily finite modes possessing a particular duration. If there is 
nothing more to an individual, for Spinoza, it is difficult to see how it could be known 
from the viewpoint of eternity. Indeed (although this is disputed by Bennett), Marx 
Wartofsky holds that for Spinoza time, number and measure belong inherently to the 
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first kind of knowledge.185 They are ‘aids to the imagination’ and ‘fundamentally 
false’.186 
As Wartofsky puts it, the crux of the problem is that ‘either there is only one 
individual, and there are no finite existences of individual things…; or there is no 
infinite substance, but only the aggregate of finite individuals.’187 He surveys three 
attempts to reconcile the (seeming) contradiction between the simplicity of substance 
and its differentiation into real individuals, by all of which he is unpersuaded. 188  The 
first of these he calls the Platonist reading, according to which only substance is real 
and individuals are an imaginative illusion (compare the critics enumerated at the start 
of this section). The second, Neo-platonist, interpretation presents modes as 
possessing a lesser degree of reality, derived from substance. Finally, the nominalist 
position holds that ‘only individuals are real’ with substance a ‘bloodless’ 
abstraction.189 Wartofsky’s own purpose in examining Spinoza’s account of 
individuation is precisely to expose this contradiction and to diagnose it as resulting 
from Spinoza’s methodology. Nonetheless, in so doing his article strikes me as 
offering some resources valuable in helping to reconstruct a satisfying Spinozan 
account of individuation. Certainly, Wartofsky is convinced that Spinoza views 
individuals as real. He confirms that what the third kind of knowledge offers is 
knowledge of the essences of individual things (and that, pace Christopher Martin, 
these must be unique rather than common essences).190  
In the ‘letter on the infinite’ to Meyer, Wartofsky points out, Spinoza says we 
can only think of modes in terms of quantity and of limited duration when we think of 
them in abstraction from their real being in substance.191 Individuals are not parts of 
substance and are not denumerable. If they are not to be simply fictions, but proper 
objects of the third kind of knowledge, then Wartofsky concludes that individuals 
must themselves be infinite. So for Spinoza, either individuals are not real, or they 
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must be ‘somehow infinite in their essence, yet singular in their existence.’192 For 
Wartofsky, this remains an ‘enormous tension in Spinoza’s system’,193 and yet it 
points to the very kind of picture that forms the basis of at least two of what I would 
suggest to be the three most useful readings of Spinozan individuation.  
 
2.3 Individuation by Formal Essences 
 
The first of these is set out in Christopher Martin’s 2008 article ‘The 
Framework of Essences in Spinoza’s Ethics’.194 Martin distinguishes between two 
kinds of modal essences – actual and formal. While actual essences are durational and 
particular, formal essences are eternal and pertain to species. He identifies a mode’s 
actual essence with its endeavour to maintain its ratio of motion and rest - in other 
words, with its conatus.195 Formal essences on the other hand, Martin believes, should 
be understood as mediate infinite modes. For Martin, Spinoza’s mediate infinite 
modes are best pictured as laws of nature. Formal essences are infinite in the sense 
that they are eternally and universally true specifications of what it is to be some 
particular thing. Thus Martin suggests ‘[t]he mediate infinite mode humanity, for 
instance, stipulates conditions for a mode’s being a human being’.196 The relationship 
between a mode’s actual and its formal essence, according to Martin, is one of 
instantiation: formal essences are laws of nature, actual essences are instances of the 
former.197 This helps to explain how a mode that is itself of finite duration can 
nonetheless have an infinite and eternal essence. ‘As these essences exist apart from 
their exemplification in actually existing modes’, Martin writes, ‘they exist even when 
unexemplified, and as such are the object and idea of non-existing modes.’198 
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With this insight into the nature of formal essences, Martin believes that he has 
taken ‘a first step toward a robust account of individuals in Spinoza’s one-substance 
metaphysic.’ In doing this, he hopes ‘to have dispelled some of the disbelief that 
follows the recognition that individuals for Spinoza are mere modes, i.e. properties or 
qualities, of the one substance.’ While it is true that individuals are modes, Martin 
argues, it ‘fails to capture the identity and individuality that modes have on account of 
their essence.’199 His model does seem to have the advantage that modes can be 
picked out – in virtue of their formal essences – in a way that is not simply a function 
of an observer’s imagination. For one thing, these essences are eternal (so not at the 
mercy of time/duration). In this sense, his account of individuation is a robust one. 
Whilst remaining modes or qualities of substance, Spinozan individuals are not 
fictions or illusions but exist in a metaphysically profound sense. 
Arguably a disadvantage of Martin’s picture, however, is that it categorises 
formal essences as species essences. This may give us pause as to whether Martin’s 
own account really captures ‘the identity and individuality’ that we think of 
individuals as having. Formal essences being laws of nature, they are, as Martin puts 
it ‘capable of being simultaneously identically exemplified in numerous finite 
modes.’200 In other words, modes of the same kind share an essence: ‘[t]he difference 
between a mode’s existence and essence is that its existence is unique to it, whereas 
its essence is not.’201 This means that the feature of an individual which guarantees its 
real existence (as a potential object of the third kind of knowledge, rather than a 
fiction of the first) is not unique to any particular individual. A mode such as a flower 
or a person is of finite duration and has as its actual essence the striving to maintain 
its pattern of motion and rest. What takes us beyond this – what guarantees a mode’s 
real existence – is its formal essence. This, however, is not particular to that mode, but 
something in which all other modes of the same kind participate. As unique, finite 
particulars, then, modes may seem to be no better off in Martin’s picture than they 
were under the physicalist reading.202 
Garrett’s article ‘Spinoza on the Essence of the Human Body and the Part of the 
Mind that is Eternal’ points to Spinoza’s distinction between a body’s actual 
endurance and its formal essence (and, like Martin, between its formal and actual 
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essence).203 He contends that ‘[t]he so-called “Physical Digression” following 2P13S 
strongly suggests that this formal essence lies in or involves a certain “fixed pattern of 
motion and rest” that makes an extended singular thing what it is.’204 Garrett too 
confirms that a thing’s formal essence doesn’t entail the actual existence at any given 
time of that singular thing. In a sense, singular things are derivative of their formal 
essences. Formal essences exist in their own right as modes of substance.205 Because 
they do not have a particular duration but are permanent features of reality they 
cannot be ordinary finite modes. Instead Garrett, like Martin, concludes that they must 
be infinite modes: ‘the formal essences of singular things are existing infinite modes 
in their own right’.206 So a formal essence is a permanent mode which grounds the 
actual existence of a singular thing (and exists as a ‘nonlocalized part of the human 
body.’)207 
Garrett’s claim that a mode’s essence forms part of that mode represents a key 
difference from Martin. The latter makes explicit that ‘[a]lthough each mode (i.e. each 
individual) exemplifies some formal essence or other, it does not follow that the 
formal essence is itself an element of the mode, just as it does not follow that the form 
is an element of particulars exemplifying it.’208 For Martin, formal essences are 
independently existing natural laws which are simply exemplified by finite modes as 
and when the order of causes dictates that such come into existence. For Garrett, 
formal essences retain their independence from temporary modes whilst forming part 
of those modes. So a finite mode, for Martin, is one among many possible 
instantiations of a formal essence. For Garrett, on the other hand, a mode has its 
formal essence as a (non-localised) part of itself. Garrett, then, offers an account 
according to which formal essences are both infinite and unique to – indeed part of – 
individual finite modes. Thus an individual mode has, in its formal essence, an 
identity which is unique to it but also independent of the imaginative structures of  
duration and motion.  
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 The final reading of individuation in Spinoza which seems to me to hold firm 
against the objection that individuals can have no real existence in his system is that 
offered by Valtteri Viljanen in his 2007 article ‘Field Metaphysic, Power, and 
Individuation in Spinoza’.209 Viljanen draws, as the title suggests, on Bennett’s field 
metaphysic theory, but also on Deleuze’s understanding of the relationship between 
an actual finite mode and its essence.210 He makes explicit, as I have argued above, 
that that there are both physical and metaphysical elements to Spinoza’s account of 
individuation. In fact, Viljanen quotes Spinoza in support of this ‘“the Ethics … must 
be based on metaphysics and physics” (Ep27).’211 
Viljanen distinguishes between ‘(1) eternal essences that specify certain spatial 
arrangements of  intensity as individuals, and (2) actual individuals, i.e. relatively 
stable concrete structures of power quanta that realize these arrangements in 
temporality.’212 Actual individuals, then, are particular arrangements of power – 
patterns of motion and rest – each maintained by its own conatus. Essences, for 
Viljanen ‘could be seen as blueprints or diagrams that pick out certain patterns of 
intensifications as individuals’.213 So while an individual exists for a particular 
duration, its essence is timeless: ‘formal essences do not come and go out of existence 
(E2p8, 2p8c), but an individual’s actual being begins and ceases at certain temporal 
moments.’214 He agrees with Deleuze that ‘a mode exists actually when it possesses 
the extended parts that correspond to its eternal essence’.215 Viljanen continues: ‘an 
individual’s temporal existence can be seen as a state of affairs where concrete power 
quanta are organized in the arrangement corresponding to the individual’s essence.’216 
Thus like Deleuze, Viljanen holds that a mode is individuated by its eternal 
essence,217 and has its temporal, physical existence for as long as the blueprint that is 
its essence is actually expressed by the appropriate arrangement of forces. 
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I suggest, then, that Spinoza’s philosophy offers resources for a metaphysical 
account of individuation, according to which modes differ essentially as well as 
existentially. A mode of durational existence has an actual essence (conatus as a 
striving to preserve the ratio of motion of rest). It also has a formal essence (the 
formula or blueprint of that ratio of motion and rest or coherence of organisation 
which has metaphysical status of an infinite mode. This may form a part of the 
durational mode or may simply be instantiated by it, but in either case is permanent, 
not dependent on duration, not merely physical, knowable by third kind of knowledge 
and therefore real. 
 
2.4 Personal Identity 
 
In an article entitled ‘Personal Identity in Spinoza’, Ruth Saw inflects the charge 
that Spinoza’s system is unable to account for real individuation to deal with human 
individuals in particular.218 Her criticisms are as follows. Fist, that Spinoza’s account 
of bodily individuation in general is insufficient, producing only ‘derived, dissoluble, 
and in a sense, illusory individuals’.219 Second, that Spinoza’s focus on the body 
leaves him failing to account for the unity of the mind or that of the person as such 
(‘the moving together of the bodily parts must not be allowed to engender the unity of 
the mind, nor even of the total organism’).220 Third, that he cannot explain human 
agency: because Spinoza’s distinction between activity and passivity is not made in 
terms of free will, Saw argues, ‘[i]t does not… yield the notion of the “active” man as 
agent.’221 Even in the case of the active man, his ‘actions’ are to be explained 
causally, thus ‘Spinoza has no account whatever to give of the “I” who does anything 
at all.’222 Taken together, these failings mean that Spinoza can offer no distinctive 
(and successful) account of personal identity. Saw therefore concludes that the 
Spinozan ‘human person is not a person in the ordinary sense of the word.’223 
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2.4.1 
Certainly, human persons are not unique in the sense of having a substantial 
identity, for Spinoza, as he clarifies at IIP10 ‘[t]he being of substance does not pertain 
to the essence of man, or substance does not constitute the form of man.’ Rather, like 
every other finite individual, they are modes: ‘[f]rom this it follows that the essence of 
man is constituted by certain modifications of God’s attributes.’ (IIP10C). I have 
argued in the foregoing that Spinoza can account for the reality of modal individuals. 
In the case of individuals which happen to be human beings, Saw says Spinoza wishes 
to claim that ‘identity through duration is not possible’ and that on his account, 
neither body nor mind is ‘self-identical through time’.224 She judges that ‘if he is 
right, we cannot give a satisfactory account of the human person.’225 
There seem to me to be two options open to the defender of Spinoza. One is to 
deny that Saw’s conclusion follows: to deny the Humean supposition that without 
strict identicality there can be no identity at all. Even were Spinoza to hold that there 
was no strict identity across time, we need not accept that he has no real account of 
human identity. In fact, Saw herself believes that ‘Spinoza rejects the notion of 
identity throughout duration in favour of continuity of life history, so long as there is 
enough similarity maintained through the parts of the history.’ In his ‘Spinoza on 
Individuation’, Lee C. Rice argues that Spinozan personal identity is a matter of 
degree: ‘talk about preservation of a constant balance of motion and rest among the 
parts which make up an individual is talk about a relation or balance which is more or 
less constant’.226  Admittedly for Rice the criteria for whether something counts as the 
same individual are conventional, but, he insists, ‘this does not make personal identity 
a purely conventional matter’227 because whether or not the criteria apply in any given 
case is a matter of fact.  
For Don Garrett the story is slightly more complicated, and he offers an 
alternative reading of Spinoza’s famous example of the Spanish poet who suffers a 
disease making him forget his life until that point.228 Rice claims that the philosopher 
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accepts someone might effectively become a different person during the course of 
‘his’ life. Further, he insists that ‘[w]ith as much propriety we often speak of a person 
as “not being the same person” after events of far less destructive (or even 
constructive) force.’229 According to Garrett, however, Spinoza implies both that the 
poet is and is not the same individual as he was before and again, both that aged men 
in general are the same individuals as the infants they began life as and that they are 
not. Garrett’s suggested solution is that  
 
there is an individual that does continue, constituted by the particular fixed ratio of motion 
and rest involved in continuation of the same animal functions, and another individual that 
does not, one for which the more complex fixed pattern of motion and rest involved in 
retaining memory and similarity of higher mental functioning is essential.230 
 
This second option perhaps has the advantage of greater compatibility with the 
general account of individuation offered previously. It allows for the possibility of an 
account of identity – including personal identity – where the criteria of sameness are 
not just conventional and identity is more than a matter of degree. 
 
2.4.2 
 With regard to Saw’s second objection – the criticism that Spinoza can at best 
explain bodily identity and offers no account of that of the mind – Rice and Garrett 
again suggest alternative defences. Rice advises that we take ‘a somewhat 
Strawsonian turn and claim that our criteria of identification and reidentification are 
wholly geared to bodies in space’.231 If this is true of philosophical accounts of 
identity in general, for Rice, then it is not a failing of Spinoza’s that ‘[a]ny talk of 
mental identity would be, on this account, derivative’.232 On the other hand, Garrett 
admits that on Spinoza’s definition (Garrett is referring to IIA2” Definition) 
individuals are composed of bodies, but suggests that ‘he restricts the Definition to 
extension only because it occurs in a discussion that is devoted explicitly to 
bodies’.233 Given Spinoza’s parallelism and ‘the identity of ideas with their objects’, 
Garrett argues, ‘it is not difficult to infer’ what his theory of the identity of a thinking 
individual would be: ‘a thinking thing is an individual in virtue of being the idea of a 
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composite body with a fixed ratio of motion and rest’.234 Certainly, Spinoza himself 
does not hold that it is only extended things which can be individuals. Garrett 
highlights his claim at IIP21D that ‘the mind and the body are one and the same 
individual.’ Indeed, he notes, ‘Spinoza states explicitly that human beings are 
individuals’.235 
Spinoza is not, though, as explicit as we might like on what it is that 
constitutes the individuality of a mind. In my view, given that eternal essences are 
central to his account of individuation, he does provide some discussion of mental 
individuals in his treatment of the eternity of the mind at V P22 and P23, where he 
says that each mind has eternal existence in God as a ‘certain mode of thinking’. Even 
here, though, the (eternal part of the) mind is figured as an idea which expresses the 
body under a species of eternity. Perhaps the explanation is simply that the topic of 
individuation arises at a point in Ethics when Spinoza is treating of extended things, 
and he would have assumed his readers could draw out an account of the thinking 
individual from that discussion. Or perhaps – as Rice suggests – it is that our 
understandings of mental identity are always derivative of those concerning the 
identity of bodies.  
 
2.4.3 
 Saw’s third objection is that Spinoza offers no account of human agency. Lee 
Rice rejects her claim that Spinozan individuals are not agents. That Spinozan persons 
have no free will is irrelevant, he insists, because they are nonetheless ‘centers of real 
action—they are causally efficacious’.236 Rice suggests that Saw’s error in thinking 
there can be no agency without free will results from her view that ‘what constitutes 
the human individual has to be something distinctly human (in this case freedom).’237 
He points out that while what makes a particular individual human must indeed be 
something distinctively human, the same is not true of what makes him or her an 
individual.238 In his view, Spinoza would ‘flatly reject’ this second claim.239 This 
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indicates a notable difference between the accounts of individuation offered by 
Schopenhauer and Spinoza. For Schopenhauer, as we have seen, what individuates a 
person at the most profound level is being an expression of a unique Platonic Idea – 
and this applies to human beings alone. There is no parallel in Spinoza’s philosophy: 
a human being is individuated in the same way as any other mode. It is not clear, 
however, that this constitutes a weakness in Spinoza’s account. As Rice puts it at the 
start of his article ‘the philosopher has no right to assume’ that the question of 
personal identity is distinct from that of identity as such.240 Indeed, it could be seen as 
an advantage to be able to offer one explanation that covers a diversity of phenomena, 
and – as we saw in the previous chapter – the naturalisation of the human being is one 
aspect of Spinoza’s thought which has often been admired. At the very least, Rice is 
surely right to reject the claim that the lack of a specifically human way of 
individuating persons leaves Spinoza with no account of their individuation at all. 
 
3. SCHOPENHAUER’S SPINOZISM REGARDING INDIVIDUATION 
 
3.1 Some Similarities of Form and Content 
 
I mean now to offer an analysis of Schopenhauer’s Spinozism when it comes 
to the problem of individuation. Schopenhauer and Spinoza are two thinkers with a 
common problem, but with very different philosophical approaches. Each is a monist, 
committed to the embedded-self thesis – a picture of a univocal reality in which 
human selves are as enmeshed as everything else – and thus each owes us an account 
of how and to what extent individuals can be picked out. Neither can appeal to 
differences of substance to explain the distinction between one individual and 
another.241 But while Schopenhauer is a transcendental idealist of empiricist bent, 
Spinoza is a rationalist, realist and arch-metaphysician. Nonetheless, their responses 
to this problem have marked similarities in terms of both structure and content. 
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 In the first place, each has a fairly straightforward account of how individuals 
can be distinguished within space and time. For Schopenhauer, it is the forms of space 
and time – provided by the knowing subject – which constitute the principium 
individuationis. Because of them, the world as representation, unlike the world as 
will, comprises a plurality of phenomena. For Spinoza, a mode can be picked out as 
an individual with reference to its pattern or ratio of motion and rest. 
  For neither thinker, though, is this a sufficient response to the problem of 
individuation and I would suggest that we shouldn’t accept it as such either. 
Schopenhauer’s phenomena are not only mind-dependent but, he is wont to say, 
illusory. Organisation in terms of motion and rest is an inadequate (in Spinoza’s 
sense) way to divide up reality, characteristic of the first kind of knowledge. The 
physicalist element of modal individuation is imaginative for Spinoza, just as spatio-
temporal individuation is merely phenomenal for Schopenhauer. 
 The first concept which takes us beyond this simple account of individuation 
in Spinoza is that of conatus. Spinoza refers to a mode’s conatus as its actual essence. 
By ‘conatus’, Spinoza means desire, or self-preserving force. ‘Desire is man’s very 
essence’, he writes in Ethics III Definitions of the Affects I, and explains that by 
desire he means ‘all the strivings of human nature that we signify by the name of 
appetite, will, desire, or impulse.’ This is markedly similar to Schopenhauer’s view 
that what each of us really is, is a willing being. My phenomenal body is a 
concretisation of my will and it is only through its relationship to this embodied will, 
Schopenhauer says in §§18 and 19, that the knowing subject finds itself as an 
individual.242 
Ultimately, for Schopenhauer, any individual is the working out or expression 
in empirical reality (over time, in space and subject to causality) of some act of will. 
In other words, each individual is the manifestation of a particular Platonic Idea. This, 
for him, is individuation in its most metaphysically profound sense. The Spinozan 
equivalent is individuation by virtue of a mode’s formal essence. Schopenhauer’s 
Platonic Ideas and Spinoza’s formal essences represent the most interpretatively 
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challenging and contentious aspects of their respective accounts of individuation. 
Before offering some analysis of the internal coherence of each and the extent to 
which they shed any light on one another, I want to briefly point to one clear 
similarity and one potential disparity. 
Both Schopenhauer and Spinoza explicitly reject universal abstractions. 
Spinoza’s critique of them is well known. The examples he gives are the universals 
man, horse and dog. For Schopenhauer, each of these species would have its own 
Platonic Idea, but he is keen to emphasise that the Ideas as he understands them do 
not fall into the category of abstract universals. For one thing, Platonic Ideas are 
percepts rather than concepts. While a Platonic Idea is expressed as a ‘species or 
kind’, ‘the species are the work of nature, the genera the work of man; thus they are 
mere concepts.’243 Plato himself, in Schopenhauer’s view, used ‘Ideas’ too loosely – 
‘Schopenhauer believes that there is a fundamental distinction between the Idea and 
the concept, the latter being a mere object of rational thought and science. Plato, he 
says, failed to make such a differentiation and thus he sometimes characterized as 
Ideas universal abstractions which are not Platonic Ideas at all.’244  For neither 
thinker, then, can universal concepts abstracted or derived from experiences of 
particulars help to explain the way reality is divided up into individuals. 
 The status each gives to causation may seem to evidence a major difference 
between Schopenhauer’s account of individuation and that of Spinoza. As Saw 
emphasises, for Spinoza to understand something properly is to understand it in its 
causal connections. She concludes from this that it is not people in their individuality 
that are known at the highest level of knowledge but in their causal contexts.  In my 
view, Lee Rice is right to deny that an individual is understood in its causal context at 
the expense of being understood as an individual.245 Either way, to know an effect one 
must know its cause and adequate knowledge maps the causal connections between 
things. For Schopenhauer, conversely, causation is a feature of the phenomenal realm 
and the most adequate knowledge available to us – knowledge of the Platonic Ideas – 
precisely involves knowing things outside of their ordinary causal contexts. It is only 
when the veil of causality is lifted that the essence of an individual can be seen. 
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This stark contrast can at the very least be softened in the light of Thomas M. 
Ward’s discussion of varieties of causation in Spinoza in his ‘Spinoza on the Essences 
of Modes’.246 He maintains that the ‘the proximate cause that is sought in a complete 
definition of a thing is the fixed and eternal thing which is the essence of that 
thing’.247  The cause which must be understood in order to understand an individual, 
then, is that individual’s (formal) essence. But the kind of causation that operates 
between an essence and a particular thing is not ordinary efficient causation, for 
Ward, but ‘formal or exemplar causality’.248 Ward’s picture of the ‘infinite modes of 
EIP21 as formal essences which are produced prior to and independent of the creation 
of finite modes, and which function as the formal causes of finite modes’249 brings the 
relationship between Spinoza’s individuals and their formal essences much closer to 
that between Schopenhauer’s phenomena and their Platonic Ideas. Schopenhauer 
denies that causality can operate other than between one phenomenon and another, 
and explicitly criticises Spinoza for his unwarranted extension of the concept. But 
given Ward’s sense of causation its role in defining the nature of an individual no 
longer puts Spinoza at odds with Schopenhauer. 
 Individuation at its most adequate is a function, for Schopenhauer, of the 
Platonic Ideas and, for Spinoza, of the formal essences of modes. I now turn to the 
difficult problem of how each model is to be understood in its own right and in 
comparison to its counterpart, aiming to assess the extent to which either is 
convincing and to see whether either has resources to flesh out or improve the other 
account or at least whether either can illuminate the other. 
 
3.2 The Nature of Individuation in Schopenhauer and Spinoza 
 
In the first place, there is a question as to the kinds of things that count as 
individuals for each thinker.  For Schopenhauer, as we know, it is the principium 
individuationis which separates out what we would perhaps normally think of as 
individuals – which distinguishes this pen from that paper, our cat Hero from their cat 
Millie. They are individuated phenomenally. Apart from in the case of human beings, 
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it is species – including natural forces – with which Platonic Ideas are identified. For 
Spinoza, the answer is less clear. As Don Garrett puts it ‘persons and animals are 
clearly identified as individuals, it is less obvious whether nonliving things... can be 
individuals.’250 On the other hand, as he notes, even spatially discontinuous groups of 
people can be considered individuals. Certainly, Spinoza allows for a series of 
‘nested’ individuals: ‘[e]very individual is part of an individual of still higher 
complexity; but it does not thereby sacrifice its own status as an individual’251 and 
indeed Garrett himself had earlier quoted Spinoza’s statement in L7S that ‘the whole 
of nature is one individual’. In fact, if we focus on formal essences as the locus of real 
individuation even the cases of humans and animals might not be quite so clear-cut. 
On Martin’s understanding of them, formal essences pick out species rather than 
particulars. This, of course, would position Spinozan and Schopenhauerian 
individuation even more closely together. This is not, however, a particularly 
widespread reading of Spinoza’s formal essences. On the two alternative readings I 
considered, those of Garrett and Viljanen, anything that has a fixed pattern of motion 
and rest or a pattern of intensification is an individual, but it is apparent that Garrett at 
least finds insufficient clarity in the Ethics as to the sorts of things that count. 
Another set of interpretative problems concerns the status or nature of 
individuation according to each philosopher. Are things individuated physically, 
metaphysically or epistemologically? Are the distinctions between individuals 
subjective or objective? As regards the first of these questions, I have argued that 
Spinoza’s account of individuation is not just physicalist or mechanistic but 
metaphysical.252 Schopenhauer’s account too is not merely physical but arguably even 
more metaphysical in its reliance on the category of Platonic Idea.  We have seen 
though, that Hein and others model Schopenhauer’s Platonic Ideas not as things 
known but (more adequate) ways of knowing the one thing that really is. Thus in 
attempting to distance Schopenhauer from Plato and problems affecting his own 
account of Ideas and in trying to show how the Ideas are truly integral to 
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Schopenhauer’s system Hein, Neeley and Chansky offer readings of Schopenhauer’s 
Ideas which downplay their metaphysical and emphasise their epistemological role.  
This takes us to the second question: whether the distinctions between 
individuals are subjective or would exist in the absence of a knower. This itself is not 
uncontentious as regards Schopenhauer’s account of the Platonic Ideas. Christopher 
Janaway speaks of them as parts of reality to be discovered and Schopenhauer calls 
species works of nature rather than works of man.253 However he also says that they 
retain the form ‘object for subject’ and there is, he insists, ‘no object without a 
subject’.254 Only the will itself is truly non-ideal. Schopenhauer calls the Platonic 
Ideas manifestations of acts of will, which may indicate that there is some non-
subjective basis for individuation, but as discussed above the notion of multiple acts 
of will may not be one to which Schopenhauer is entitled. For Spinoza, individuation 
is not merely a function of the imagination’s inadequate way of understanding the 
world. Essences of things are known by the third kind of knowledge which is 
adequate and parallels the order and connection of physical reality. Individuation may 
remain relative to knowledge, but one point to consider is that holding something to 
be for the intellect, or knower-dependent, needn’t have the usual idealist implications 
given the role of the infinite intellect of God. To say that an individual’s essence 
exists in the mind of God is very different to saying that things are only individuated 
from the perspective of finite human subjects. Thus even if the distinctions between 
Schopenhauerian and Spinozan individuals exist for knowers (and it is not clear that 
this is the case for either),255 that does not imply that they are illusory in the way that 
phenomena are. 
 
3.2.1 The Nature of Spinoza’s Formal Essences 
 
This means that Schopenhauer and Spinoza reject nominalism (understood 
loosely) regarding Platonic Ideas and formal essences respectively.256 Schopenhauer 
can’t plausibly be taken to hold that the term ‘Platonic Idea’ is an empty name; the 
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same is true of Spinoza and ‘formal essence’. It may seem that Schopenhauer’s 
Platonic Ideas should be classed as universals – I will consider that possibility below. 
I don’t think, though, that Spinoza’s formal essences should be accorded that status. 
Admittedly, such a reading might well fit Christopher Martin’s interpretation of their 
role. For Martin, Spinozan formal essences are – like certain of Schopenhauer’s 
Platonic Ideas – laws of nature. Each such formal essence exists apart from and is 
instantiated in multiple actual essences. However, Spinoza’s famous critique of 
universals such as ‘horse’ and ‘man’ was noted above, and as Thomas M. Ward puts 
it, ‘Spinoza scoffs at the realist thesis that a shared nature exists independent of the 
things of which it is the nature’.257 In this sense, Spinoza is a nominalist, and his 
views may seem opposed to those of Schopenhauer, at least on many interpretations 
of the latter. As Ward himself has it, for Spinoza ‘[a]ll essences… are individual 
essences’.258 This characterisation does seem in tune with the accounts of Garrett and 
Viljanen, outlined above, according to which each finite mode is individuated by its 
own, unique formal essence. 
 If Spinozan formal essences are particulars rather than universals, are they also 
concrete entities? In my view, they are not. For one thing, they are infinite and 
eternal, while ordinary, concrete modes are finite and of a particular duration. I would 
suggest that Spinoza’s formal essences are, in fact, abstract objects. This too would 
seem to chime with the models offered by Viljanen and Garrett, both of whom speak 
of them almost as mathematical formulae specifying patterns of motion and rest 
whose actualisation will constitute a finite mode. It also fits with my contention that 
space and time are features of individuation according to the first kind of knowledge, 
and do not apply to the formal essences of modes. 
Questions remain as to the nature of the relationship between an ordinary 
mode and its formal essence. For one thing, there is some indication of a causal 
relationship between them. For Spinoza, to fully understand an individual is to 
understand its causal origin.259 More specifically, on Ward’s picture a Spinozan 
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essence is ‘some feature or features of a thing which cause(s) other (non-essential) 
features’.260 Given that things of different natures cannot act causally upon one 
another and that causality may anyway be thought (as it certainly is for 
Schopenhauer) to operate only between spatio-temporal entities, it might seem 
difficult to explain how there can be such a relationship between concrete finite 
modes and formal essences conceived as abstract objects. I think, though, that Ward is 
right to suggest that Spinoza conceives of two different types of causality, efficient 
causality operating between finite modes and what Ward calls ‘formal or exemplar’ 
causality between formal essences and concrete particulars. 261 On this understanding, 
the existence of a causal relationship between finite modes and their formal essences 
does not rule out the latter having the nature of abstract objects. 
 Another such question concerns the independence of formal essences from 
their respective durational modes. Viljanen has it that ‘when an individual’s eternal 
essence is actualized in duration… substantial power as conatus in a sense ‘grabs hold 
of’ the formation that corresponds to the individual’s eternal essence’.262 This makes 
it sounds as though formal essences exist in their own right (even when not 
instantiated by their finite modes), and Garrett is explicit about this. He notes that ‘the 
reality or being of the formal essence of a singular thing – such as the formal essence 
of a human body – does not presuppose or entail the actual existence of that singular 
thing’ and says that ‘Spinoza strongly implies that formal essences are truly 
something in their own right’ concluding that ‘formal essences of singular things must 
be modes of God.’263 Formal essences are, then, independently existing modes – but 
infinite rather than finite ones. While Ward seems to support this reading in his 
conclusion when he says that for Spinoza ‘formal essences are produced prior to and 
independent of their determination as the essences of finite modes’, he also reminds 
us that ‘Spinoza thinks both that the essence cannot be or be conceived without the 
thing of which it is the essence, and that to grant the essence is to posit the thing.’264 
Ward is here arguing against the possibility of common essences, but this point also 
seems difficult to square with the idea that a formal essence could exist independently 
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of – indeed, prior to – the thing of which it is an essence. Just possibly, some sort of 
distinction could be drawn between the mere positing of a finite thing and its 
actualisation or, as Ward hints at in the quotation above, between a formal essence’s 
existence as such and its existence or determination as the essence of some concrete 
thing in an attempt to resolve this tension. 
 Connectedly, it remains to be clarified whether a formal essence relates to its 
concrete mode as an exemplar to its instantiation or as a part to a whole. In fact, for 
Ward and for Garrett it seems to be both. Ward sees Spinoza as following those 
medieval Aristotelians who held that ‘God creates through these essences as the 
archetypes or exemplars of created things.’265 He also argues, though, that for Spinoza 
‘the essence is some feature or features of a thing which cause(s) other (non-essential) 
features’, which sounds more akin to a part/whole relationship.266 Similarly, Don 
Garrett refers to Spinozan formal essences as ‘unchanging forms that can be 
instantiated or exemplified by existing things’, but insists too – as previously outlined 
– that they constitute non-localised parts of those things.267 
 This kind of reading of Spinoza may be thought to leave him to open to a 
criticism helpfully summarised by the author of the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy’s entry ‘Spinoza’s Physical Theory’, who argues that  
 
it represents Spinoza as, not an avant-garde thinker anticipating modern physics, 
but as a rear guard defender, despite his official anti-scholastic stance, of the 
traditional neo-Aristotelian doctrines of essence and substantial form, open to the 
same charges of ad hoc theorizing and appeal to occult powers that Modernity 
and the Scientific Revolution leveled against it in its their rise to intellectual 
dominance.268 
 
It should be noted, though, that Ward highlights two ways in which Spinoza’s is not 
an Aristotelian or neo-Aristotelian position. First, Spinoza’s formal essences are not 
universals: as Ward puts it, ‘Spinoza firmly denies that Aristotelian natural kinds 
characterize the deep structure of reality’.269 Second, Ward insists, ‘Spinoza followed 
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Descartes’s profound innovation to this basic model; they broke from the medieval 
tradition by putting the formal essence firmly on the side of what is produced.’270 In 
Spinoza’s terms, formal essences remain part of Natura Naturata rather than Natura 
Naturans, just as Schopenhauer’s Platonic Ideas remain object rather than will. 
I would suggest, in summary, that Spinozan formal essences are particular 
rather than universal, but nonetheless infinite. That they are abstract rather than 
concrete but in a sense causally related to their actual, durational modes. They should 
probably be interpreted as having an existence independent of these concrete modes – 
and could arguably be understood as possessing a greater degree of reality271 – but 
this interpretation needs to be made consistent with what Spinoza says about essences 
in IID2. 
 
3.2.2 The Nature of Schopenhauer’s Platonic Ideas 
 
The nature of Spinoza’s formal essences is contested, that of Schopenhauer’s 
Platonic Ideas is under-examined. It is very difficult to pin them down in terms of the 
standard philosophical categories used above. Nonetheless, I attempt here to sketch 
out some of the possibilities which emerge from the discussion in the first part of this 
chapter and to indicate problems that may attach to each. 
Schopenhauer, as Hilda Hein points out, believes that Plato errs in (sometimes) 
imagining the Ideas as universal concepts abstracted from concrete particulars. Thus 
Hein: ‘Schopenhauer believes that there is a fundamental distinction between the Idea 
and the concept... Plato, he says, failed to make such a differentiation and thus he 
sometimes characterized as Ideas universal abstractions which are not Platonic Ideas 
at all.’272 Nonetheless it is in my view most plausible to read Schopenhauer’s own 
Platonic Ideas as both abstract and universal: abstract rather than concrete because 
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they are free from the forms of space, time and causality, universal rather than 
particular because each is instantiated in multiple individuals.273 
The immediate challenge for this suggestion is to show that it is compatible with 
Schopenhauer’s critique of Plato. What distinguishes Schopenhauer’s Platonic Ideas, 
when understood as abstract universals, from Plato’s unsatisfactory universal 
abstractions? Schopenhauer insists upon the point that his Ideas are percepts rather 
than concepts. Perhaps the idea is that they are perceived and exist in their 
instantiations. This would seem to tally with Julian Young’s statement that the artist 
‘perceives the individual as Idea’, rather than perceiving a separate idea.274 Possibly, 
Young himself is making a stronger claim: that if the Platonic Ideas are to exist at all 
it can only be as particulars, and that the Ideas are exhausted by their instantiations. 
He does, after all, claim that ‘ontologically speaking, the Ideas can only be normal 
individuals.’275 Schopenhauer surely rules out any possibility of reading his Platonic 
Ideas as phenomena – as concrete, spatio-temporal particulars. Perhaps Young could 
be understood, then, as advancing a nominalist writing-off of the Platonic Ideas, 
according to which only phenomena (and will) exist. Given the crucial role the Ideas 
play in Schopenhauer’s system this seems no more plausible an interpretation. In my 
view, the most charitable way of understanding Young is to see him as rejecting only 
the notion of the Ideas existing separately to the individuals which express them in a 
concrete way, and so as open to the abstract objects model.276 
If the Ideas do indeed exist in their phenomenal instantiations, perhaps it is as 
essential features of the latter. This would certainly make for a parallel between 
Schopenhauer’s Ideas and Spinoza’s formal essences as interpreted by Garrett and 
Ward. Such a suggestion might be supported by what James D. Chansky says about 
aesthetic perception of the Platonic Ideas, in which ‘the incidental and inessential fall 
away, leaving for this consciousness no longer the mere particular thing but the object 
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as it is itself’.277 For Hilda Hein, Schopenhauer’s Platonic Ideas differ from those of 
Plato himself because ‘for Schopenhauer the Ideas are present in the realm of 
ordinary experience.’ However, she says, ‘they are never totally realized in natural 
phenomena.’278 Perhaps we can conclude, then, that while for Plato ordinary things 
are separate and imperfect copies of the Ideas, for Schopenhauer the Ideas exist in 
phenomenal individuals, probably as their essential natures or features. They are not, 
however, exhausted by these phenomenal instantiations and do have some 
independent existence – in my view, best characterised as an abstract rather than 
concrete existence. 
Schopenhauer does also appear to think of the Ideas as universals.279 We have 
seen that Spinoza’s account of individuation seems to rule out this possibility. For 
Spinoza, if the essence of something exists, then that thing must itself exist, and so 
each thing must have its own unique essence. For Schopenhauer, however, individual 
cats come and go while their essential cat-like nature persists. Of course, an account 
which sees the essential nature of a cat as a universal which exists in multiple 
individuals – effectively, an Aristotelian immanent realist position – is open to 
criticism. One line of criticism dates back to Pierre Abelard’s famous question as to 
whether a universal was itself one or many, and if it was supposed to be one, how it 
could exist in different things at the same time. The Aristotelian model of universals 
does at least have the advantage of not being susceptible to the so-called ‘Third Man 
Argument’, raised by Plato himself.280 However, unlike Platonic realism, it can’t 
accommodate the possibility of the Ideas having some existence independent to their 
instantiations. 
 
3.2.3 Conclusions from the Foregoing 
 
 To conclude this section of the analysis, I have suggested (against Martin) that 
we read each Spinozan formal essence as unique to its concrete mode, but each 
Schopenhauerian Idea as a universal instantiated in a multiplicity of phenomena. It 
seems plausible, to me, to see both a formal essence and a Platonic Idea as 
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constituting part of a finite individual – its essential features. I think formal essences 
and Platonic Ideas should probably be interpreted as having some kind of existence 
independent of their durational instantiations and that therefore both are best 
understood as abstract objects. 
There are other notable similarities. First, for each thinker finite individuals 
are dependent both upon other finite individuals and their formal essence or Platonic 
Idea. Ward expresses this as a combination of efficient and formal causality but it is a 
point Garrett and Viljanen also make.281 Schopenhauer, for his part, insists that ‘every 
natural cause is only an occasional cause.’282 As he explains in the same passage, the 
appearance of a phenomenon is determined by other phenomena, its inner nature 
depends on an ‘immediate phenomenon of the will’ – a Platonic Idea.283 So while 
Schopenhauer rejects any possibility of causality operating outside of the spatio-
temporal realm, his account of the relationship of dependence between a temporal 
thing and its eternal essence seems very close to Spinoza’s. 
Second, both philosophers highlight the composite nature of an individual and 
the fact that each imperfectly expresses its essence. For Spinoza, individuals seem to 
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be composite by definition.284 Chansky notes that for Schopenhauer ‘our essential 
character or nature manifests itself as our whole organic body and all its functions and 
activities’ but also that the Ideas constitute what ‘nature struggled but failed to 
produce’ in individuals ‘because of the inevitable conflict among all the various forms 
of nature.’285 This is echoed by Hilda Hein who describes complex individuals as 
composites whose imperfections arise because they combine different Ideas, but it 
also resonates clearly with what Beth Lord has to say about the Spinozan human mind 
and body expressing their essences only partially thanks to their confusion with other 
ideas or bodies.286 
Each account has a neo-Aristotelian aspect which leaves it exposed to a degree 
of criticism. In Spinoza’s case, it seems to be the very appeal to formal essences as the 
basis for individuation which provokes the objection of invoking a discredited 
metaphysical category of entities. This would presumably also apply to 
Schopenhauer’s Ideas, with the added difficulty that they are also universals. Still, it is 
hardly surprising that two thinkers who I have interpreted as realists on this question 
would find themselves subject to such ‘Ockham’s Razor’-style criticisms. It is that 
very realism, of course, which enables each to offer an account of individuation in 
which the distinctions between things have a real metaphysical grounding. 
 There are, then, significant resonances between Spinoza’s account of 
individuation by formal essences and Schopenhauer’s by Platonic Ideas, concerning 
the nature and metaphysical status of these entities and how they relate to ordinary 
individuals. It is worth noting that such questions have received much fuller 
discussion in the scholarly literature on Spinoza. It seems to me that the analysis 
therein offers resources which could help in the development of a more cogent 
interpretation of Schopenhauer’s Ideas such that those commentators who seem to 
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have dismissed them as unworkable could perhaps be persuaded that they have been 
too hasty.287 
 
3.3 Individuation and Methodology, Intuitions and Ethics 
 
3.3.1 Individuation and Philosophical Method 
 
Three tasks remain. First, to consider any implications of the foregoing for our 
understanding of Schopenhauer and Spinoza’s respective methodologies. Second, to 
assess the extent to which their accounts of individuation might be thought to tally 
with our intuitions on the subject and third to point to connections between these 
accounts and the ethical theories of each thinker. With regard to the first of these, 
their accounts of individuation may seem to call into question aspects of the way I 
have characterised Schopenhauer and Spinoza’s philosophical approaches throughout 
this thesis. When it comes to individuation, we seem to be confronted with a 
Schopenhauer whose Kantianism is tempered by his Platonism, a Spinoza who 
appears more of an idealist than a realist with respect to time and a comparatively 
metaphysically modest Spinoza and metaphysically extravagant Schopenhauer. 
Not all of this withstands scrutiny, however. Taking Spinoza first, his is not a 
merely physical account of individuation, there is a metaphysical element in virtue of 
the formal essences. Characterising the physicalist part of the account as subject to the 
first kind of knowledge is what makes Spinoza seem closer to Schopenhauer’s 
idealism on space and time. The very distinction between realism and idealism, 
however, may be complicated by the existence of adequate knowledge in the infinite 
intellect of God. Schopenhauer appears to give a more clear-cut, metaphysical answer 
to the question of what individuates things but the metaphysics of Ideas has been a 
source of contention, trailing problems such as that of explaining the plurality of the 
Platonic Ideas given their freedom from the forms of the principle of sufficient reason. 
There may also be a question – given his empiricism – as to what entitles him to the 
notion of Platonic Ideas at all. Schopenhauer does, though, think that Platonic Ideas 
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can be directly experienced – they are perceived in aesthetic experience. And the 
accusation of metaphysical extravagance may be unfair. Several of the readings of his 
Platonic Ideas I have discussed reposition him as closer to Kant, with the only 
metaphysical distinction he draws being between that which exists in itself and its 
manifestations. Indeed even this distinction Hein understands on a two-aspect rather 
than two-worlds model. 
It remains the case, however, that for each thinker there is an account of 
individuation within space and time which gives only an inadequate picture of the 
nature of reality. For both, too, individuation ultimately depends upon the relationship 
between durational, finite particulars and their infinite, eternal essences which, I have 
argued, should be understood as abstract objects. Thus, as was the case with the 
embedded self, the similarities between the two thinkers’ accounts of individuation 
surely do call into question the extent to which they can be operating with entirely 
alien philosophical approaches.288 
 
3.3.2 Intuitions as a Test of Individuation 
 
I will now briefly assess whether each thinker can offer a satisfying answer to 
the questions set out at the beginning of this chapter – and more generally whether 
their accounts fit with our intuitions about individuation. For neither can there be 
substantial individuation – to what extent, then, can things be really distinct? For 
Schopenhauer, as I have said, the distinctions between a pen and a piece of paper and 
between the cats Hero and Millie are merely phenomenal. That doesn’t just mean 
subjective but, arguably, illusory and certainly distant from will as it is in itself. 
Distinctions between species, between mankind and other species and between one 
human person and another are less distant, but nonetheless not features of ultimate 
reality. For Spinoza, any individual has an essence. This may well imply that 
manufactured things, inanimate things, and non-human living things are all as much 
individuals as human beings. There is no special account of personal identity nor any 
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marker distinguishing one species from another. In fact, when Spinoza discusses talk 
of the species man, horse and dog it is to highlight the inadequacy of universals. Of 
course, there are varying degrees of complexity, and a human being is more complex 
and more capable than a rhododendron. But there is no reason to believe these degrees 
of complexity are differentiated into distinct grades, as with Schopenhauer’s Platonic 
Ideas of species. 
The question of whether Spinoza’s theory of individuation is intuitively 
appealing has been much discussed – the same cannot be said for Schopenhauer. Don 
Garrett is convinced of the plausibility of Spinoza’s account. He remarks that ‘readers 
of the Ethics are often struck by a sense that modern science will eventually lead us to 
something very much like Spinoza’s approach to individuation.’289 He concludes that 
the theory is coherent and reasonable290 and that Spinoza’s ‘rejection of substance as a 
principle of individuation at the very least clears the way for an alternative conception 
of individuality, one from which… a powerful conclusion about individual things 
might be derived.’291 
 One aspect of Spinoza’s account that appeals to Garrett is its inclusivity – it 
can allow not only for natural forces and species of living things to count as 
individuals but also – at least arguably – such things as inanimate objects, cooperative 
groups of people and the whole of nature. Also, as Garrett points out, it is not too 
rigid292 but is able to accommodate the idea of something that changes nonetheless 
remaining the same individual. I would suggest that this tallies better with our normal 
ways of thinking about individuals than do the more restrictive accounts of identity 
later offered by Locke and Hume. (Though it should be noted that Ruth Saw feels 
otherwise, commenting with regard to personal identity that ‘our feeling that we are 
persons is in spite of whatever Spinoza may be thought to have shown as to our 
ephemeral and fragmentary nature.’)293 
Equally, it may be thought to be in Spinoza’s favour that he recognises the 
connectedness of individuals and the fuzziness of distinctions between them – and, 
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even more so, between different species.294 It might follow, though, that for Spinoza 
unlike Schopenhauer the distinctions between types of individuals are merely 
conventional. As Lee C.Rice puts it, the difference between the identity criteria for 
churches, persons and cats ‘is one of degree, and is determined by the conventions 
which we establish.’295 The worry for critics of Spinoza is that his criteria of identity 
are too loose, that there are – according to his picture – infinitely many ways of 
drawing the boundaries of individuals.296 This is part of what motivates the many 
objectors, listed early in this chapter, concerned about the disappearance of 
individuals in Spinoza’s system. I have tried to argue that his appeal to formal 
essences allows Spinoza to offer a metaphysically-grounded account of individuation, 
but even without this he is able to distinguish between individuals proper and mere 
things by stipulating that an individual is something which maintains its pattern of 
motion and rest.297 
As I say, the intuitive appeal of Schopenhauer’s account of individuation seems 
to have been much less discussed. The exception, perhaps, being his treatment of 
aesthetic experience, which was taken up enthusiastically by artists if not by 
philosophers.298 On the other hand, Julian Young’s insistence that Platonic Ideas are 
‘ordinary perceptual objects’ rather than ‘exotic entities’299 is motivated by his sense 
that the alternative represents an ‘impossibly odd view’300 and Bela Egyed judges 
Schopenhauer’s theory of the Platonic Ideas to be ͚the weakest aspect of his 
philosophy since it precludes any reference to rigorous conceptual and empirical 
analysis—comes across as artificial and, from a modern scientific point of view, 
amateurish.͛301As we saw in the previous chapter, Schopenhauer’s emphasis on the 
embodied nature of the self has, however, found favour and certainly he himself 
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believes that our intuitions of personal responsibility find satisfaction in his rendering 
of the free intelligible character. 
As regards the theory of individuation itself, we can perhaps be guided to some 
extent by what commentators have made of Spinoza’s model. Certainly, 
Schopenhauer shares the project Garrett admires in Spinoza of seeking to explain 
individuation without appeal to substantial distinctions. It is, though, a less inclusive 
account – at least at the more metaphysically profound level of the Ideas, which 
individuate only species as such and human persons. Of course this has the 
consequence that natural kinds are not merely conventional for Schopenhauer, as they 
seem to be for Spinoza. 
As a corollary, it is perhaps worth questioning the extent to which readers’ 
intuitions – even assuming they coincide – offer a good standard against which to test 
the philosophies under consideration. This itself is a point which has been discussed 
within the scholarship on Spinoza. In Ruth Saw’s judgement ‘to apply one very 
important test to a metaphysical system’ is ‘to exhibit its inner harmony, but this 
needs to be complemented by another test, the confrontation with fact, or at any rate, 
with our ordinary way of referring to facts.’302 This test she takes Spinoza to fail on 
the question of personal identity. Lee Rice, however, disagrees both that Spinoza fails 
the test and that it should be considered in any way a decisive one: 
 
there is no special problem about personal identity and... identity through time is a matter 
of degree. Both of these also seem plausible to me, and also appear to be in accord with 
ordinary linguistic usage; though I should not regard the latter as being a decisive point in 
their favour.303 
 
Rice develops this theme, noting Spinoza’s caveat that ‘I am aware that in ordinary 
usage these terms have different meanings. It is not, however, my intention to 
explicate the meanings of words, but rather to explicate the nature of things’304 and 
noting, too, that ‘in twentieth-century terms’ Spinoza’s metaphysics is ‘revisionary 
and not descriptive (in Strawson’s sense).’305 It seems perfectly possible that Spinoza 
would designate an appeal to intuition or to our ordinary ways of speaking of things 
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an appeal to the first kind of knowledge rather than an adequate, rigorous 
philosophical test.306 
 
3.3.3 Individuation and Ethics 
 
The last of my three tasks is to point to the fact that the ethical theory of each 
thinker is shaped by his account of individuation. Taking Schopenhauer first: for one 
thing, it is only in virtue of the intelligible character that each of us is free and can be 
held responsible for our actions. For Schopenhauer, knowledge of the Platonic Ideas – 
of what things are in their essence – is valuable in its own right, as is clear from his 
aesthetic theory as set out in §§34-52. But these sections also reveal that the kind of 
experience we enjoy when perceiving the Platonic Ideas, one in which the 
individuality of the knowing self, as well as that of the object, drops away, gives us 
our first taste of possible salvation. It is the first indication that there may be a way of 
escape from the torment of life and further that any such salvation will involve first, a 
kind of knowing that has freed itself from servitude to the will and second, a 
dissolution or vanishing of the individual. On the other hand, it is precisely as 
individuals and species that we suffer. In §61 Schopenhauer reminds us of the lesson 
of book 2 that ‘there was necessarily a constant struggle between the individual 
species, and that precisely in this way was expressed an inner antagonism of the will-
to-live with itself.’307 That book also made clear that the Platonic Ideas themselves are 
in conflict: ‘since the higher Idea or objectification of will can only appear by 
subduing the lower Ideas, it endures the opposition of these.’308 What is more, 
Schopenhauer identifies the ethical mode of life that is compassion with an 
understanding of the illusory or phenomenal nature of individuation. To recognise that 
beyond the phenomenal each of us is constituted by the same will is to take on 
another’s interests as our own.309 
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For Spinoza, as Garrett points out, the theory of conatus is founded on 
individuation and in turn founds Spinoza’s psychology and ethics.310 His descriptive 
or psychological egoism starts from the idea that each individual has a conatus – the 
very essence of an individual is to strive to preserve itself. Nonetheless, because of 
certain facts about individuals, this egoism is compatible not only with cooperation 
but with many traditional virtues, even to the point of self-sacrifice.311 First, the 
Spinozan self is embedded, integrated into and dependent upon a network of other 
individuals. Second, what we seek to preserve is ourselves as active beings, in the 
case of humans this means as rational possessors of true ideas, for the sake of which 
we should be prepared to put aside our own immediate physical interests. Indeed 
Spinoza concludes in EIVP73 that ‘[a] man who is guided by reason is more free in a 
state, where he lives according to a common decision, than in solitude, where he 
obeys only himself.’ This relates to two other aspects of Spinoza’s ethical theory to 
which his account of individuation is relevant. The first is Spinoza’s own conception 
of freedom, according to which to be free is to be self-determined, so that we are freer 
the more active we are, and the more what we do follows from our own nature. The 
second is that for Spinoza as for Schopenhauer blessedness is very closely tied to 
knowledge and particularly to understanding the true nature of reality and our place as 
modes within it. And it is as possessors of adequate ideas that we can hope to achieve 
a kind of eternity. My next two chapters will examine the Spinozism of 
Schopenhauer’s ethics and the relationship between the two thinkers’ accounts of 
salvation in turn. 
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Ethics 
 
  
The central aim of my thesis is to demonstrate commonalities between 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy and that of Spinoza and to argue that reading 
Schopenhauer as a Spinozist can help us to understand aspects of his philosophy that 
would otherwise remain obscure. It is often the influence of Kant’s philosophy on 
Schopenhauer that represents the greatest obstacle to characterising him as a Spinozist 
– and Schopenhauer at least thought of himself as a Kantian. This is certainly one 
major difficulty that arises in trying to present Schopenhauer’s ethics as Spinozist, 
because Schopenhauer adheres to Kant’s notion of noumenal freedom. But perhaps 
equally challenging to this project is the gulf between Spinoza’s optimism and 
Schopenhauer’s pessimism. Spinoza is a pantheist who identifies the whole of reality 
with God, while Schopenhauer is an atheist who thinks that the inner nature of reality 
itself – which he calls the will – is a malevolent force. Spinoza recommends human 
cooperation and believes that nothing is more useful to a person than other people, 
while Schopenhauer subscribes to the inevitability of conflict between individuals. 
Again, Spinoza claims that by becoming increasingly rational we also become more 
free, more powerful and more happy until we ultimately reach the state of highest 
blessedness, which he calls the intellectual love of God. Schopenhauer thinks that 
human life alternates between boredom and suffering, that it would be better for us 
not to have been born and that the best we can hope for is to withdraw from life 
through ascetic denial of the will. 
 Despite all of this, I hope to show that Schopenhauer’s philosophy leaves 
room for an ethics which is very close to that of Spinoza and which he himself largely 
overlooks. I will also suggest that the ways in which Schopenhauer’s ethics depart 
from Spinoza’s are not to Schopenhauer’s advantage and that his ethical theory would 
have been more persuasive had it remained closer to Spinoza’s. In the final chapter I 
will address the questions of pessimism and optimism and of salvation. In this, I focus 
on the possibility of a practical ethics within determinism and particularly on the role 
of knowledge and the account of the self in such a project. I will start by establishing 
Schopenhauer’s Kantian account of freedom and its limits, before setting out the 
ethical theory Spinoza offers despite his determinism. I will suggest that 
Schopenhauer has resources for a similar account and address three objections that I 
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think he would be likely to raise to that suggestion. Finally, I will argue that 
Schopenhauer’s refusal to offer a full moral philosophy in the style of Spinoza is a 
product of his own particularly narrow understanding of what constitutes the ethical 
domain. 
 
1. ETHICS WITHIN DETERMINISM 
 
1.1 Schopenhauer’s Kantian Theory of Freedom 
 
Schopenhauer takes a Kantian line on what is perhaps the debate most 
fundamental to ethics: the question of whether we have any freedom or if all of our 
actions are determined.312 Certainly, Schopenhauer’s theory of freedom could not 
have existed prior to Kant (and hence wasn’t available to Spinoza) because it depends 
on Kant’s separation of phenomenal and noumenal realms. Kant, of course, 
distinguishes the appearances of things (which he designates phenomena) from things 
as they are in themselves (noumena). He maintains that our knowledge is limited to 
phenomena or to things as they appear to us, and we can have no knowledge of things 
as they are in themselves. 
Schopenhauer, as we know, shares Kant’s idealism, which he adapts to some 
extent. He maintains that space, time and causality – which he labels the forms of the 
principle of sufficient reason – are not to be found in things as they are in themselves 
(that is, noumena) but are forms within which objects appear to us and this is because, 
effectively, they are provided by our own minds. This means that space, time and 
causality only apply to phenomena and not to things in themselves. And this in turn 
means that anything that is noumenal is not subject to the causal order and can 
therefore be called free. 
Schopenhauer accepts, along with Kant, that as phenomenal individuals we are 
utterly subject to the causal order of nature – that is, all our actions are determined. 
This means that if we are to be free at all, it can only be to the extent that we 
ourselves are not only phenomena but are also noumenal or intelligible beings. And 
going beyond the more cautious Kant, Schopenhauer positively asserts that ‘the 
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intelligible character of every man is to be regarded as an act of will outside time’.313 
He maintains that this act is free because it falls outside the principle of sufficient 
reason, which, again, applies only to phenomena, and only within which laws of 
causality apply. 
The topic of freedom, then, might seem an unfruitful place to start the attempt 
to construct a Spinozistic account of Schopenhauer’s ethics – after all, the Kantian 
notion of the noumenal realm as a last refuge for human freedom was unavailable to 
Spinoza. Schopenhauer’s Kantian response to the question of whether or not we are 
free, however, leaves his philosophy with a problem that Spinoza also faced and 
because of this Spinoza’s Ethics may offer resources to be plundered in the search for 
a solution, as we shall see. 
Both Kant and Schopenhauer are interested in freedom because they are 
concerned to establish that a person can be held responsible for their actions. If my 
actions are caused by something outside of myself then I cannot be said to be 
responsible for them. For Schopenhauer, what I do as a phenomenal individual is 
determined by motives operating on my character. If my character is egoistic then the 
motive of buying a chocolate bar will move me to action; in the same situation a 
person of compassionate character might respond to the motive of buying the Big 
Issue.314 Because of this my behaviour is not free but determined by the potential 
motives I stumble across and, in the final analysis, by my own character (which 
determines whether any particular motive will be operative in my case). This is what I 
call Schopenhauer’s character-determinism. But if a person’s actions are determined 
by her character, the only remaining possibility for validly holding her responsible for 
her actions would be if her character itself wasn’t caused by anything else. And this is 
exactly what Schopenhauer claims. As we saw, Schopenhauer holds that things as 
they are in themselves are immune to causality. Therefore my intelligible character 
(my character as it is in itself) is free because it is uncaused (causality just doesn’t 
apply to it) – so nothing outside of me is responsible for my actions.315 
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Freedom of the noumenal self or intelligible character is morally relevant for 
Kant and Schopenhauer because it means that we can legitimately hold people 
responsible for their actions. But in another sense it might seem completely irrelevant 
to ethics. Anything noumenal is independent of all time and space: noumenal 
freedom, then, cannot concern the actions performed by individuals in the world, 
which, surely, constitutes the realm in which ethics plays a role. Indeed, 
Schopenhauer denies that human actions can ever be free – they are strictly 
determined by an individual’s character.316 Given that our freedom only exists in the 
noumenal realm and even then is rather a matter of being uncaused than of freely 
choosing or acting, as far as human individuals are concerned Schopenhauer is 
effectively a determinist. 
Here, then, is the problem that Schopenhauer’s Kantian conception of freedom 
bequeaths him. If freedom is restricted to the noumenal realm and our daily actions 
are entirely determined then writing an ethics at all may seem pointless. We are not 
free to choose one course of action over another, we will necessarily do what our 
unchanging characters dictate. Why, then, does Schopenhauer appear to prescribe a 
certain course, to suggest, as he does, that the compassionate life is better than the 
egoistic, and that asceticism is best of all? The problem, more pressingly, is to make 
room for ethics (and, perhaps, to make sense of Schopenhauer writing an ethics) 
within a determinist picture of (phenomenal) reality.317 
This is not a question that Schopenhauer focuses on in his ethical writings. 
However, the fact that Spinoza clearly believes that it makes sense for a determinist to 
still be an ethicist – to show people that they can become better, and even freer – 
might inspire us to look more carefully at his successor Schopenhauer’s work. Does 
that work provide any resources on which to base an ethics, any indications that one 
can change one’s behaviour in a morally relevant way, for instance? I will argue that 
it does, and that these resources demonstrate significant similarities with those 
Spinoza himself provides. 
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2. Spinoza’s Ethics: Freedom Within Determinism 
 
My account of Spinoza throughout has been based primarily on the Ethics as 
the locus of the systematic and mature exhibition of his philosophical thought. The 
title of his major work indicates that Spinoza’s project is, ultimately, to show us the 
route to virtue and happiness,318 its subtitle – Demonstrated in Geometrical Order – 
reminding us that this will be achieved whilst nonetheless treating human behaviour 
‘as if it were a question of lines, planes, and bodies’,319 in effect, without recourse to 
the notion of free will. Spinoza is a determinist: ‘[i]n nature there is nothing 
contingent, but all things have been determined… to exist and produce an effect in a 
certain way’,320 even a necessitarian: ‘[t]hings could have been produced by God in 
no other way, and in no other order than they have been produced’,321 and free will is 
explicitly ruled out: ‘[t]he will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary 
one…each volition can neither exist nor be determined to produce an effect unless it 
is determined by another cause’.322 But Spinoza nonetheless believes that humans do 
have a degree of freedom and can become better and happier. 
Spinoza understands freedom in terms of self-determination. Because ‘God 
acts from the laws of his nature alone, and is compelled by no one’, Spinoza holds 
God to be a free cause.323 When explaining human bondage, Spinoza reminds us that 
this is not possible for human beings: ‘[i]t is impossible that a man… should be able 
to undergo no changes except those which can be understood through his own nature 
alone, and of which he is the adequate cause.’324 However, the more closely we 
human beings approximate to God’s position, the freer we are. We are more free the 
more that we are active, less so the more that we passively endure experiences which 
are beyond our control. For Spinoza, this means that we are free to the extent that our 
behaviour results from our own adequate understanding but unfree while we are 
subject to and swayed by passions. Thus in the Demonstration to Part IV Proposition 
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23 Spinoza writes: ‘insofar as he is determined to do something from the fact that he 
understands, he acts’, while when outlining the nature of bondage in the Preface to 
that part he tells us ‘the man who is subject to affects is under the control, not of 
himself, but of fortune’ so that ‘though he sees the better for himself, he is still forced 
to follow the worse.’ 
Thus for Spinoza to be free is to be active, for one’s own essence to be the 
cause of what one does. Because the nature of the mind is to understand, the more we 
know and understand, the freer we are. Our essence – our conatus – is to strive to 
preserve ourselves, and the nature of the mind is to understand, so that ‘what we strive 
for from reason is nothing but understanding’.325 In fact, such understanding reduces 
the power that the passions have over us: Propositions 3 and 4 of Part V – ‘Of Human 
Freedom’ – tell us that we can form a clear and distinct idea of any affect of the body 
(P4) and that when we do this with a passion, it ceases to be one (P3). So for Spinoza, 
within a deterministic system in which free will is an illusion, we can nonetheless 
increase our freedom by increasing our knowledge and understanding. 
It is also precisely by gaining knowledge and freedom that we can become 
both happy and virtuous. Joy, for Spinoza, is that emotion ‘by which the mind passes 
to a greater perfection’326 and the mind ‘rejoices insofar as it conceives adequate 
ideas, that is (by P1), insofar as it acts.’327 The activity of the mind brings joy even to 
the point of blessedness – the greatest happiness of which we are capable is the 
intellectual love of God. As Spinoza explains in Part V Proposition 32 ‘[w]hatever we 
understand by the third kind of knowledge we take pleasure in’ and in its Corollary 
‘[f]rom the third kind of knowledge, there necessarily arises an intellectual love of 
God’, having already established in P16 that ‘[t]his love toward God must engage the 
mind most.’ Finally, in the Scholium to VP36 he is able to conclude that ‘we clearly 
understand wherein our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists, namely, in a 
constant and eternal love of God’. 
Our greatest happiness, then, comes through intellectual activity. That this also 
corresponds to our greatest virtue is really a foregone conclusion given Spinoza’s 
definition of virtue – and his definitions of good and bad. Spinoza asserts repeatedly 
that a thing’s virtue is simply its power to act according to its own nature. So for 
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instance EIV Definition 8: ‘by virtue and power I understand the same thing… the 
very essence, or nature, of man, insofar as he has the power of bringing about certain 
things, which can be understood through the laws of his nature alone’ and EIVP18 S: 
‘virtue (by D[efinition]8) is nothing but acting from the laws of one’s own nature’. It 
follows, then, that ‘[k]nowledge of God is the mind’s greatest good; its greatest virtue 
is to know God.’328 This is because, as we have seen, virtue consists in acting 
according to one’s own nature – at its apex, for the human mind, this means knowing 
and loving God – but also because good and evil are, for Spinoza, relative to desire. In 
Part IV Definition 1 he establishes that ‘[b]y good I shall understand what we 
certainly know to be useful to us.’ This means that from the point of view of a human 
being, whose blessedness consists in intellectual activity, ‘[w]e know nothing to be 
certainly good or evil, except what really leads to understanding or what can prevent 
us from understanding.’329 Thus the greatest virtue we can attain inevitably coincides 
with our greatest freedom and happiness: understanding. 
What is perhaps more surprising is that Spinoza claims that our happiness 
coincides, too, with virtue in the more traditional sense. Those who are freer, more 
active and more happy will also possess the moral virtues. As he puts it at EIVP46, 
‘[h]e who lives according to the guidance of reason strives, as far as he can, to repay 
the other’s hate, anger, and disdain toward him, with love, or nobility.’ A little later, 
at EIVP72, Spinoza insists that ‘[a] free man always acts honestly, not deceptively’ 
and claims in the demonstration to that proposition that even if he ‘could save himself 
from the present danger of death by treachery’ a free man would refuse to do so. In 
brief, the compatibility between egoism and moral virtue depends on at least three 
Spinozan ideas. First, that what we seek to preserve when seeking to preserve 
ourselves is our active understanding and possession of adequate ideas (rather than 
simply our bodily existence, for instance). Second, that what the free person desires is 
available to all, not a good over which we are doomed to compete. And third, that as 
finite parts of nature we are dependent on one another – in particular, on modes who 
are like us, for our own well-being. Because of this ‘[t]he good which everyone who 
seeks virtue wants for himself, he also desires for other men’ and ‘free men are very 
useful to one another, are joined to one another by the closest bond of friendship (by 
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P35 and P35C1), and strive to benefit one another with equal eagerness for love’.330 
Spinoza, then, is a determinist who denies free will to God and man alike. He 
nonetheless believes that we can become both happier and more morally virtuous. We 
achieve this through gaining knowledge: through exercising power by coming to 
understand ourselves and God, the reality of which we are part. 
 
1.3 Character-Determinism and the Possibility of Changing Behaviour 
 
 Until this point, then, I have argued that although Schopenhauer believes 
humans are (noumenally) free, he appears to have left no space for ethics. This is 
because ethics concerns the actions of individuals but, for Schopenhauer, freedom is 
precluded from the phenomenal arena in which individuals live: our actions as 
individuals are determined. Spinoza, too, is a determinist but he believes that we have 
some degree of control over our actions: we can modify our behaviour to become 
better and happier people. Could one argue that Schopenhauer similarly makes room 
for ethics?  
As previously noted, Schopenhauer insists that each of us has a single, 
unchanging character which strictly determines all of our actions. But at the same 
time, Schopenhauer discusses the phenomenon of remorse, which he describes as 
arising as a result of performing an action that is not within one’s character. Also, he 
states that one can ‘acquire’ one’s true character over the course of a lifetime. Both of 
these seem to challenge that picture of an unchanging and inescapable character. In 
my view, however, that picture can be shown to be consistent with these notions of 
acting out of character and of acquiring one’s character. 
 Egoism, compassion and malice are, for Schopenhauer, the three basic types 
of human character. Most people’s natures comprise a mix of all three, but the 
proportions of each component are eternally fixed in each individual. If one’s 
character is predominantly egoistic, then to act out of character would be to act in a 
way that is, so-to-speak, ‘too’ altruistic. This could happen, Schopenhauer points out, 
through a misreading of the situation. If you signed up to donate money to charity 
because you thought you were signing up for an investment scheme you would have 
acted more altruistically than was in keeping with your character because the ‘wrong’ 
                                                 
330
 Spinoza, EIVP37 and EIVP71D. 
 107 
external stimulus operated on it. When you later realised this, you would feel regret or 
remorse, on Schopenhauer’s account. 
 Schopenhauer’s explanation of remorse, then, reveals that being better 
informed can change your behaviour. And it is in this sense, too, that Schopenhauer 
suggests one’s character can gradually be ‘acquired’. If over your lifetime you gain in 
knowledge and understanding of the world and your reason improves at clearly 
distinguishing motives then your behaviour will become increasingly in keeping with 
your (nonetheless unchanging) character. Your character can only express itself 
properly if your knowledge and reason set the world before it properly. Your 
behaviour at the age of seventy may look radically different to that at the age of 
seventeen if you become wiser – or less so! At each point your character determines 
your behaviour but at one it is obstructed by your lack of knowledge or reasoning 
ability so that the resultant behaviour is very different in each case. 
While Schopenhauer’s statement that and explanation of how we can act out 
of character seem clear, neither he nor his interpreters focus on this to any great 
extent. The one real exception to this is the account offered by John Atwell, which 
challenges the view that Schopenhauer’s character-determinism is compatible with 
the phenomenon of acting out of character. He writes that ‘Schopenhauer is honest 
enough to acknowledge the feeling of repentance, but to acknowledge it is one thing 
and to accommodate it in a reasonable manner is another… it certainly appears that he 
cannot do the latter.’331 He points out that, for Schopenhauer, there can be no action 
without a motive, and that motives can’t operate in the absence of a character. In fact, 
he says, there ‘cannot be an “operative” motive or action of the egoistic or altruistic 
sort without a corresponding susceptibility in the character – which all means that 
there can be no actions done “out of character”’.332 In other words, if you don’t have 
an egoistic aspect to your character then you can’t respond to an egoistic motive. But 
without a motive there can be no action, so unless you have an egoistic element to 
your character it is impossible for you to perform an egoistic action at all – and so 
there can be no such thing as ‘out of character’ behaviour. 
If the phenomenon of remorse (which seems to presuppose such ‘out of 
character’ behaviour) really were so hard to reconcile with his theory of human action 
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one might be surprised that Schopenhauer drew attention to it at all. In a footnote to 
Atwell’s article his editor darkly hints that Schopenhauer might have raised the notion 
of acting out of character in the hope that it could explain away some of his own 
dubious behaviour. My own view is that rather than standing in need of a somewhat 
cattish psychoanalytical explanation, Schopenhauer’s account of remorse points the 
way to the untrumpeted but rich and plausible ethical theory one can extract from 
Book 4. 
 Atwell’s own, rather half-hearted, attempt to show how Schopenhauer can 
deal with the idea of acting out of character unfolds as follows. He suggests that those 
actions which are not explicable with reference to my own unique character result 
from the operation of motives on a general human character in which I participate. 
(Atwell uses the same model to explain the acquired character, which is achieved 
when one acts solely on motives to which one’s own unique character responds, 
shunning those which only provoke action via the general human character). Briefly, 
questions which this account does not seem well-designed to answer include the 
following: if the general human character is ‘“rather charitable” or “moderately 
generous”’ as Atwell suggests, how does one explain actions that are more egoistic or 
malicious than those demanded by one’s own character?333 Also, if my own character 
is an amalgam of the general human character and my own particular ratio of 
compassion, egoism and malice then why should it be that in certain situations only 
the former element responds to motives and in others only the latter? Since Atwell 
himself notes that ‘this line of argument can extricate Schopenhauer from 
inconsistency only partially, and perhaps it does not even do that’, I shall abandon 
it.334 
 Atwell is right that both motive and character are necessary to explain each 
human action. He is not, however, quite right to say that there ‘cannot be an 
“operative” motive or action of the egoistic or altruistic sort without a corresponding 
susceptibility in the character’.335 This is because, as Schopenhauer explicitly states, 
motives operate not as they are but as they are known or seem to be. Thus a 
compassionate person could respond to a motive that was in fact egoistic if they 
thought it was altruistic, in which case an egoistic motive would have been operative 
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without there being any corresponding susceptibility in the character. Motives 
influence character through the medium of knowledge and, as I indicated earlier, to 
the extent that knowledge distorts reality or reason fails to extrapolate the 
consequences of some particular course one could be misled into acting out of 
character. As one corrects one’s knowledge and as one’s reasoning abilities improve 
one’s actions will increasingly fit one’s character; thus one will come to acquire one’s 
character. 
In my view, the lack of attention to this aspect of Schopenhauer’s moral 
philosophy is unfortunate because, I shall suggest, it leaves him with a significant 
body of ethical theory that remains compatible with his character-determinism and 
relegation of human freedom to the noumenal realm. My immediate concerns, then, 
are to demonstrate that Schopenhauer provides the resources for an ethical theory, the 
scope of that ethics (which I want to say is significant), and that it has a Spinozistic 
character. 
 The interpretation of Schopenhauer’s theory of remorse and the acquired 
character which I just offered might suggest that knowledge stands between potential 
motivating factors and my character, often obscuring or misrepresenting reality, and 
so might imply that a more immediate relation between motives and character would 
allow one to express the latter more fully. But in fact, without perception we would 
have no access to the motives at all and without knowledge the range of motives that 
could affect us would be dramatically reduced, making us much less successful at 
pursuing our interests. If our only access to motives was, as Schopenhauer says it is 
for animals, through perception we could only respond to things immediately in front 
of us. As it is, we can set all the relevant motivating factors before ourselves in the 
abstract so that each can exert its proper influence on our characters. We can, 
therefore, be influenced by motivating factors that aren’t actually present – perhaps 
most importantly by future ones through our awareness of time. This means, for 
instance, that a person of largely egoistic character could decide to sacrifice her 
immediate pleasure in favour of a greater benefit that would only be enjoyed in the 
future. She would, through her abstract reasoning ability, be acting more fully in 
accordance within her own character, deriving a greater personal gain instead of a 
smaller one. 
 In this respect, Schopenhauer endorses Spinoza’s claim that it is to my 
advantage to increase my knowledge and improve my reasoning ability. For Spinoza, 
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freedom and happiness are correlated with self-determination. The fewer erroneous 
ideas I have, the less I am affected by things outside of myself and the more I can be 
truly myself. The greater the extent of my self-determination in this sense, the more 
free and happy I will be. Of particular relevance to Schopenhauer’s ethics is Spinoza’s 
insistence that using reason helps a person to fulfil his or her nature more 
successfully, perhaps by helping that person to become aware that something he or 
she took to be in his or her interests in fact wasn’t, or vice versa.336 Schopenhauer and 
Spinoza are equally in agreement concerning how things can go wrong. One can act 
in a way that is opposed to one’s nature if one is misled by false ideas or has 
inadequate knowledge; if one reasons badly; or if one fails to reason at all and one’s 
actions are determined merely by perceptions. Perhaps more notable still is the fact 
that both mention two further sources of unrepresentative action: when emotion 
overpowers reason and when motives are furnished by the imagination rather than 
reality. 
 Like Spinoza, then, Schopenhauer gives us an account of how a person can 
come to fulfil her own nature, where this means coming to act more in accordance 
with her character and where it is achieved through improved knowledge and 
reasoning abilities. But this means that – thanks to an element of his theory that is far 
from the focus of his moral philosophy – Schopenhauer gives us much of what we 
demand of an ethics. Our capacity for knowledge gives us a great deal of control over 
our actions by allowing us to be motivated only as is appropriate to our own nature, it 
distinguishes us from animals and it allows us to take time and future consequences 
into consideration in our deliberations. And while this sphere of control is bounded by 
Schopenhauer’s character-determinism (his view that a person’s behaviour is 
determined by her unchanging character), it leaves room for a person to change her 
life radically in strikingly moral ways. Earlier I gave the example of a person whose 
behaviour appeared very different at different stages of life while that individual’s 
character nonetheless remained the same, and Schopenhauer himself maintains that a 
‘wild youth can be followed by a staid, sober, manly age.’337 But Schopenhauer goes 
further still, saying that:  
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the ability to modify knowledge, and through this to modify action, goes so far that 
the will seeks to attain its ever unalterable end, for example, Mohammed’s paradise… 
[by] applying prudence, force, and fraud in the one case, abstinence, justice, 
righteousness, alms, and pilgrimage to Mecca in the other.338 
 
If pursuing Schopenhauer’s theory can make the difference between a violent, 
fraudulent person and a just and charitable one, one might wonder if it doesn’t fully 
satisfy the criteria for a successful ethics. 
 While Schopenhauer has to allow that even on his own account we can change 
our behaviour to a significant extent, he wouldn’t have to accept that this is morally 
relevant because such change needn’t be for the better. A person of compassionate 
character needs reason and knowledge for her actions to be as expressive of 
compassion as her character demands. But equally, by enabling her actions to more 
fully express her character an egoistic person would use knowledge and reason to 
become more selfish. Thus the development could be for good or bad, depending on 
the quality of a person’s character. Given this, moral considerations appear to remain 
stuck outside of the domain of human action since the compassionate, egoistic or 
malicious nature of a person’s character depends on a noumenal act of will unchosen 
and unalterable by that person.339 
 
1.4 Knowledge and Virtue 
 
For Spinoza, the moral relevance of the impact of reason and knowledge on 
behaviour is clearer. According to Spinoza, everyone’s nature is egoistic, but reason 
clearly reveals that one’s self-interest is best served through co-operation with others. 
A cooperative community, in turn, can only be maintained if its members behave 
justly towards one another. For Spinoza, then, to act in a way that is more in tune with 
reason is inevitably to act more justly towards others. Could Schopenhauer accept a 
claim like this? It seems unlikely given his characterisation of the phenomenal world 
as a constant struggle between individuals over limited resources. Schopenhauer does 
seem to hold that in the long-run it is advantageous to at least appear virtuous. 
Equally, Spinoza would, of course, have to accept that on certain occasions my own 
physical well-being would be best served by treating another unjustly. His claim that 
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genuine virtue to the point, in certain circumstances, of self-sacrifice follows from 
enlightened egoism depends on his belief in a ‘true’ self-interest that is not identified 
with one’s physical well-being or even, perhaps, one’s continued existence as an 
individual. 
There is a second, though related, way in which education leads inevitably to 
more ethical behaviour on Spinoza’s account. To properly understand the world is to 
have one’s image of oneself as an entirely distinct individual – perhaps as a substance 
in one’s own right, for example – undermined. For one thing, Spinoza holds that each 
individual is simply a mode of the one substance, which he calls God or nature. For 
another, the lines we draw to separate such modes are not clear-cut: I am not utterly 
separate, for instance, from the tools I use, from my family and friends or from the 
communities of which I am a member – to some extent my interests are bound up 
with theirs. So for Spinoza an adequate knowledge of reality brings with it an 
expanded sense of self and identification with others which in turn leads me to 
promote ‘their’ interests along with my own. 
 Schopenhauer shares the view that knowledge of reality is central to virtue in 
this sense. His own metaphysical position identifies phenomenal individuals as 
illusions that deceive those who see the world through the veil of maya. In reality, 
everything is will, to which the principle of individuation does not apply. But this 
means, for Schopenhauer, that I am really as much you as I am me. If perpetrator and 
victim are, in reality, one, then to hurt another is to hurt myself. Schopenhauer tells us 
that the compassionate person lives according to the motto ‘[i]njure no one; on the 
contrary, help everyone as much as you can’.340 But presumably this is also how a 
self-interested person would behave if they had attained to the knowledge that they 
and everyone else are ultimately identical. 
Arguably, then, Schopenhauer ought to hold not that a compassionate person 
is someone of a radically different character to an egoistic person, but – along with 
Spinoza – that compassion results from the combination of a self-interested nature and 
knowledge of how the world really is. This means that it would not take an (at any 
rate, impossible) change of character for an egoistic person to behave 
compassionately. Nor would an egoist behaving compassionately rely on them being 
misled into acting out of character. Instead, once my sense of my self has been 
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expanded to take in the whole of reality, properly fulfilling my self-interested nature 
would itself involve behaving compassionately towards all other phenomenal 
individuals. 
 We saw, earlier, that Schopenhauer certainly has the resources to account for 
significant and ethically relevant changes in behaviour over the course of a lifetime. 
We also saw that, like Spinoza, he can explain this in spite of his determinism. And, 
again like Spinoza, that he holds man’s reasoning ability to be responsible for this 
possibility. We also saw, however, that this theory falls short of being a true ethics. 
While the changes in behaviour that improved knowledge can bring are ethically 
relevant – one could, for instance, as Schopenhauer’s ‘Mecca’ example suggested, 
become a pilgrim instead of a fraudster – the role of reason in producing these 
changes is morally neutral because the changes could go either way. In other words, if 
your character is egoistic then increasing your knowledge might well change you from 
a pilgrim to a fraudster. 
 Presumably it is expected of a moral philosophy that it be capable of pointing 
out a course that is guaranteed to make us more virtuous – or at least one which holds 
no risk of making us less so. On the model I have extracted from Schopenhauer’s 
theory this would only be possible if it were the case that advancing reason and 
knowledge necessarily made us better. For Spinoza, this is in fact the case: we are all 
self-interested, and treacherous behaviour will never accord with this self-interest as 
clear reasoning reveals it to be. This, however, follows from Spinoza’s conception of 
a ‘higher’ self-interest which involves taking knowledge and reason to be goods in 
themselves. It does not seem obvious that Schopenhauer would have any reason to 
accept this picture, but he does concur with Spinoza in asserting that to see the world 
truly is to identify with others and thus behave compassionately towards them. 
Because, for Spinoza, the basic nature of all is to be self-interested, then this 
compassion can only be a kind of extended self-interest (which perhaps fits well with 
the etymology of compassion as ‘feeling with’). My argument in this section has been 
to the effect that Schopenhauer’s own account of compassion might make it too sound 
like a kind of extended self-interest. But if this is so, then surely compassion needn’t 
be inborn but something that a person of egoistic character could also achieve if only 
they had adequate knowledge of reality? 
 Were Schopenhauer to argue this he would, like Spinoza, have shown the 
following things: 
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First, that knowledge and reason can lead you to act differently 
Second, that they can do this to such an extent that your behaviour can be radically 
changed 
Third, that such a change in behaviour would necessarily make you more virtuous 
And fourth, that it would nonetheless continue to be a fulfilment of your own 
character. 
 
In other words, he would have provided a full ethical theory within his character-
determinism. 
 
2. SCHOPENHAUER’S OBJECTIONS 
 
 Schopenhauer, of course, does not argue this and would strongly object to it. 
Before offering some criticisms of what I’ve called Schopenhauer’s character 
determinism, I will outline three specific objections that I think he would raise to the 
ethical theory I’ve derived from his philosophy. I’ll diagnose them as depending on 
Schopenhauer’s view of what is relevant to ethics which, if not idiosyncratic, is 
certainly not universal. First, Schopenhauer takes compassion or altruism to be the 
(sole) mark of morality, so that he would refuse to categorise even an enlightened 
egoism as praiseworthy. Second, he is what David E. Cartwright calls a ‘motivational 
pluralist’, who would insist that compassion cannot be reduced to or explained as an 
expanded version of egoism.341 Third, he argues that it is a mistake to believe that 
ethics can be really transformative: that knowledge can change us in morally relevant 
ways. 
 
2.1 Compassion as the Mark of Morality 
 
 First, he would object that the ethics of extended egoism are insufficient to 
morality. As an illustration, Schopenhauer compares on the one hand the situation in 
which an ideal state governed its dominion perfectly according to the self-interest of 
its members with, on the other hand, the situation in which justice of disposition 
prevailed, that is, in which everyone naturally and in accordance with their own 
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character freely gave everybody else their due. Schopenhauer maintains that while the 
effect would be exactly the same in each case, the inner natures of the two would be 
opposite and the first situation would have nothing to do with morality. 
 Aside from their radically divergent understandings of freedom, this surely 
represents the biggest difference between Schopenhauer and Spinoza as regards 
ethics. In ‘Schopenhauer’s Philosophy of Value’, Christopher Janaway puts it bluntly: 
‘[t]he single criterion of moral goodness for Schopenhauer is that one’s action spring 
from compassion.’342 In his own essay in the same volume, David Cartwright concurs: 
for Schopenhauer, ‘compassion is the basis of all virtue’ and he elaborates that 
‘malice is the incentive for morally reprehensible actions, egoism for morally 
indifferent actions and compassion for actions possessing moral worth’.343 
Schopenhauer’s reasons for holding this view are less easy to establish. 
Cartwright’s own suggestion is that Schopenhauer’s reasoning appeals to the idea that 
the ethical necessarily has to do with the relation to other people: ‘[e]goism, he 
argues, cannot confer moral worth on actions because the ethical significance of any 
action lies only “in reference to others.”’344 This seems to fit ill with his claim that 
Schopenhauer – like Spinoza – sees good and bad as defined in relation to will.345 
Cartwright’s claim that ‘Schopenhauer defined the good as that which is in agreement 
with one’s will’346 resonates strongly with Spinoza’s statement in Ethics III P39S that 
‘[b]y good here I understand… what satisfies any kind of longing… we desire nothing 
because we judge it to be good, but on the contrary we call it good because we desire 
it’. Spinoza concludes from this that ‘each one, from his own affect, judges, or 
evaluates, what is good and what is bad’. If good and bad are relative to our desires, it 
is difficult to see from what independent standpoint Schopenhauer feels able to judge 
compassion as the one motive carrying moral worth. If he wants to share Spinoza’s 
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naturalisation of morality, surely Schopenhauer too ought to hold that a thing only has 
moral worth in as much as it satisfies some desire. 
Other commentators have concluded that Schopenhauer takes it to be 
obviously true that compassion is the mark of the morally good, or at least to be an 
accurate description of how we do as a matter of fact evaluate actions morally. 
Michael Maidan, for instance, argues that Schopenhauer doesn’t really prove that 
(only) altruistic acts are moral, but simply surveys a variety of moral systems to show 
that this is a shared intuition.347 Schopenhauer is unable to show that altruism is 
intrinsically worthwhile, Maidan believes, but Maidan proposes that it possesses 
moral value, for Schopenhauer, as a species of the denial of the will: ‘[t]he moral 
worth of altruism seems to depend not on its intrinsic value, but on its connexion 
with… the denial of the Will.’348 Indeed, ‘any act has moral worth, in proportion to 
the measure of self-denial of the Will that it manifests.’349 Of course, denial of the 
will may seem to stand in just as much need of an explanation as compassion as the 
criterion of moral worth. Possibly, such denial has moral worth because 
Schopenhauer sees the will itself as evil. While Maidan doesn’t dwell on this, he does 
mention in passing the idea of ‘redeeming the will’.350 Maidan does, though, discuss 
one problem with tying the moral value of altruism to its role as a species of will-
denial: ‘[t]he identification of morality with salvation… empties the moral act of its 
specificity’, and he notes that it entails that ‘aesthetic experiences, philosophic 
cogitations, and other acts’ which manifest a degree of denial must also have moral 
value.351 Such a morally revisionary claim seems hard to reconcile with 
Schopenhauer’s supposed method of surveying moral systems. 
If it is difficult to find reasons for Schopenhauer’s view that compassion is the 
mark of morality, it is harder still to find justification for the view that compassion is 
its sole mark – that the only criterion for whether something has moral value is 
whether it was inspired by compassion. Neither of the suggestions considered above 
seem capable of sustaining such a claim. That an action must be concerned with 
                                                 
347
 Michael Maidan ‘Schopenhauer on Altruism and Morality’, Schopenhauer Jahrbuch 69 Band 
(1988): 265. 
348
 Maidan, ‘Schopenhauer on Altruism and Morality’, 268. 
349
 So that ‘it is because altruism can be seen as one of the forms in which the self-denial of the Will 
operates, that it can be said to have a moral value… any act has moral worth, in proportion to the 
measure of self-denial of the Will that it manifests.’ Maidan, ‘Schopenhauer on Altruism and 
Morality’, 269. 
350
 Maidan, ‘Schopenhauer on Altruism and Morality’, 269.  
351
 Maidan, ‘Schopenhauer on Altruism and Morality’, 271 and  269. 
 117 
others to have ethical significance may rule out moral egoism, but surely does not 
leave Schopenhauer’s position as the only viable one.352 To take one example, 
Utilitarianism would seem to offer a moral system which is not characterised by 
compassion per se but which is clearly marked by ‘reference to others’. Maidan’s 
view that altruism is valuable as a species of denial of will not only shifts the criterion 
of value from compassion to denial, but precisely leaves compassion as just one 
species among a broader genus of morally valuable activities. Maidan himself seems 
exasperated by Schopenhauer’s implication that ‘compassion is not only a necessary, 
but also a sufficient condition for morality’, which he calls ‘plainly erroneous’.353 For 
one thing, ‘[a]n act can be motivated by sincere compassion, and yet be an immoral 
one according to some other standard.’354 For another, such a view fits ill with what 
Maidan sees as Schopenhauer’s method of appealing to intuitive support and a review 
of established ethical positions to underwrite his moral claims. As Maidan puts it 
‘there is a contradiction between Schopenhauer’s account of morality and his 
description of the history of ethical thought. Schopenhauer rightly points out that 
classical ethical thought was eudemonistic… pity entered into Western ethical thought 
only through Christianity’.355 In other words, compassion has certainly not been 
universally acknowledged as the criterion of morality. It therefore seems to me that 
we can conclude, with Maidan, that ‘altruism… cannot be the sole and legitimate 
mark of morality. Schopenhauer’s identification of altruism and morality provides us 
only with a too narrow criterion of morality, one which cannot be supported in 
intuitive terms’.356 Schopenhauer’s insistence that compassion is the mark of morality, 
and its only mark, represents an extremely narrow understanding of the ethical and 
one for which it is difficult to find persuasive underpinnings in his work. 
Of course, there have been those who have argued that – far from being the 
mark of what is moral – pity or compassion is in fact morally troubling. Foremost 
among such critics is Nietzsche, who responds explicitly to Schopenhauer, but 
Spinoza too has an argument to the effect that pity is an evil rather than a good. In his 
‘Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche on the Morality of Pity’, Cartwright notes that 
Spinoza, Kant and Nietzsche share an account of the nature of pity – what he labels 
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the ‘psychological model’ – as well as a negative evaluation of it.357 His contention is 
that Schopenhauer’s model is different. In another article, ‘Schopenhauer’s 
Compassion and Nietzsche’s Pity’, he argues that the term ‘Mitleid’, common to 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, should in fact be translated differently in each case: as 
‘compassion’ in Schopenhauer’s case, and ‘pity’ in Nietzsche’s. This is important 
because ‘these nouns name emotions that are morally different in ways that show why 
Schopenhauer could correctly praise Mitleid and Nietzsche could correctly condemn 
it.’358 For Cartwright’s Nietzsche, pity is to be condemned because it implies a 
superior status in the pitier, who helps the sufferer in order to enhance these feelings, 
so that this help is ‘not morally good.’359 It is effectively a form of contempt. It 
represents an exercise of power, but a weak one which picks on easy prey.360 It results 
in actions either designed to relieve the pitier’s own suffering or gain applause.361 Its 
correlative is self-pity, which ‘is debilitating’ and ‘robs its agent of natural incentives 
to solve one’s own problems’.362 On the other hand, Schopenhauer’s compassion ‘has 
as its ultimate end another’s well-being… it is an altruistic motive’.363  
For Cartwright, then, despite the two philosophers using the same term, the 
ethical attitude which Nietzsche condemns is very different to the one which 
Schopenhauer praises (‘[i]nsofar as the conception of Mitleid is employed in 
Schopenhauer’s ethics, it is not the emotion Nietzsche detailed’) so that Nietzsche’s 
criticisms of Schopenhauer miss their mark.364 In fact his view is that Schopenhauer 
himself would hold that actions performed out of pity, as characterised by Nietzsche, 
‘are egoistic and lack moral worth’.365 Cartwright does acknowledge that part of 
Nietzsche’s aim is to show not only that pity is problematic, but that what 
Schopenhauer takes to be instances of compassion are in fact examples of pity and 
further, that no cases of Schopenhauerian compassion are to be found. I will discuss 
below the question of whether or not Schopenhauer convinces on the very existence 
of compassion as a source of ethical action. Perhaps the differences between 
Nietzsche and Schopenhauer dissolve if we understand the former as objecting not to 
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compassion but to pity. Even if so, can Spinoza’s concerns about commiseratio be 
reconciled with Schopenhauer’s extolling of Mitleid in a similar way? 
Spinoza does use the two different nouns commiseratio (pity) and 
misericordia (compassion). It is of the former that he writes that ‘in a man who lives 
according to the guidance of reason’ it ‘is evil of itself and useless.’366 On the other 
hand, of compassion he says it ‘is love, insofar as it so affects a man that he is glad at 
another’s good fortune and saddened by his ill fortune’, so that it may seem if as he 
evaluates them quite differently.367 However, when defining pity, Spinoza’s analysis 
is that ‘[t]here seems to be no difference between pity and compassion, except 
perhaps that pity concerns the singular affect, whereas compassion concerns the 
habitual disposition of this affect.’368 It may be that Spinoza thinks of compassion as a 
broader tendency towards concern for others which would incorporate both the 
positive affect of joy at another’s well-being as well as the negative passion of 
suffering with their pain. Given that Schopenhauer’s focus is overwhelmingly on the 
role of another’s suffering as ethical motive – thus on what Spinoza would term pity – 
it seems as if the disagreement between the two thinkers must be real. Even if 
misericordia also encompasses a positive affect, Schopenhauer’s Mitleid would 
equate to Spinoza’s commiseratio or pity. Spinoza classifies pity as a passion rather 
than an active affect and defines it as sadness at another’s suffering.369 ‘Sadness is a 
man’s passage from a greater to a lesser perfection’370 and so for Spinoza ‘sadness… 
is directly evil’,371 from which follows Spinoza’s conclusion at EIVP50 that pity itself 
is evil.372 
 
2.2 Motivational Pluralism 
 
One might also wonder whether it is necessary or even plausible to posit three 
different fundamental types of character, as Schopenhauer does – the compassionate, 
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the egoistic and malicious. This certainly doesn’t seem to be a necessity in accounting 
for human behaviour, Spinoza, for instance, believes he can explain such diverse 
phenomena as Schadenfreude (or pleasure at someone else’s suffering) and self-
sacrifice from just the single motivating tendency of egoism. 
We have seen, then, that there is doubt over whether Schopenhauer has 
successfully shown that being prompted to action by another’s suffering is morally 
praiseworthy and certainly over whether it can be the only praiseworthy ethical 
impulse. But there is also a question to be answered about whether such a motivation 
actually exists: the question of Schopenhauer’s motivational pluralism.373 This is the 
second element of Schopenhauer’s ethics that would lead a defender of his to object to 
the ethical position I sketched above. A Schopenhauerian would see it as reductive in 
explaining away seemingly altruistic acts as ultimately egoistic. But Schopenhauer’s 
claim that there exists a plurality of ethical drives – in particular, that compassion is 
really distinct from egoism – is open to question. 
Spinoza holds that we, like everything else, are driven in everything we do by 
our striving to continue in existence. Schopenhauer, by contrast, believes that some 
human actions are motivated purely by concern for others. For Schopenhauer 
compassion is, as Christopher Janaway puts it, ‘an irreducible incentive present in the 
character of human beings’.374 For a number of commentators, such a claim has stood 
in need of explanation. David Cartwright notes the tension between Schopenhauer’s 
motivational pluralism and his metaphysical monism375 and more specifically raises a 
question about the compatibility of the existence of compassion with the role 
Schopenhauer gives to egoism in his account of human nature. ‘One of the problems 
that Schopenhauer’s Mitleids-Moral faced’, he writes, ‘was to explain how it is 
possible for me to pursue another’s well-being given the central significance of 
egoism in his analysis of human behavior.’376 The problem being that ‘Schopenhauer 
had argued that egoism is our “chief and fundamental incentive” (B, 131; E II, 
196)’.377 Both Janaway and Michael Maidan are exercised by the same issue. Thus 
Janaway: ‘Schopenhauer admits that the existence of compassion is somewhat 
                                                 
373
 To borrow David Cartwright’s term. Cartwright, ‘Compassion and Solidarity with Sufferers’, 139. 
374
 Janaway, ‘Schopenhauer’s Philosophy of Value’, 6. 
375
 Cartwright ‘Compassion and Solidarity with Sufferers’, 139: given his  metaphysical monism ‘it 
appears that Schopenhauer should have been a motivational monist in some sense of that term, 
recognizing that there was some single motive that ultimately accounts for all human actions.’ 
376
 Cartwright, ‘Schopenhauer’s Compassion and Nietzsche’s Pity’, 561. 
377
 Cartwright, ‘Schopenhauer’s Compassion and Nietzsche’s Pity’, 561. 
 121 
mysterious. We are in our essence, and not by choice, beings that will their own well-
being, which means, in ethical terms, that we are all egoistic’, so that Janaway 
concludes that ‘[c]ompassion therefore seems to go against our nature as 
individuals’378 while Maidan asks ‘[i]f egoism is a general characteristic of being, 
how is altruism possible at all? It would seem, at first glance, that altruism is 
something contra naturam, a mere impossibility’.379 
Indeed, given the similarities between Schopenhauer and Spinoza’s monist 
metaphysics and, even more so, given their dynamist accounts of the self one might 
well expect Schopenhauer to share Spinoza’s psychological egoism. Just as for 
Spinoza the essence of the self is conatus, for Schopenhauer we are fundamentally 
willing beings, fated to constant striving. Cartwright, Janaway and Maidan between 
them seem to adopt two different strategies in attempting to account for and, to the 
extent they find possible, defend Schopenhauer’s motivational pluralism. The first is 
to present Schopenhauer as making an empirical, descriptive claim: as presenting 
evidence for the existence of compassion as an incentive for action. The second is to 
essay explaining how compassion is possible in the light of Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy of the will as essence of both self and world. 
As an example of the first strategy, Janaway suggests that ‘[a]gainst the 
sceptical line that all would-be compassionate actions are ultimately egoistic, 
Schopenhauer appeals to the reader’s intuitions about particular examples’.380 He 
notes that Schopenhauer points to ‘inner satisfaction’ and the ‘sting of conscience’ to 
evidence ‘a great deal of consensus’ about the praiseworthiness of other-directed 
action, which tends to be ‘applauded by third parties’. He takes it that Schopenhauer 
‘aims to describe’ what counts as morally good, appealing to shared standards as 
‘decisive evidence for this in ordinary experience’.381 This, of course, fits with 
Maidan’s understanding of Schopenhauer’s empirical method as noted above. But if 
this is all the foundation Schopenhauer gives for his insistence on the existence of 
compassionate stimuli it seems to leave him vulnerable to the counter-assertion of 
others who don’t share these intuitions. David Cartwright has it that given ‘the 
Kantian/Schopenhauerian notion that morally good actions are not performed out of 
self-interested motives’ then for Nietzsche ‘there are no morally good actions… since 
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all actions are egoistic.’382 It may well be that when confronted with the kind of 
instances to which Schopenhauer appeals, a reader is as likely to ascribe them to 
egoistic as to altruistic motives. Cartwright notes that in On the Basis of Morality 
Schopenhauer admits his examples of altruism ‘were not immune to doubt’ and that 
others may be able to explain them egoistically, but refuses to debate with such 
people, limiting himself to addressing ‘“those who admit the reality of the matter”’.383 
This perhaps hints that he has separate reasons for believing in the reality of 
compassion as a motive force. 
This brings us to the second strategy, of attempting to explain the nature of 
compassion and how it is possible within Schopenhauer’s broader system. Cartwright, 
Janaway and Maidan all make attempts at this, with Maidan judging that ‘[i]f egoism 
exists because of the contradictions among the parts of the world conceived as a 
multiplicity, altruism is based, according to Schopenhauer, on the other pole of the 
duality of being, i.e., in the underlying unity of all beings, in the unity of the Will.’384 
Similarly for Janaway ‘[m]orally good and morally bad human beings relate 
differently towards the very fact of individuality… The good character… has the 
superior insight into reality… compassionate human beings sense the allegedly deeper 
truth that the separateness of individuals is an illusion.’385 Janaway and Maidan’s 
explanations, then, both appeal to metaphysical unity and the illusory nature of 
phenomenal individuation. The risk with this strategy is that the distinction between 
compassion and egoism becomes blurred. Thus David Cartwright notes that ‘[t]his 
type of analysis’ – that is, that compassion involves penetrating the principium 
individuationis and seeing another’s woes as my own – ‘has led commentators, such 
as Eduard von Hartmann, Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Scheler, Patrick Gardiner, and D. 
W. Hamlyn to suggest that Schopenhauer reduced compassion to some form of 
egoism.’386 This is also an argument that Julian Young makes, claiming that despite 
Schopenhauer’s official position ‘the altruist does act for the sake of his own interest, 
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the only difference between him and the egoist being that he acts for the sake of the 
interests of his metaphysical rather than his empirical self.’387 
This would, of course, bring Schopenhauer much closer to Spinoza’s own 
position, according to which compassion is a natural disposition, but one that is 
ultimately to be explained with reference to our self-interest. Acting to relieve 
another’s suffering is, for Spinoza, quite natural: ‘[a]s far as we can, we strive to free 
a thing we pity from its suffering.’388 This is because pity is a version of affect 
mirroring, wherein ‘[i]f we imagine a thing like us… to be affected with some affect, 
we are thereby affected with a like affect.’ Thus it is quite compatible with, and in the 
final analysis a function of, our egoistic natures, because what moves us is ultimately 
‘an affection of our body’.389 So for Spinoza pity is a genuine and spontaneous 
disposition which provokes a real desire to help the subject’s suffering fellow but is 
nonetheless explicable in terms of subject’s own conatus or striving towards 
flourishing. 
The distinction between egoism and compassion is, though, absolutely crucial 
to Schopenhauer’s account of the morally good, and David Cartwright tries to offer a 
reading of the nature of compassion capable of preserving that distinction. To my 
mind, he is not quite able to show both that compassion is explicable given 
Schopenhauer’s metaphysics and that it is not reducible to egoism. In his 
‘Schopenhauer’s Compassion and Nietzsche’s Pity’, Cartwright argues that there are 
two possible ways for a Schopenhauerian to explain the possibility of compassion 
given that egoism is the fundamental human incentive. ‘One is based’, he writes, on 
Schopenhauer’s ‘metaphysics and the ultimate unity of being. That is, Mitleid is 
possible because the separation between individuals is only apparent’. The second is 
that ‘Mitleid as a desire for another’s well-being is possible only if another’s misery 
becomes directly the same sort of incentive as my own misery.’390 
Cartwright elaborates on each of these possibilities in his chapter ‘Compassion 
and Solidarity with Sufferers: The Metaphysics of Mitleid’. With regard to the first, 
he clarifies that Schopenhauer’s true position cannot be that compassionate behaviour 
is motivated by ‘cognition into the unity of being’, but that such ‘conduct “shows” or 
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“expresses” what his metaphysics describes – the unity of the will’.391 He admits that 
some of what Schopenhauer says suggests the former interpretation, but argues that 
‘Schopenhauer distanced himself from this view by claiming that he did not mean for 
the phrase that others were an ‘I once more’ to be taken literally.’ Rather than 
explaining feeling another’s pain metaphysically, ‘he moves to consider whether the 
behaviour of good or evil characters is metaphysically warranted’.392 Cartwright’s 
second approach is to naturalise compassion such that the compassionate person 
‘participates imaginatively in’ the other’s suffering.393 This enables the pain of the 
sufferer to become a motive for the compassionate person, just as her own pain would 
for the egoist. 
Each of these approaches has problems. Cartwright is sensitive to the fact that 
appealing to its metaphysical underpinnings to explain the possibility of compassion 
risks it collapsing into egoism. In fact he himself judges that Schopenhauer’s 
‘attempts to ground compassion metaphysically were unsuccessful’.394 Instead he 
emphasises those passages where Schopenhauer talks of compassionate behaviour as 
exemplifying a more profound metaphysical understanding rather than being 
motivated or made sense of by the compassionate person recognising her oneness with 
the other. The worry here, though, is that we are left with no real explanation of how 
compassion is possible: of why it is that a being defined by ceaseless striving would 
set its own interests aside in favour of another’s. Cartwright’s preferred approach, 
therefore, is that of explaining compassion psychologically by appealing to the role 
the imagination plays in enabling us to be motivated by another’s suffering.395 
The problem Cartwright himself identifies with this second approach is that it 
would not be acceptable to Schopenhauer. But while he acknowledges this, if 
compassion were indeed ‘returned to the province of psychology’, Cartwright argues, 
it ‘could be explained by the natural sciences, which seems to be perfectly compatible 
with the descriptive and empirical nature of Schopenhauer’s ethics.’396 He believes, 
too, that ‘this reformulation eliminates the very phenomenon that leads Schopenhauer 
to call compassion “the great mystery of ethics” and which led him to claim that 
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compassion required a metaphysical rather than a psychological explanation.’397 It 
strikes me, however, that this approach needs to plot an extremely careful course 
between the Scylla of explaining too little and the Charybdis of explaining 
compassion as a version of egoism. On one side, is it merely descriptive rather than 
explanatory? Schopenhauer, of course, is insistent upon the limited scope of natural 
science to explain the inner nature or meaning of phenomena in general. In this 
particular case, if we are not given an account of how and why it is that imagining 
another’s suffering motivates us to act on their behalf it seems as though we are again 
(as with the first strategy adopted by Schopenhauer’s defenders, as discussed above) 
being asked to accept the existence of compassion as a brute fact. On the other side, 
there must be a suspicion that what gives this account of compassion any plausibility 
it has is that it explains altruistic behaviour in terms of our own interests. We 
imaginatively take on another’s suffering as our own and so wish to relieve that 
suffering. This helps to explain why Cartwright’s second solution ‘would not please 
Schopenhauer’: it too may threaten to collapse back into egoism.398 
I would argue, then, that it is difficult to find a convincing reason to accept 
Schopenhauer’s motivational pluralism. We seem to be left either with accepting the 
existence of compassionately-motivated behaviour as a blunt fact (supported by 
disputed empirical examples) or with an explanation of compassion which makes it 
impossible to distinguish clearly from the kind of enlightened, expanded egoism 
characteristic of Spinoza’s ethics. It may in fact be the case that Schopenhauer’s 
ethics of compassion is not just unexplained but inexplicable: Cartwright himself cites 
Janaway’s conclusion that the intersubjectivity of Schopenhauer’s ethics is precluded 
by his own metaphysics.399 As Janaway summarises it ‘Schopenhauer cannot make 
morality depend on the recognition of intersubjectivity, and at the same time explain 
its possibility in terms of the absorption of all individuals into a single will.’400 The 
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judgement is stark: Schopenhauer can’t have it both ways. If compassion is to remain 
distinct from egoism then the compassionate person must see the object of her 
concern as a separate person.401 If compassion is to be explicable, it can only be 
because the compassionate person sees no such distinction. No wonder he calls it ‘the 
great mystery of ethics’. 
 
2.3 The Impotence of Knowledge 
 
The third objection that Schopenhauer might raise is as follows. Early in this 
chapter I presented Schopenhauer with a dilemma: if nothing of moral relevance can 
take place at the level of one’s behaviour as a human individual then why be 
prescriptive at all? Why write an ethics? This may have been somewhat misleading: 
Schopenhauer does note that being prescriptive is fruitless for this very reason, 
maintaining that ‘[v]irtue is as little taught as is genius… We should therefore be just 
as foolish to expect that our moral systems and ethics would create virtuous, noble, 
and holy men, as that our aesthetics would produce poets, painters, and musicians’.402 
One response, however, would be that he ought to have been prescriptive: his theory 
shows us how we can use reason to change our lives in radical ways. I will suggest 
below that to rule this out from being ethically relevant can only be done arbitrarily. 
This claim does need one qualification however. It may be that what one can 
uncontroversially take from Schopenhauer’s philosophy is an ethics that has morally 
relevant features but falls short of being a full moral doctrine. While Schopenhauer 
concedes that reason can change your life and help you to fulfil your character, one 
can only guarantee that such a change will be for the better if one accepts, which 
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Schopenhauer doesn’t, that we can improve our knowledge in a way that will 
inevitably make us more virtuous. 
 This means that the third difficulty for the picture I presented above of a 
Schopenhauerian ethics along Spinozan lines is that Schopenhauer argues that it is a 
mistake to believe that ethics can be really transformative: that knowledge can change 
us in morally relevant ways, as it can for Spinoza. Schopenhauer does hold, in 
common with Spinoza, both of the following things: that reason and knowledge can 
be instrumental in fulfilling one’s character, and that compassion follows from a truer 
knowledge of the world than does egoism. But it is not the case, for Schopenhauer, 
that just anyone can discover this truth and thereby become more compassionate. This 
is because of the distinction Schopenhauer draws between two types of knowledge, 
one being abstract, conceptual knowledge along with the use of reason, and the other 
being an immediate intuitive or perceptual awareness of how things are.403 This 
means that for Schopenhauer the world-view that inspires benevolence or compassion 
is knowledge of an entirely different sort to the type which enables a person to act 
more in accordance with their own character, whatever that character happens to be. 
This latter type of knowledge consists of abstract reasoning which, for instance, 
enables a person to hold before them different possible motivations and compare 
them, allowing each to affect their will with its proper force. The former kind, by 
contrast, is an intuitive knowledge of the way the world is.404 
 What Schopenhauer claims is that abstract, conceptual knowledge can only 
ever enable you to better fulfil the character which is already yours. It can never play 
a role in making an egoistic person more compassionate. It is worth briefly 
considering what convinces Schopenhauer of the different potencies of these two 
types of knowledge. One possibility would be that they differ in terms of content. One 
might imagine that abstract knowledge can’t induce compassionate behaviour because 
it can’t provide us with the relevant picture of how the world is, but this surely can’t 
be what Schopenhauer is claiming. After all, Schopenhauer’s philosophy itself is 
presumably intended to offer an account of the fundamental nature of reality – an 
abstract equivalent to the compassionate person’s intuitive recognition of the 
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illusoriness of individuals. While abstract knowledge can effectively present us with 
the same content as intuitive knowledge can, and while such knowledge is 
presumably available to anyone, it cannot change our behaviour, according to 
Schopenhauer. 
 Schopenhauer’s position, then, appears to be that while reading his philosophy 
could provide an egoist with an understanding of the world equivalent to the 
compassionate person’s understanding, it couldn’t move them to behave 
compassionately. A second possible way of explaining this division might appeal to a 
kind of Humean, sentimentalist picture according to which knowledge and reasoning 
are motivationally impotent and only passion can move us to action. This does 
perhaps tally with some passages of The World As Will and Representation. For 
instance, when discussing the power of knowledge over the fear of death, 
Schopenhauer writes that ‘the inward and merely felt consciousness of what we have 
just raised to distinct knowledge does… prevent the thought of death from poisoning 
the life of the rational being.’405 This may suggest that knowledge as such is 
powerless but gains force when it manifests as feeling. Spinoza makes such a claim at 
EIVP14 ‘[n]o affect can be restrained by the true knowledge of good and evil insofar 
as it is true, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect.’ Schopenhauer, however, 
doesn’t seem to make it explicit that the difference between abstract and intuitive 
knowledge is that only the latter carries an emotive force – except by merely claiming 
that only it can influence behaviour. And indeed later in the same paragraph where he 
talks of the consoling power of the felt consciousness of immortality, the gloss is 
rather different: 
 
when feeling [the fear of death as extinction of the individual] leaves us helpless to 
such an extent, our faculty of reason can nevertheless appear and for the most part 
overcome influences adverse to it, since it places us at a higher standpoint from which 
we now view the whole instead of the particular. Therefore philosophical knowledge of 
the nature of the world… could… overcome the terrors of death.406 
 
This version makes it sound rather as if knowledge has power over rather than as 
feeling – and indeed that this is true of philosophical knowledge. 
 It seems, then, that one can gain abstract knowledge of the fundamental nature 
of reality and that such knowledge does have power at least to overcome emotion. 
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One might wonder, then, why the purely instrumental reasoning of an egoistic person 
who knows that in reality as such she is as much the other as she is herself couldn’t 
lead her to behave in what we would normally call a compassionate way. 
Schopenhauer argues that it is of the nature of such abstract knowledge that it not be 
capable of changing our behaviour, whereas the intuitive insight a compassionate 
character has into the nature of reality does explain her actions. It is difficult to 
establish what justifies the distinction between these two kinds of knowledge.407  
Nonetheless, Schopenhauer holds that it is only as intuitive knowledge that an 
understanding of how the world is can have an impact on behaviour and for 
Schopenhauer intuitive knowledge is not something that one can gain. It seems, 
instead, that one is born with a certain level of intuitive understanding, that it is 
impossible to move between levels and therefore that one’s behavioural scope is 
permanently fixed. While the exact relation that Schopenhauer envisages between 
intuitive knowledge and character remains unclear, his way of ruling out the 
possibility just mentioned might be with reference to the idea that character types are 
defined as embodying a certain level of intuitive knowledge. To be of compassionate 
character is simply to see the world as will, to be egoistic is to see it from within the 
principle of sufficient reason that is, as a collection of distinct individuals. However, 
merely to stipulate that different levels of intuitive knowledge are tied to different 
types of character doesn’t prove that one can’t move from one level of knowledge to 
the next – it simply shows that if one could, Schopenhauer’s character system would 
be undermined. 
 In other words, all the weight of Schopenhauer’s argument is thrown back 
onto his claim that a person’s character is fixed and eternal. I shall suggest some 
problems with his argument for this claim shortly. First, however, it is worth noting 
that Schopenhauer seems to be sending mixed messages regarding whether or not 
one’s level of intuitive knowledge can change. I have argued that what prevents 
Schopenhauer from offering a full ethical theory on Spinoza’s model, in which greater 
knowledge inevitably leads to great virtue, is Schopenhauer’s insistence that a 
person’s intuitive knowledge – the kind which is tied to character – is permanently 
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fixed. But Schopenhauer doesn’t seem fully consistent on this. Part 4 of The World as 
Will and Representation apparently suggests a situation in which it does change. For 
Schopenhauer, the ultimate virtue is denial of the will, and this appears to embody a 
level of intuitive knowledge that is yet more adequate than that possessed by the 
compassionate person. One denies one’s will because one recognises, along with the 
compassionate person, that noumenal reality consists of undifferentiated will rather 
than phenomenal individuals, but also that the essence of this reality is striving and 
hence suffering, from which the only escape is through asceticism. Schopenhauer 
does not seem to suggest that one is born an ascetic. The most common route by 
which this mode of living is reached is a breaking of the will through intense 
suffering. This can happen even to the wicked: if great suffering leads such people to 
asceticism, Schopenhauer says, ‘they have become different, and are completely 
converted.’408 And it seems to be the case that suffering produces this change in 
behaviour by revealing to one a fact about reality – that is, by changing one’s 
knowledge of the world. After all, Schopenhauer says that ‘the last secret of life has 
revealed itself to them in the excess of pain, the secret, namely, that…the tormented 
and the tormentor…are in themselves one…and since they ultimately see the identity 
of the two, they reject them both at the same time; they deny the will-to-live.’409 In the 
case of denial of the will-to-live, then, one can gain intuitive knowledge of reality and 
as a result of this change one’s way of life for the better. If it can happen in this case, 
one is tempted to question why it can’t happen at one level down such that an egoistic 
person comes to see through the veil of maya to her underlying identity with others 
and therefore comes to behave more compassionately? 
 The objection here, then, is that Schopenhauer offers us no good reason to 
accept that a person’s level of intuitive knowledge – and hence their moral behaviour 
– can’t improve, apart from by referring us back to his position on the unalterability of 
character. In fact, he even gives us one example in which it seems someone’s intuitive 
knowledge can change! One qualification to this should be acknowledged: while this 
case does seem to represent an altered level of intuitive knowledge, Schopenhauer 
would not accept that it constitutes a change of character. He maintains that denial of 
the will involves a withdrawal from rather than a change of character. But if one’s 
level of insight can change then it seems all the more difficult to deny that we can 
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change for the better. To do so would surely require divorcing one’s character type 
from one’s level of intuitive understanding. This in turn would seem to leave 
Schopenhauer with no real explanation of why it is that the compassionate person 
relates to others in a more morally praiseworthy way than the egoist and perhaps with 
no way of distinguishing between character-types at all. 
  
2.4 Problems Concerning the Intelligible Character 
 
 Schopenhauer refuses to offer a Spinozistic ethics in which increasing one’s 
knowledge and reasoning abilities inevitably makes one more virtuous because he 
insists that the kind of intuitive knowledge which has an impact upon behaviour is 
unchangeable. I have suggested that he justifies this assertion by tying a person’s level 
of intuitive knowledge to their character, which is itself unalterable. But what, in turn, 
justifies that claim? For Schopenhauer one’s intelligible character is fixed because it 
is noumenal and therefore eternal or outside of time. We have, then, come full circle. 
All the weight of Schopenhauer’s refusal to offer a moral theory on the model of 
Spinoza’s falls back on his doctrine of the intelligible character as a free act of will 
outside of the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, including time and causality. 
 This doctrine is perhaps the most problematic aspect of Schopenhauer’s 
ethical philosophy. One of these problems, perhaps a comparatively minor one, 
concerns Schopenhauer’s evidence for the freedom of the intelligible character. 
Schopenhauer, of course, argues in his Prize Essay of the Freedom of the Will that the 
feeling of freedom that many profess to have is misleading, and deceives us into 
believing our actions are freely chosen.410 But Schopenhauer himself seems to rely on 
our feelings of responsibility for our actions as evidence of our noumenal freedom. In 
‘Schopenhauer’s Philosophy of Value’, Janaway interprets Schopenhauer as follows: 
‘[s]elf-consciousness gives us the impression of being free when we act, but 
Schopenhauer unmasks this as an illusion.’411 Just a few lines later Janaway asks 
‘[w]hy then do we have feelings of responsibility and guilt…?’ and answers on 
Schopenhauer’s behalf that ‘what I feel responsible for and guilty about is my 
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character as it is in itself’.412 It looks as if our feelings of responsibility are supposed 
to stand in need of an explanation – with reference to the intelligible character – while 
our impressions of being free can be dismissed as illusory. Julian Young, quoting the 
Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will, glosses Schopenhauer’s argument as follows: 
 
[t]he truth of universal causation is an inescapable datum. But so too is “the wholly 
clear and certain feeling of responsibility for what we do”. Since the “Kantian” 
accommodation of both these facts is the only possible accommodation, we have no 
option but to accept it as the truth of the matter.413 
 
Again, while we should dismiss our misleading feelings of freedom, we must 
nonetheless accept the existence of the intelligible character as the only possible 
explanation for our feelings of moral responsibility. 
 The more substantial metaphysical concerns that attach to Schopenhauer’s 
doctrine of the intelligible character have been carefully detailed, in particular by 
Christopher Janaway, so I will just touch on some of them very briefly here. As we 
know, Schopenhauer believes that a person can be held responsible for her actions 
because these actions are determined by that person’s intelligible character, which is 
itself a free act. Schopenhauer explains that the intelligible character is a Platonic 
Idea. In the first place, given that Platonic Ideas are representation rather than will, 
Schopenhauer doesn’t seem entitled to call intelligible characters free. This can 
perhaps be circumvented by characterising the intelligible character as a 
representational manifestation of a free act in the will. However, this seems to 
exacerbate a second problem – that of the questionable relationship between a person 
and the free act which entitles us to hold her morally responsible. 
 Even if the intelligible character is identified as a Platonic Idea, the fact that 
the Platonic Ideas are not subject to individuation by space and time makes the 
intelligible character seem very alien to the phenomenal individual who is also 
supposed to be identified with it. All the more so if the intelligible character is 
indentified with an act of will: such an act can be no act of mine, I am an individual – 
so that one might reasonably question the fairness of basing my responsibility on an 
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act that was not performed by me.414 Given that the noumenal realm is supposed to be 
entirely foreign to individuation, identifying the intelligible character with a free act 
of will trails other puzzles. First, one might ask how there can be different acts in a 
realm to which individuation and plurality don’t apply, but Schopenhauer holds that 
different people have different characters and presumably attributes this fact to the 
existence of different noumenal acts. Second, one might question how any act is 
possible at all, given that time only holds for phenomena and not for things in 
themselves.415 
 
3. SCHOPENHAUER’S NARROW CONCEPTION OF ETHICS 
 
3.1 The Exclusion of Politics 
 
 We have seen that Spinoza offers a model of ethics within determinism. While 
there is no free will, a person is able to become freer, happier and more virtuous – to 
better fulfil her own nature – through developing her understanding of reality. There 
are resources within Schopenhauer’s philosophy for a similar ethical theory. Although 
a person’s actions are determined, motives can only operate as they are known, so an 
improved understanding can enable a person to better fulfil (to ‘acquire’) her 
character. Equally, a person’s degree of virtue is tied to her level of metaphysical 
insight. Nonetheless, Schopenhauer would deny that this amounts to a constructive 
ethical position. This is because he would reject the idea that knowledge can make, 
say, an egoist more virtuous, on the basis of his motivational pluralism, his claim that 
compassion is the mark of morality and his scepticism about the transformative power 
of knowledge. Schopenhauer would accept that knowledge can transfigure a person’s 
behaviour within her character. However, compassion is genuinely distinct from 
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egoism, only compassion is moral and compassion is innate – improved knowledge 
can’t alter a person’s character and therefore can’t be morally transformative. 
 I have raised problems with each of the three theses on which Schopenhauer’s 
rejection of prescriptive ethics (and by inference, rejection of the Spinozan ethics I 
have attempted to derive from his own philosophy) is based. Even setting these 
problems aside, to agree with Schopenhauer’s conclusion one would need to accept a 
narrow and far from universal conception of what counts as ethics. For one thing, 
politics would be excluded from the sphere of moral philosophy, as would various 
types of established ethical systems. In this final section of the chapter, I intend to 
make clear that Schopenhauer’s vision of ethics is unusually narrow and investigate 
whether we should accept the restrictions he places on what counts as ethical. 
 Schopenhauer is explicit about the moral irrelevance of political justice – of 
justice in the context of the political state. Because egoism is non-moral (or possibly, 
immoral) and because the state in general and its justice system in particular are 
founded on appeals to self-interest, they too can have no moral value. Christopher 
Janaway rightly notes that for Schopenhauer ‘[t]he justice that is a moral virtue for 
Schopenhauer is quite distinct from the kind of justice which consists in acting out of 
respect for law’. The latter, a function of the state, motivates behaviour only by 
threatening punishments or offering rewards – in other words, by appeals to self-
interest. Indeed for Schopenhauer the state as such emerges as a tool of collective 
self-interest – Janaway again:  ‘[h]e regards the State as an institution that arises from 
collective egoism, and not, strictly speaking, as a matter of morality.’416 
 In ‘Schopenhauer’s Politics: Ethics, Jurisprudence and the State’, Neil Jordan 
makes a case, against Schopenhauer, for the state’s moral value.417 He argues that the 
separation between political and moral justice is not so clear as Schopenhauer 
suggests. The state is founded on a contract; given Schopenhauer’s view that contracts 
are moral institutions, the state ‘possesses a certain moral legitimacy’ on 
Schopenhauer’s own terms.418 In like manner, Jordan takes evidence from 
Schopenhauer’s theory of punishment to show that his separation of politics and 
morality doesn’t hold up. Despite his official view that the only purpose of 
punishment is to deter (by appeal to self-interest), Schopenhauer is to be found hoping 
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that punishment can achieve ‘correction of knowledge and the awakening of a desire 
to work’.419 In other words, Jordan writes, punishment ‘plays a corrective role of an 
instructional nature’ and the state’s ‘punishment and “re-education” of criminals 
constitutes a moral obligation”.420 Jordan also points out that in Schopenhauer’s view 
punishment ‘should be of equal worth’ to the crime, which I would argue seems like a 
concern motivated by something like fairness rather than by deterrence.421 Indeed 
Jordan himself concludes that ‘in accordance with Schopenhauer’s approach to 
jurisprudence, the state must be guided… by moral considerations of fairness… that 
reach beyond his broader claim that the only real aim of punishment is to deter.’422 
 Schopenhauer would no doubt reply that even in its educative role punishment 
has no moral value. Jordan is right to say that ‘punishment can direct a man along a 
more socially acceptable path in life’, but it does this, as Jordan himself notes, by 
showing the man better ways to pursue his ends.423 The corrective re-education that 
punishment can provide makes no difference morally, for Schopenhauer, because of 
his character determinism. The best that instruction can do is to show a person how 
better to fulfil her own ends, it can’t change those ends (which are fixed by her 
character) and so is remote from what matters morally. 
 Even if it were true that the state operates only by appeal to self-interest, and 
therefore within rather than as a corrective to egoism, Schopenhauer’s dismissal of 
claims for its moral relevance clearly depend on his own narrow reading of what 
counts morally. I argued in section 2.1 above that it is difficult to see what justifies his 
exclusion of all but actions motivated by compassion from carrying moral value. Here 
we see in a more concrete way how this leads to the exclusion of practices or 
motivating principles which would be taken by many to have moral worth. Jordan 
quotes Schopenhauer: ‘the State contract or the law… is readily devised and 
gradually perfected by egoism which, by using the faculty of reason, proceeds 
methodically, and forsakes its one-sided point of view.’424 Jordan notes that for 
Schopenhauer this function should not ‘be conceived of as moral in any way’ because 
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it is ‘based entirely upon the collective self-interest of the people’.425 The role of 
political collectives in using reason to overcome one-sided self-interest and facilitate 
cooperation (banishing a brutal and irrational state of nature), though, is just the sort 
of quality that has Spinoza lauding their contribution to virtue.426 
 Jordan himself suggests that ‘the state may be of moral worth precisely 
because it resists the popular will’.427 He implies that in this respect the state shows 
itself not to be beholden to collective egoism alone but also to real considerations of 
justice. I suspect a Schopenhauerian would decline to acknowledge this as an 
exception to the state’s function to further collective self-interest. It could certainly be 
within the long-term interests of a group to establish and uphold a justice system 
against which there would be occasional temptations to rebel. But again the point is 
that a state enables an enlightened self-interest in which desires are reflected upon and 
pursued rationally and collectively. While it might remain within the logic of egoism, 
this is very different from the situation in which each pursues his or her own 
immediate appetites with no thought to other people or to the long term. Why is a 
political theorist like Spinoza unentitled to call this a moral difference? 
 Reminding ourselves of Schopenhauer’s statement, reminiscent of Spinoza’s 
own position, that ‘every good is essentially relative; for it has its essential nature 
only in its relation to a desiring will’ we might rather feel that it is Schopenhauer who 
has no right to exclude self-interested actions from the realm of the moral.428 So while 
Jordan correctly says that for Schopenhauer ‘the “state of justice” realized by the 
successful state is a semblance of virtue only… the value of such a situation amounts 
to little more than the fact that the citizens will it’, if good is relative to the will it is 
hard to see how this can offer a basis on which to exclude the state from having moral 
value.429 Similarly, Jordan quotes Schopenhauer’s statement that ‘the state “is by no 
means directed against egoism, but only against the injurious consequences of egoism 
arising out of the plurality of egoistic individuals”’ as an explanation for the 
previously cited Schopenhauerian view that the state’s protective function shouldn’t 
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‘be conceived of as moral in any way’.430 But again, if good and bad are defined in 
relation to the will, one must wonder where Schopenhauer is able to find a standpoint 
from which to dismiss the state as non-moral. More generally, this is a question of 
what standard Schopenhauer can use against which to measure compassion as morally 
good and egoism as bad (or at best non-moral) – Spinoza, for instance, would deny 
the existence of any standard independent of the interests of individuals. 
 Neil Jordan, then, argues that the state is more than just a machine to serve 
collective egoism. He points out that while Schopenhauer insists on a separation 
between politics, which concerns actions suffered and operates through providing 
egoistic motives, and morality, which concerns the intentions or will behind an action, 
this separation is belied by Schopenhauer’s own account of punishment and the social 
contract.431 According to Jordan, even the Schopenhauerian state operates according 
to principles of fairness and moral justice, and so plays a genuinely ethical role. I 
would add that even where its function is underpinned by collective self-interest, it 
should nonetheless be seen as having moral value. It may be true that politics is 
interested in actions rather than intentions and is founded on egoism rather than 
compassion, it does not follow straightforwardly that it is outside of the moral realm. 
 
3.2 The Exclusion of Self-Interest 
 
 Much of this, of course, has relevance far beyond Schopenhauer’s exclusion of 
the political from the realm of morality, which simply offers a useful illustration. 
There are well-established ethical systems including, most relevantly to the Spinozan 
ethical resources within Schopenhauer’s own theory, those modelled on flourishing, 
for which acting in one’s own self-interest is compatible with – even necessary for – 
virtue.432 Certainly when we see the goods which Spinoza believes flow from 
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enlightened egoism it can seem narrow to the point of idiosyncrasy to insist that they 
hold no moral value. 
For Spinoza, as we know, ‘[t]he first and only foundation of virtue, or of the 
method of living rightly… is the seeking of our own advantage.’433 Pursuing one’s 
own true advantage (that is, the preservation and strengthening of oneself as a 
thinking being) brings greater freedom and brings happiness – even blessedness.434 It 
brings wisdom to the ignorant, and through wisdom, power,435 including the power to 
restrain one’s lusts.436 It brings a respect for religion and morality – indeed a more 
honourable commitment to these which isn’t, like that of the multitude, simply 
motivated by hope for reward and fear of punishment after death.437 It brings many of 
the traditional virtues – freedom from the sins of anger, envy and pride.438 It brings 
shared interests and an end to conflict.439 It brings a desire for others to attain the 
same good.440 It brings friendship, cooperation and a striving to benefit others.441 
According to Spinoza, then, seeking her own self-interest makes a person 
freer, happier, wiser and gives her greater control over the passions which affect her. 
It also leads to a commitment to religion and morality and to the development of 
virtues and the overcoming of sins. Finally, it encourages her to work with others, 
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prevents her from coming into conflict with them and leads her to care about and 
promote their interests. Thus when Spinoza claims that he has shown that ‘men who, 
from the guidance of reason, seek their own advantage – want nothing for themselves 
which they do not desire for other men. Hence, they are just, honest, and honourable’, 
he says that he has done so in order ‘to win, if possible, the attention of those who 
believe that this principle – that everyone is bound to seek his own advantage – is the 
foundation, not of virtue and morality, but of immorality… I have shown… that the 
contrary is true’.442 This will seem convincing to many – but it did not to 
Schopenhauer. 
In Schopenhauer’s view, no matter what goods egoism might lead to it cannot 
be the foundation of morality because the sole criterion of moral value is having a 
compassionate intention. Effectively, the intention must be altruistic, because a 
compassion that is compatible with egoism wouldn’t merit the name, on 
Schopenhauer’s model. I (following Spinoza!) have tried to argue that altruism is not 
all there is to morality. Figures including Seneca, Aristotle, Mill and Nietzsche – as 
well as Spinoza – held self-interest to be in harmony with morality. I suggest many 
readers would feel intuitively that the goods listed by Spinoza as the fruits of rational 
self-interest hold moral value. For Schopenhauer’s debarring of egoism and its fruits 
from moral relevance to be more than stipulative, for his restricted understanding of 
the ethical to be more than arbitrary, he needs to offer a good reason for identifying 
compassionate intention alone as morally valuable. I argued in section 2.1 above that 
no convincing reason seems to be forthcoming. 
Finally, I want briefly to draw attention to one further suggestion regarding 
something that might be part of what underpins his insistence that compassion is the 
lone mark of morality. In ‘Schopenhauer’s Philosophy of Value’, Christopher 
Janaway explains Schopenhauer’s contention that an egoist can be made less harmful 
by providing him with a different set of interests. He writes ‘Schopenhauer sometimes 
refers to this figuratively as reforming the head but not the heart of the human being. 
The heart is his will, as opposed to the less essential and mutable intellect’.443 Could it 
be that part of why Schopenhauer puts all the weight of his moral theory on 
intentions, and in particular on the compassionate character, is because he sees them 
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as more integral to a person than any other feature? For Schopenhauer, a person is 
essentially will and to be judged according to the nature of his or her will; reform of 
the intellect, while having the advantage of being possible, does not touch the inner 
nature of the person. This could, I suggest, help to explain the different ethical 
approaches of Schopenhauer and Spinoza. While both argue against Descartes that a 
person is not to be identified with his or her intellect, I do not take Spinoza to hold 
that will or conatus is more essential to a person than is intellect – or even that the two 
can be straightforwardly distinguished in this way. I will investigate the roles that 
their respective understandings of the nature of the self play in Schopenhauer and 
Spinoza’s ethical thought further in section 3.2 of the final chapter.  
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
I have argued that, in spite of himself, Schopenhauer offers resources for an 
ethics along the lines of Spinoza’s moral philosophy, wherein embedded individuals 
subject to causation can nonetheless reach self-fulfilment through improving their 
knowledge. Spinoza, of course, is a psychological egoist for whom virtue and 
happiness grow out of pursuing one’s enlightened self-interest. For Schopenhauer, by 
contrast, nothing has moral value that fails to spring from a compassionate will. I have 
suggested that Schopenhauer gives no satisfying reason for this stipulation, and 
indeed that the profound distinction he draws between compassion and egoism is 
undermined by his own metaphysics of embeddedness and his claim that good is 
relative to desire (both shared with Spinoza). 
While Schopenhauer accepts that knowledge can radically change a person’s 
way of living, he denies that this has moral relevance because knowledge can only 
influence behaviour not character.  Again, it is not entirely clear how Schopenhauer 
justifies the claim that the only moral change would be a change of character – 
possibly he takes empirical evidence to show that this is a widely accepted view, 
possibly it rests on his belief that the will or character is more essential to a person 
than the intellect. I have also questioned whether he gives reason for us to believe that 
knowledge has no transformative power over character.444 If he is indeed unable to 
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prove both that abstract philosophical knowledge is different to the kind of intuitive 
knowledge that is morally relevant and that the latter is innate and unchangeable, then 
the space for an ethics which is not merely descriptive remains open. 
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Salvation 
  
 
1. SPINOZAN BLESSEDNESS AND SCHOPENHAUERIAN SALVATION 
 
1.4 Virtue and Happiness 
 
In the previous chapter I described the coincidence of virtue, activity, freedom, 
power, joy and understanding in Spinoza’s ethical theory. This happy confluence 
reaches its pinnacle with what he calls blessedness: the intellectual love of God. As its 
preface states, Book V of Ethics – Of Human Freedom – concerns ‘what freedom of 
mind, or blessedness, is’.445 Meanwhile, a discussion of salvation takes up the latter 
part of Book 4 of The World As Will and Representation so that the analysis of this 
state forms the apex of Schopenhauer’s philosophical system too.446 The two 
philosophers use similar, quasi-religious language in their accounts of blessedness or 
salvation.447 Spinoza usually writes of beatitudo but also uses salus (so that Curley 
translates the formula at VP36S as ‘salvation, or blessedness, or freedom’). Not only 
does he claim that this blessedness consists in the love of God, but also identifies it 
with what ‘is called glory in the Sacred Scriptures’.448 Schopenhauer uses das Heil, 
(which he compares to faith, and to Christian ‘new birth’, which comes through grace 
alone)449 and cites Christian, Hindu and Buddhist saints and ascetics as expressing 
such holiness in their conduct.450 
The consonances here are more than superficial. In each case, the best state 
available to us is one which embodies virtue, profound knowledge and the stilling of 
passions which disturb us, as well – arguably – as some kind of transcendence of 
finitude or mortality. I will take virtue first. At P41D of the fifth part, Spinoza 
reminds us that ‘[t]he first and only foundation of virtue, or of the method of living 
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rightly (by IVP22C and P24) is the seeking of our own advantage.’ We have learnt 
from Part IV that virtue is acting according to the laws of our own nature and acting 
to preserve ourselves under the guidance of reason. Because, by P36S ‘the essence of 
our mind consists only in knowledge’, it is when engaging in the intellectual love of 
God that we are most active and so this intellectual activity also constitutes our 
greatest virtue. We also know from Part IV that such virtue, despite its foundation in 
self-interest, is not incompatible with traditional moral characteristics of honesty, 
beneficence and love but rather inevitably expresses itself in them.451 Compare 
Schopenhauer’s claim when discussing salvation and its foundation the ascetic denial 
of the will that ‘this system of ethics fully agrees with the Christian dogmas proper’ 
and ‘is also just as much in agreement with the doctrines and ethical precepts of the 
sacred books of India’.452 This denial of the will-to-live, he insists, springs ‘from the 
same source from which all goodness, affection, virtue, and nobility of character 
spring’,453 in contrast to ‘the wicked man’ who is marked out by ‘the vehemence of 
his willing’,454 and he points to the charity and love of neighbour expressed in 
Christian and Hindu asceticism.455 Indeed Schopenhauer identifies denial of the will 
with saintliness: it is the highest virtue, exceeding both voluntary justice and 
charitable compassion. 
It must be unsurprising that according to Spinoza’s ethics our greatest virtue, 
when understood as the pinnacle of our activity and self-fulfilment, would also bring 
the greatest joy of which we are capable. In Part V he stresses repeatedly that the 
intellectual love of God represents true blessedness in this sense. So for instance at 
P36S ‘our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom consists… in a constant and eternal 
love of God… And this love, or blessedness, is called glory in the Sacred 
Scriptures… it can rightly be called satisfaction of mind… it is joy’. This is because 
our minds are at their most active and so achieve their greatest satisfaction when 
understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, that is, when understanding 
them in relation to God – which means engaging in the intellectual love of God.456 In 
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addition to such understanding being pleasurable in itself,457 any passage from a lesser 
to a greater perfection brings joy, so achieving the greatest perfection (that is, self-
realisation or activity) of which we are capable brings the greatest joy: blessedness.458 
It is more surprising, surely, that Schopenhauer should end The World As Will 
and Representation with a promise of a happy state. Of course, the idea of death as a 
welcome release from suffering may seem entirely congruent with his pessimism,459 
and it is certainly to this that he believes the ascetic can look forward: ‘if death 
comes… it is most welcome, and is cheerfully accepted as a longed-for 
deliverance.’460 But Schopenhauer does not only speak of an escape from suffering 
but of ‘the enviable life of so many saints and great souls among the Christians, and 
even more among the Hindus and Buddhists’.461 He characterises this life as ‘full of 
inner cheerfulness and true heavenly peace’ and suggests ‘it is an unshakable peace, a 
deep calm and inward serenity, a state that we cannot behold without the greatest 
longing’.462 Indeed in the same section (§68) he talks of bliss and blessedness, 
inferring from the ‘most blissful’ (‘säligsten’) moments we experience – in aesthetic 
contemplation – to just ‘how blessed [‘wie sälig’] must be the life of a man whose 
will is silenced… forever’.463 Thus it seems for Schopenhauer, as for Spinoza, that 
some of us can hope for a longed-for state of cheerfulness, peace and, indeed, 
blessedness.464 
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1.5 Knowledge 
 
1.2.1 The Role, Nature and Content of Knowledge 
 
As regards the connection between salvation and knowledge, Spinozan 
blessedness consists in perfection of the mind (P33S),465 identified as the intellectual 
love of God which is achieved through knowledge of the third kind.466 For Spinoza, 
then, ‘[t]he greatest satisfaction of mind there can be arises from this third kind of 
knowledge’ and ‘he who knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to the 
greatest human perfection, and consequently (by Def. Aff II), is affected with the 
greatest Joy’.467 According to Spinoza, therefore, blessedness results from or consists 
in knowledge. This knowledge is of a specific kind: intuitive knowledge which is 
grasped sub specie aeternitatis.468 And what this knowledge concerns, as propositions  
29 and 30 of Part V make clear, is the nature of reality as depending on God and in 
particular of the individual’s own place in reality as an expression of God – in other 
words, it is knowledge of our own embeddedness.469 I would argue that 
Schopenhauer’s accounts of each of these – of the role, the nature and the content of 
knowledge in our salvation – are markedly similar. 
For Schopenhauer, a person can reach the point of denial of the will in one of 
two ways: either by recognising the phenomenal nature of the principium 
individuationis and that suffering is essential to the will or as a result of enduring 
‘great personal suffering’.470 In the first case, it is clear that it is knowledge which 
offers the route to denial and hence salvation, as Schopenhauer makes explicit at 397 
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‘denial of the will-to-live, which is the same as what is called complete resignation or 
holiness, always proceeds from that quieter of the will; and this is the knowledge of 
its inner conflict and its essential vanity’. But a change in knowledge is essential to 
the more common second case too, so that Schopenhauer says of the subject of great 
suffering that ‘[w]e see him know himself and the world, change his whole nature, 
rise above himself and above all suffering… in inviolable peace, bliss, and 
sublimity’.471 It is also conceivable that for Schopenhauer, as for Spinoza, salvation 
actually consists in or involves a state of knowledge. This might be implied by the 
comparison Schopenhauer draws between it and the more temporary release provided 
by aesthetic contemplation, which is of course a state of will-less knowing. Bernard 
Reginster, who agrees that in both aesthetic experience and ascetic resignation 
‘freedom from willing is achieved through knowledge’ argues that in the former ‘it is 
simply by assuming this pure cognitive stance that the individual frees himself from 
the will’ whereas in the latter ‘the individual must free himself from the will before he 
can assume that pure cognitive stance’.472 This seems to indicate that, according to 
Reginster, knowledge is not after all a precondition of denial of the will, but rather 
that such denial provides the route to knowledge. If this is right, Schopenhauerian 
blessedness would presumably consist in the achievement of that knowledge. 
Schopenhauer does, however, remark of denial of the will that ‘such a state cannot 
really be called knowledge, since it no longer has the form of subject and object’ and 
because it is incommunicable – although the qualifying ‘really’ perhaps suggests that 
he would otherwise have been tempted to characterise it that way!473 
What is more certain is that the knowledge required for salvation is of a 
special kind, just as it is for Spinoza. As Bela Egyed puts it, Schopenhauer ‘agrees 
with Spinoza (and Plato), in opposition to Kant, that there is a form of knowledge that 
can go beyond everyday human understanding.’474 The knowledge achieved in 
Schopenhauerian aesthetic contemplation does seem to bear comparison to Spinoza’s 
knowledge sub specie aeternitatis, each being a perception of things independently of 
their spatio-temporal existence.475 Further, the insight that leads to the denial of the 
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will-to-live is precisely a penetration beyond the principium individuationis, whose 
forms are space and time. In addition, both Schopenhauer and Spinoza refer to the 
knowledge belonging to the most blessed individuals as a form of intuition. However, 
each understands something rather different by this term. When Spinoza calls the 
third kind of knowledge intuitive, he seems to have in mind the certainty and 
immediacy with which it is grasped (‘no one fails to see’, ‘in one glance’).476 
Schopenhauer, unlike Spinoza, sees intuitive knowledge as utterly divorced from what 
he calls the ‘dogmas’ of reason. The Christians, Hindus and Buddhists who achieved 
salvation believed different rational dogmas, but ‘the inner, direct, and intuitive 
knowledge from which alone all virtue and holiness can come is nevertheless 
expressed in precisely the same way’.477 For Schopenhauer, intuition seems to be 
defined by the fact that it is distinct from abstract reason. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, one’s level of intuitive insight appears to be innate according to 
Schopenhauer, so that ‘[i]t is therefore just as little necessary for the saint to be a 
philosopher as for the philosopher to be a saint’.478 This marks a clear and 
consequential difference from Spinoza’s view that we become more joyful and 
blessed as we gain understanding and become more active in our reasoning. In section 
2.1 below, I explore what this means in terms of to whom salvation is available for 
each thinker. 
As we saw, Part V of the Ethics tells us that the knowledge involved in 
blessedness consists in an understanding of ourselves and other modes as modes of 
God. For Schopenhauer, too, the knowledge which is essential to salvation comprises 
an understanding of the connectedness of reality and our embeddedness in it. It is a 
prerequisite of salvation that the will should ‘recognize or know its own inner nature 
in this phenomenon.’479 Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge proceeds from God – the 
whole of reality as such – to the essence of individual things,480 just as for 
Schopenhauer it is ‘knowledge of the whole’ which ‘becomes the quieter of all and 
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every willing.’481 In section 68 Schopenhauer reminds us that the essence of goodness 
is seeing through the prinicipium individuationis. Now he adds that a higher degree 
still of this penetrating vision ‘will at once show an influence on the will which goes 
still farther.’482 For the person who truly understands that the distinction between self 
and other is illusory (and thus takes on the whole world’s suffering as his own), ‘that 
knowledge of the whole… becomes the quieter of all and every willing.’483 Salvation, 
then, belongs to the person who sees reality sub specie aeternitatis, recognises the 
connected nature of reality beyond the forms of the principium individuationis and 
understands his or her own existence as a phenomenon or expression of that ultimate 
reality. Schopenhauer’s account of the content of the knowledge which is key to 
salvation, however, has a characteristically pessimistic overtone entirely absent from 
Spinoza’s picture. What the ascetic knows is not simply that all phenomena are 
expressions of the one reality, will, but that the essential nature of reality is conflict 
and suffering. I will assess the coherence of this claim in section 3.1 below. 
 
1.2.2 The Value of Knowledge 
 
The kind of knowledge essential to blessedness clearly offers both of what 
Schopenhauer calls, in his analysis of the experience of aesthetic contemplation, 
objective and subjective value. In section 38 of The World As Will and 
Representation, he maintains that aesthetic experiences are valuable in part because 
they involve a kind of knowledge unavailable in ordinary life and in part because they 
provide respite from the suffering inherent to constant willing. As we have seen, 
Spinoza’s blessed person and Schopenhauer’s ascetic understand reality in the most 
adequate and profound way, so that they do indeed benefit from the objective value of 
achieving a special kind of knowledge. But each also enjoys a particular and similar 
subjective effect that results from this knowledge – the power it has over disturbing 
passions. 
Part IV of Ethics articulates Spinoza’s view that we are unfree to the extent 
that we are governed by and unable to control our passions. We are necessarily part of 
nature and as such, subject to forces beyond our control. This means that we are 
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subject to passions. The more we are able to preserve ourselves and pursue our own 
advantage, the more we are ‘endowed with virtue’.484 Unfortunately, the passions 
which ‘torment’ us can extinguish or restrain our knowledge of what is really good for 
us and our ability to pursue the good,485 as when the ‘rash desire’ for a momentary 
pleasure disrupts the pursuit of a greater but more remote good.486 In addition, the 
more subject we are to passions, the more we come into conflict with one another.487 
Part V, of course, offers the remedy for this bondage to the passions, with its 
preface promising to demonstrate ‘the power of the mind, or of reason, and… above 
all, how great its dominion over the affects is, and what kind of dominion it has for 
restraining and moderating them.’488 P20S assures us that clear and distinct 
knowledge either entirely removes passions or at least ‘brings it about that they 
constitute the smallest part of the mind’. It is, then, knowledge or reason that brings 
the passions under our control – specifically, knowledge of passions themselves, so 
that Spinoza insists that ‘we can devise no other remedy for the affects which depends 
on our power and is more excellent than this, which consists in a true knowledge of 
them.’489 By coming to understand a passion which enslaves us we dissolve it: ‘[a]n 
affect which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct 
idea of it.’490 This is because the act of understanding is by its nature joyful and 
liberating; to understand anything in its proper place in reality – in relation to God – 
brings us joy. This is why Spinoza can conclude that ‘insofar as we understand the 
causes of sadness, it ceases (by P3) to be a passion, that is (by IIIP59), to that extent it 
ceases to be sadness. And so, insofar as we understand God to be the cause of 
sadness, we rejoice.’491 Thus reason, for Spinoza, has the power to moderate the 
affects and free us from their power, to the extent that understanding a sad passion 
actually turns it into a joy. One addendum to this is worth noting: it is particularly 
understanding the nature of the passions as necessary that enables a person to limit 
their power. In general, we are more strongly affected by things when we consider 
them to be free, but when we identify their causes and see them as they really are – as 
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necessary unfoldings of substance – their impact is lessened. ‘Insofar as the mind 
understands all things as necessary, it has a greater power over the affects, or is less 
acted on by them.’492 In the case of the passions, this means that their harmful power 
over us is diminished. 
Schopenhauer, too, holds that understanding something to be necessary is a 
balm for our distress: ‘nothing is more effective for our consolation than a 
consideration of what has happened from the point of view of necessity’.493 Reginster 
draws attention to this comment and glosses Schopenhauer’s view as follows: ‘if I 
believe that my current privations could not have been avoided, they will feel less 
painful than if I believe they could have’,494 which clearly resonates with Spinoza’s 
claim that ‘sadness over some good which has perished is lessened as soon as the man 
who has lost it realizes that this good could not, in any way, have been kept.’495  
More generally speaking, for Schopenhauer, willing is suffering, so anything 
that can release us from our servitude to desire is of great value. We know from Book 
3 that knowledge can perform this service, and something similar happens in the 
denial of the will. One whose will is silenced, Schopenhauer writes, ‘is then left only 
as pure knowing being, as the undimmed mirror of the world. Nothing can distress or 
alarm him any more’.496 As we saw in section 1.2.1 above, Reginster confirms that in 
both aesthetic experience and ascetic resignation ‘freedom from willing is achieved 
through knowledge.’497 Reginster’s view, once again, is that the process is slightly 
different in each case. In aesthetic contemplation ‘it is simply by assuming this pure 
cognitive stance that the individual frees himself from the will’ – the mind’s power 
allows it to free itself (temporarily) – whereas in asceticism ‘knowledge actually 
“quiets” the will, or induces its “self-suppression”.’498 For Reginster, then, with 
aesthetic experience it is the fact that I know objectively which allows temporary 
escape from will, in resignation it is the content of the knowledge – the will’s 
inevitable frustration – which directly affects the will, quieting it.499 It is interesting 
that he suggests that it might be by means of reflection on the stirrings of the will that 
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knowledge is able to offer us relief from them. As Reginster puts it ‘if I manage to 
reflect on my jealousy, I also thereby, if only for a moment, cease to be jealous.’500 
Reginster’s formulation strongly recalls Spinoza’s words at VP3 and VP4S (quoted 
above), expressing his contention that sad passions can be dissolved by coming to 
understand them. Schopenhauer and Spinoza, then, might well be in agreement on the 
specific points that it is through reflecting on the passions that we can lessen their 
power over us, and that they trouble us less the more we understand them to be 
necessary. They certainly do seem to share the broader idea that our blessedness or 
salvation consists, in part, in a freedom from disturbing feelings, and that this freedom 
comes as a result of knowledge. 
 
1.3 Immortality 
  
One final commonality that I would like to highlight between the highest 
blessing proffered to humanity in Part V of the Ethics and that advanced at the end of 
The World as Will and Representation is as follows. It may be that each philosopher 
thinks there is a kind of immortality available to us. Indeed, in Volume II 
Schopenhauer endorses Spinoza’s comment that ‘sentimus experimurque nos 
AETERNOS esse’ – as Payne translates it, “[w]e feel and experience that we are 
eternal”.501  Julian Young does seem to believe that Schopenhauer envisages some 
sort of post-death state. In ‘Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Death and Salvation’ he notes 
that ‘temporary release from suffering is possible through art; permanent release is 
possible through “denial of the will”, that is to say, death.’502 Of course, this could 
simply mean that the ascetic’s death puts a permanent end to suffering by obliterating 
the sufferer. It might, however, suggest that, just as aesthetic contemplation induces a 
temporary state in which we are free from suffering, death gives the denier of the will 
permanent access to such a condition. This latter reading seems to be confirmed when 
Young goes on to argue that Schopenhauer sees philosophy’s task as being to provide 
consolation in the face of death, first, that death isn’t absolute annihilation for us and 
second, that there is a blissful post-death state.503 The first of these consolations is 
supposed to be assured by Schopenhauer’s idealism: our experience of the 
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phenomenal world is dependent on (being) a transcendent subject which itself lies 
outside the form of time and so must be untouchable by death.504 The second, Young 
writes, ‘Schopenhauer seeks to achieve by appeal to mysticism and art.’505 Salvation 
as a blissful post-death state is augured in ‘the testimony of mystics, “vouched for 
with the stamp of truth by art”… that that which is indeed “nothing” to the rational 
mind, is in fact a heavenly “nothing”.’ Again, that ‘beyond the “dream” of 
individuality is a divine Oneness: “pantheistic consciousness”’.506 For Young’s 
Schopenhauer, then, it seems the ascetic can look forward to a divine, heavenly state 
after death, with the writings of the mystics and the paintings of Raphael and 
Correggio evidencing the reality of such an experience. 
 On the other hand, commentators including Christopher Janaway and Dale 
Jacquette have insisted upon the point that no personal immortality is possible within 
Schopenhauer’s metaphysics. On Janaway’s reading of Schopenhauer, it is simply a 
mistake to think we survive death as individuals.507 For Jacquette, we may console 
ourselves that death is unreal without this meaning that any kind of personal 
immortality is real.508 Beyond this, the only consolation for death that Schopenhauer 
offers is just the realisation that willing life is an error, there is nothing of ‘the 
comforting sense of survival by which a particular person with specific memories and 
expectations continues after the body’s death, promised by popular religions’.509 We 
should not hope for any kind of blissful state. While Young argues that Schopenhauer 
demands a philosophy which can console us by displaying ‘one’s post death existence 
as, in some way or other, blissful’ – and that Schopenhauer takes himself to achieve 
this consolation in The World as Will – on Jacquette’s reading of Schopenhauer 
‘[t]here is nothing to look forward to as the meaning or final reward or consummation 
of life except its termination in death.’510 Death, on this picture, does offer a release 
from suffering, but there is no desirable state in its aftermath, not least because there 
is no individual subject who survives death to experience any such state. In section 
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3.3 below I appraise these divergent interpretations and assess the possibility of a 
coherent Schopenhauerian account of immortality. 
Spinoza’s insistence on a kind of immortality is more incontrovertible though 
his account of it is barely less contentious, Jonathan Bennett famously writing it off as 
‘an unmitigated and seemingly unmotivated disaster’.511 Nonetheless, Spinoza’s 
philosophy does offer a promise of immortality to the wise. While it is true of the 
ignorant man that ‘as soon as he ceases to suffer, he ceases to be’, the wise man 
‘never ceases to be’.512 Spinoza explicitly signals his intention to address the topic of 
immortality midway through Part V: ‘[w]ith this I have completed everything which 
concerns this present life… So it is time now to pass to those things which pertain to 
the mind’s duration without relation to the body.’513 Clearly, this version of 
immortality has to do with the mind, and its immunity to the destruction of the body; 
Spinoza states that ‘[t]he human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, 
but something of it remains which is eternal.’514 In particular, that which is immune to 
death is the intellectual love of God: ‘[t]he intellectual love of God, which arises from 
the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.’515 
For Spinoza, then, although we are finite modes and our bodies will inevitably 
succumb to death, we can aspire to a kind of immortality in virtue of the eternity of 
the mind. We shall see, however, that this is not – as it is for Descartes, say – an 
immunity of the mind as such and as a whole, nor of the self. Modes of thought are 
not inherently indestructible and different minds will attain eternity to different 
degrees. This is because our minds are only eternal to the extent that they have – 
better, consist in – true, adequate ideas. As Spinoza puts it in the demonstration to 
proposition 38 of Part V ‘[t]he mind’s essence consists in knowledge (by IIP11); 
therefore, the more the mind knows things by the second and third kind of knowledge, 
the greater the part of it that remains’. He has already said of the third kind of 
knowledge in P31S that ‘the more each of us is able to achieve in this kind of 
knowledge, the more he is conscious of himself and of God, that is, the more perfect 
and blessed he is.’ The result of this is that we are immortal to just the same degree 
that we are blessed – to the extent, that is, that we enjoy the intellectual love of God. 
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Spinoza’s account of immortality offers a number of blessings or consolations. 
First, of course, that we can to a greater or lesser extent transcend death. The part of 
each of us that is destroyed by death shrinks, the more that each is composed of 
adequate ideas: ‘death is less harmful to us, the greater the mind’s clear and distinct 
knowledge’. Therefore, ‘the more the mind loves God’, the more that mind survives 
the death of the body.516 This in turn reduces the fear of death: ‘[t]he more the mind 
understands things by the second and third kind of knowledge, the less it is acted on 
by affects which are evil, and the less it fears death’ 517 to the extent that ‘[a] free man 
thinks of nothing less than of death’.518 Spinoza here offers the kind of comfort which 
Schopenhauer sees it as philosophy’s calling to provide – his system purports to show 
us how to be less troubled by thoughts of death. And less troubled generally in life – 
‘the wise man… is scarcely at all disturbed in spirit’519 – and entirely upon death: 
‘[o]nly while the body endures is the mind subject to affects which are related to the 
passions.’520 The more we engage in the intellectual love of god the less we fear death 
and the less we are disturbed by sad passions. Eternity is entirely without passion: in 
its post-death existence the mind is utterly untroubled by passions.521 Finally, we are 
assured by Spinoza that what survives is the best part of us: at P40C he writes that 
‘the part of the mind that remains… is more perfect than the rest.’ He continues: ‘the 
eternal part of the mind (by P23 and P29) is the intellect, through which alone we are 
said to act (by IIIP3). But what we have shown to perish is the imagination (by P21), 
through which alone we are said to be acted on’. Thus the eternal aspect is, in a sense, 
also the part of myself that is most truly me, because it is the most active part and 
therefore the aspect of myself in which I am freest, most self-determining and least at 
the mercy of external forces. 
In another sense, however, the immortality which Spinoza believes we have 
available is utterly impersonal. Adequate ideas are eternally true. To the extent that 
my mind consists of adequate ideas it is eternal. But presumably the stock of adequate 
ideas of which my mind is composed is equally available to all other minds. My mind 
is eternal only in as much as its ideas coincide with the set of eternally true, adequate 
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ideas. Spinoza makes clear that we would be mistaken to acquiesce in ‘the common 
opinion of men’ that someone’s personal imagination or memory ‘remains after 
death’,522 P21 clarifying that ‘[t]he mind can neither imagine anything, nor recollect 
past things, except while the body endures.’ For Spinoza, of course, imagination and 
memory belong to the first kind of knowledge, in the possession of which we are least 
fulfilling our essence as reasoning beings. It may well, though, seem to be that it is 
precisely these bodies of knowledge which are most distinctive of or personal to each 
of us as individuals, so that the fact they do not survive death might limit the extent to 
which Spinoza’s picture of immortality is found to be consoling. It must also be 
remembered that Spinozan immortality does not involve duration: it is somewhat 
misleading to think of the mind as continuing to exist after the death of the body. 
Again, that is a mistaken but common opinion of men who ‘are indeed conscious of 
the eternity of their mind, but… confuse it with duration’.523 The eternity of the mind 
in as much as it consists in adequate ideas is rather a kind of timelessness than of 
unending duration or sempiternity. 
For Spinoza, then, we are immortal to the extent that our minds include ideas 
which are eternally true and not subject to time, just as for the idealist Schopenhauer 
the will is independent of time and so inasmuch as we are will, we are immortal. The 
other sense in which we have a kind of immortality, according to Spinoza, finds its 
own echo in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. As we saw in chapter two, there exists an 
eternal essence of each Spinozan mode (‘in God there is necessarily an idea that 
expresses the essence of this or that human body, under a species of eternity’)524 just 
as each Schopenhauerian self is identified with an atemporal intelligible character. 
So we have seen that Spinoza’s account of blessedness and Schopenhauer’s of 
salvation coincide on several points. The fact that each offers an account of salvation 
which nonetheless does not constitute some kind of post-death reward for virtue525 
and can be maintained while eschewing the ideas of an absolute good,526 teleology or 
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a concerned and benevolent God is remarkable enough.527 For each, the condition 
constitutes the highest human virtue and offers the greatest joy of which we are 
capable. For both Spinoza and Schopenhauer, these beneficial states belong to those 
who have the most profound knowledge of the nature of reality (in particular, 
understanding it sub specie aeternitatis and recognising the interconnectedness of 
things). Such knowledge offers both objective and subjective values for its possessors. 
Finally, there is the prospect of some kind of immortality in each account. 
 
2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL PESSIMISM 
 
The differences between Schopenhauer’s model of salvation and that of his fore-
runner fall broadly into two camps, the first having to do with the route by which it is 
attained and the second concerning the value or purpose of salvation. I turn now to 
investigate these significant divergences between the two, arguing that they are best 
explained in terms of Schopenhauer’s epistemological and his metaphysical 
pessimisms respectively. In the process, difficulties with Schopenhauer’s model will 
come to light and be examined. In this first part these concern the extent to which 
Schopenhauerian salvation is achievable. In the second, metaphysical pessimism, 
section, I will explore the extent to which we can make sense of the metaphysics of 
salvation on Schopenhauer’s own terms. 
 
2.1 Schopenhauer contra Spinoza 
 
First, then, I address the question of how and for whom blessedness or salvation is 
achievable in the light of Schopenhauer’s pessimism and Spinoza’s optimism. Of 
particular relevance is Schopenhauer’s picture of phenomenal reality as characterised 
by a fight over limited resources. By contrast, it is Spinoza’s view that the thing that is 
best for us is unlimited – in fact, the more others have it the more available it becomes 
to each of us – and that cooperation is the best way to serve our own interests. Equally 
significant is the link between ethics and epistemology discussed in my previous 
chapter – the impossibility of gaining moral knowledge in Schopenhauer’s world in 
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contrast to the positive feedback cycle of knowledge, joy, activity and freedom in 
Spinoza’s. On the other hand, when it comes to the topic of salvation specifically, the 
chasm between Spinoza’s moral and epistemological optimism and Schopenhauer’s 
pessimism narrows. For Schopenhauer, in this exceptional case, the relevant 
knowledge can be gained and can change us. Nor, presumably, is ascetic denial of the 
will an inherently limited resource over which we must fight. Rather, its rarity is a 
product, at least in part, of the need for an excess of intellect – a kind of moral genius. 
But for Spinoza, too, the blessed state of the wise is a rare one – the famous last line 
of the Ethics tells us precisely that – so that the chasm between the two thinkers may 
seem to be narrowed from this side too.528 
We know, nonetheless, that phenomenal reality is, according to Schopenhauer, 
characterised by an inevitable struggle over limited resources (this struggle itself 
being a manifestation via the principium individuationis of the will’s inner self-
contradiction).529 The moral life of human beings expresses the highest degree of this 
struggle and is dominated by the egoistic impulse driving each to ‘snatch from 
another what he himself wants’.530 This avowedly Hobbesian picture contrasts starkly 
with Spinoza’s moral philosophy, according to which the good is sharable and 
increases by being shared so that, by EIVP36, ‘[t]he greatest good of those who seek 
virtue is common to all, and can be enjoyed by all equally’ and by P37 ‘[t]he good 
which everyone who seeks virtue wants for himself, he also desires for other men’. 
This leads to Spinoza’s conclusion in Part V that blessedness (the intellectual love of 
God) ‘cannot be tainted by an affect of envy or jealousy: instead, the more men we 
imagine to be joined to God by the same bond of love, the more it is encouraged’, and 
that it ‘is common to all men’ and ‘we desire that all should enjoy it’.531 
In spite of their innate egoism Spinozan individuals, then, unlike Schopenhauerian 
ones, are naturally inclined to cooperate in order to attain the good.532 Equally, 
attaining this good is achievable for them: on Spinoza’s model, we are capable of 
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gaining the knowledge which quells passions and inspires the intellectual love of God. 
This is a result of two happy facts which are true in Spinoza’s world but not in 
Schopenhauer’s. In the first place, the third kind of knowledge, though it is a 
philosophical and rational understanding, is able to move us. At P36S Spinoza 
remarks ‘how much… intuitive, or knowledge of the third kind (see IIP40S2), can 
accomplish’, having explained at P31S that ‘the more each of us is able to achieve in 
this kind of knowledge, the more he is conscious of himself and of God, that is, the 
more perfect and blessed he is.’ Blessedness results from the third kind of knowledge, 
but though Spinoza refers to this as ‘intuitive’ knowledge, it is not some kind of 
mystical or innate insight but a paradigm of active, rational understanding.533 Because 
of this – here is the second happy fact – it is something we can achieve through our 
own efforts.534 Spinoza emphasizes the wise person’s passage to understanding and 
blessedness: ‘he who knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to the greatest 
human perfection, and consequently (by Def. Aff II), is affected with the greatest 
Joy’.535 In particular, it is through understanding our passions that we are able to 
neutralise their painful affects, situate them in relation to the necessary unfolding of 
substance and thereby attain the joyful state of the intellectual love of God.536 At 
EVP15 Spinoza states that ‘[h]e who understands himself and his affects clearly and 
distinctly loves God’, explaining further at EVP20S that clear and distinct knowledge 
of the affects ‘begets a love toward a thing immutable and eternal (see P15), which we 
really fully possess (see IIIP45), and which therefore… can always be greater and 
greater (by P15), and occupy the greatest part of the mind’. Indeed, we can understand 
any affection of our body whatsoever clearly and distinctly and in as much as we do, 
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we relate that image or affection to God. The better we understand our affections the 
more we love God – and love of God is that which most engages the mind.537 
 By contrast for Schopenhauer, as we know, knowledge of the kind that can be 
gained philosophically has no moral power. The insight that sees through the 
principium individuationis and grasps the essence of reality is not an abstract 
understanding which can be worked out and gradually increased: the saint’s conduct 
‘springs not from abstract knowledge, but from intuitively apprehended, immediate 
knowledge of the world and of its inner nature’.538 And, on the other hand, ‘[t]he great 
ethical difference of characters means that the bad man is infinitely remote from 
attaining that knowledge, whose result is the denial of the will, and is therefore in 
truth actually abandoned to all the miseries which appear in life as possible.’539 
Although one’s chance of happiness is determined by one’s level of insight, such 
knowledge is innate or, at the very least, not to be acquired by intellectual effort so 
that – as William Blake had it – ‘Some are born to sweet delight, Some are born to 
endless night’.540 A further point of contrast is the fact that for Spinoza when once we 
have gained blessedness, we are assured of it, whereas for Schopenhauer our salvation 
is always at risk. Thus Spinoza tells us that ‘[t]here is nothing in Nature which is 
contrary to this intellectual love, or which can take it away’541 whereas Schopenhauer 
points out that ascetic practices must be watchfully maintained and that desires 
constantly threaten to draw us back into the sufferings of a life ruled by will. Denial 
of the will ‘must always be achieved afresh by constant struggle’, he writes, and ‘on 
earth no one can have lasting peace.’542 
 
2.2 Narrowing the Gap 
 
 However, as I indicated above, when it comes to the relationship between 
epistemology and salvation the gap between Spinoza’s optimism and Schopenhauer’s 
pessimism may be narrower than at first appears. For one thing, though blessedness is 
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in principle achievable, according to Spinoza, he does acknowledge that it is rarely 
attained. Of the path to salvation he concludes in the final proposition of Ethics that 
‘[n]eeds must it be hard, since it is so seldom found. How would it be possible, if 
salvation were ready to our hand, and could without great labour be found, that it 
should be by almost all men neglected?’543 So blessedness, even on Spinoza’s picture, 
is found seldom and neglected by almost all. Let alone being ‘as difficult as [it is]… 
rare’, though Spinoza maintains that blessedness can be found with great labour, we 
might wonder if it is achievable at all. This is particularly so when he characterises the 
intellectual love as perfection of the mind at P33S ‘[i]f joy, then, consists in the 
passage to a greater perfection, blessedness must surely consist in the fact that the 
mind is endowed with perfection itself.’ On the other hand, Spinoza’s claim is that it 
is in virtue of the complexity of the human body that blessedness is achievable, which 
presumably leaves it in reach of all or most.544 Indeed, in the Scholium to Proposition 
10 of Part V he seems to suggest that it is not difficult to follow the rules which lead 
us to increased rationality and the intellectual love of God: 
 
One, therefore, who is anxious to moderate his affects and appetites from the love of 
freedom alone will strive… to come to know the virtues and their causes, and to fill 
his mind with the gladness which arises from the true knowledge of them… And he 
who will observe these [rules] carefully – for they are not difficult – and practice 
them, will soon be able to direct most of his actions according to the command of 
reason. 
 
 
Perhaps, though, it would be more consistent to read this passage as holding that the 
rules are not difficult to understand – not difficult in the sense of not abstruse – rather 
than that the work of following them is easily done.545 This leaves us with a picture 
according to which, in virtue of their bodily and corresponding mental complexity, 
human beings are capable of attaining the intellectual love of God and this can be 
achieved through their own striving, but where this involves great labour and so is 
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rarely accomplished. This remains, in my estimation, an optimistic, though not a rose-
tinted, picture of the relationship between knowledge and blessedness and the human 
capacity for happiness. 
 As for Schopenhauer, certainly salvation is rarely found, according to his 
world-view – it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle.546 Some 
degree of optimism, however, may be glimpsed in the fact that the kind of knowledge 
which inspires ascetic withdrawal is not entirely bound up with a person’s innate 
(intelligible) character in the way that we have seen other moral knowledge is. 
Instead, in this one instance, non-abstract, morally transformative knowledge can be 
gained and can change our relationship to the will such that salvation becomes 
attainable. It is knowledge of the inner nature of reality – penetration of the 
principium individuationis – that produces salvation: ‘when this penetration appears 
in all its force, it produces perfect sanctification and salvation, the phenomenon of 
which are the state of resignation previously described, the unshakeable peace 
accompanying this, and the highest joy and delight in death.’547 But this point can be 
reached not only through ‘suffering merely known’ but also, and more often, through 
‘suffering personally felt’.548 In other words, what happens in the course of a person’s 
life – their phenomenal existence – can in this one case change their understanding of 
the nature of reality in such a way as to transform them morally, resulting in denial of 
the will and hence salvation. 
 In fact, it is not entirely clear whether this is a case of epistemological 
optimism – of Schopenhauer accepting the existence of a kind of knowledge that is 
both transformative and acquirable. He seems, to some extent, to contrast the path to 
salvation through knowledge to the path through personal suffering, calling the latter 
‘a second way’ which is not like the first and insisting that ‘only in the case of a few 
is mere knowledge sufficient to bring about the denial of the will’.549 The suggestion 
seems to be that profound personal suffering somehow produces resignation 
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directly.550 On the other hand, in explaining this path to salvation Schopenhauer notes 
of those converted by suffering that ‘[t]he last secret of life has revealed itself to them 
in the excess of pain’, that they have come to see the identity of tormentor and 
tormented and that this is an ‘intuitive and immediate knowledge’.551 It seems 
reasonable to conclude, then, that in most cases Schopenhauerian salvation is 
achieved through the transformative power of a piece of knowledge which is acquired 
during the course of a person’s life. 
If the knowledge which produces asceticism is exceptional in this respect, it 
nonetheless remains something that can’t be attained incrementally and by our own 
efforts. Rather, it comes as from without and is passively received, rather than worked 
at, by those who are fortunate enough to be especially unfortunate in the degree of 
suffering they undergo. Schopenhauer writes that ‘salvation is to be gained only… 
through a changed way of knowledge… as from without.’552 Even more explicitly, he 
says 
 
Now since, as we have seen, that self-suppression of the will comes from knowledge, 
but all knowledge and insight as such are independent of free choice, that denial of 
willing, that entrance into freedom, is not to be forcibly arrived at by intention or 
design, but comes from the innermost relation of knowing and willing in man; hence 
it comes suddenly, as if flying in from without. Therefore the Church calls it the effect 
of grace’ 
 
The insight that induces denial of the will, then, is not something that we can 
gain through our own efforts – as  Romans 11:6 has it, if being saved comes ‘by 
grace, then it cannot be based on works’.553 Clearly in this respect Schopenhauer is 
more of an epistemological pessimist than Spinoza. Perhaps, though, he has good 
reason to be. For Schopenhauer, the fact that we can’t labour to gain salvation follows 
from the fact that we do not have freedom of the will.554 Knowledge and insight, he 
says, are independent of free choice. Presumably Schopenhauer would see it as 
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hopelessly optimistic of Spinoza – his fellow determinist – to claim that we can work 
at understanding our passions and the rest of modal reality in relation to God.555 
One further pessimistic twist in Schopenhauer’s account is arguably less well 
justified. He suggests that the remarkable agreement between Christian and Vedantic 
mystics ‘is a practical proof that here is expressed not an eccentricity and craziness of 
the mind… but an essential side of human nature which appears rarely only because 
of its superior quality.’556 Why should the superior quality of ascetic human nature of 
itself make it rare? Of course, if it is superior then there must by definition be a nature 
that is inferior to it, but I don’t see that anything follows about the relative frequency 
with which each appears. At least Spinoza offers an explanation as to why salvation is 
rare: all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare. It is not simply because of its 
excellence or superiority that salvation is rarely found, but because of the difficulty of 
achieving it. For the arch pessimist, by contrast, it is to be assumed that any great 
blessing would inevitably be meanly distributed. 
We have seen that points of disagreement between Schopenhauer and Spinoza 
on this issue can to some extent be explained by the former’s pessimism about the 
accessibility and transformative power of knowledge and the latter’s optimism. 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine of salvation – unlike Spinoza’s – is underpinned, too, by 
metaphysical pessimism. In the remainder of this chapter I look, first, at the content of 
the knowledge inherent to salvation – what is revealed in it about the nature of reality. 
Second, I examine the topic of what salvation means for the self, and what more this 
can tell us about the two thinkers’ theories of self. Finally, I address some of the 
potential metaphysical problems with Schopenhauer’s account of salvation, in 
particular immortality, the abolition of the will as such and the unique appearance of 
freedom in the phenomenal realm. 
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3. METAPHYSICAL PESSIMISM 
 
3.1 What is Known 
 
The content of the knowledge that induces or – perhaps – constitutes salvation 
is, of course, somewhat different in each case and revelatory of each thinker’s 
evaluation of the nature of reality. For Spinoza, what the blessed individual comes to 
understand is her embeddedness in reality and that reality is characterised by 
necessity. For Schopenhauer, it is an understanding of embeddedness and that reality 
is suffering. 
 For Spinoza, what the blessed person knows is that he or she is embedded, as a 
mode of substance, in a system characterised by necessity. Understanding modes in 
relation to substance effects the intellectual love of God, which constitutes 
blessedness. Certainly, gaining knowledge – becoming freer, more active, more 
powerful – brings us joy, and this is in stark contrast to Schopenhauer’s view that 
those with greater understanding are more exposed to suffering.557 It is perhaps not 
entirely clear that the joy gained results from anything more than the process or 
activity of knowing – whether the content of what we know of itself brings joy. In 
other words, does what the wise person comes to understand about the nature of 
reality constitute good news? For Schopenhauer of course – and as I shall discuss 
further below – reality is actually evil. For Spinoza, substance is at worst neutral. As 
Bela Egyed has it in ‘Spinoza, Schopenhauer and the Standpoint of Affirmation’, the 
inner nature of world is neither good nor evil for Spinoza, but a necessary unfolding, 
which is not ‘in conformity with human values and expectations.’558 There may be 
reason to believe that what we understand in making sense of our place in reality does 
itself bring us joy. For one thing, blessedness consists in the intellectual love of God, 
with the word ‘love’ seeming to suggest a positive valuation of God or substance. 
Egyed himself suggests that the nature of reality and our place within it is something 
to be positively affirmed for Spinoza, in his useful account of the way in which 
Schopenhauer diverges from Spinoza on this topic.559 Egyed argues that ‘[w]e attain 
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salvation, according to Spinoza, by affirming necessity’.560 It is precisely through this 
that we gain freedom: ‘the freedom that comes from grasping that one is a specific 
expression of the infinite power of God (natura naturatans)’ so that ‘salvation comes, 
not through denial of the will-to-live (“conatus,” in his terminology) but through its 
affirmation.’ The intellectual love of God, then, is modelled by Egyed as the 
recognition that we are finite modes of nature and the understanding that our power to 
act is a part of that.561 It is as embedded, determined individuals that we are free and 
active – our understanding of that brings us the joy that constitutes our salvation. 
 Things are, of course, very different for Schopenhauer. What marks out the 
knowledge of one who denies the will from that belonging to the compassionate 
person is that in addition to understanding that phenomenal individuals are an illusion 
and we are all, ultimately will, the will-denier also recognises the ubiquity of 
suffering. This is why such a person transcends compassion and becomes an ascetic: 
‘it is no longer enough for him to love others… but there arises in him a strong 
aversion to the inner nature whose expression is his own phenomenon, to the will-to-
live, the kernel and essence of that world recognized as full of misery.’562 
 According to Schopenhauer, then, suffering is inherent to the will’s concrete 
manifestation, the phenomenal world. This is because the will is in contradiction with 
itself,563 its inner conflict expressing itself ‘in the suffering of all that lives.’564 As 
Christopher Janaway puts it in ‘Schopenhauer’s Philosophy of Value’ ‘[w]illing 
continues perpetually and without final purpose… Throughout nature one being 
dominates and destroys another, the will tearing itself apart, says Schopenhauer, 
because it is a hungry will and there is nothing for it to feed on but itself.’565 The will 
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is in contradiction with itself, it is hungry, never-satisfied and possibly evil566 – at the 
very least Schopenhauer insists upon ‘the colossal evils of the world’.567 
Schopenhauer and Spinoza share a metaphysics of monism and dynamism: 
despite ultimate reality being one, there is constant change at the level of individuals, 
which are driven by will or conatus. I suspect, though, that Spinoza would offer two 
responses to Schopenhauer’s picture. First, while he too characterises finite beings as 
vulnerable to destructive forces greater than themselves Spinoza also insists that 
individuals are capable of strengthening themselves, particularly through combining 
with others. Second, it seems likely that he would see the idea of a hungry will as 
merely superstitious. Even the idea of the will – the inner nature of reality and 
something that is beyond space, time and plurality – being in contradiction with itself 
is perhaps difficult to make sense of. 
 Schopenhauer’s counter, of course, is to accuse Spinoza of an unrealistic – 
even callous – optimism. Robert Wicks mentions Schopenhauer’s ‘repeated 
condemnations of optimism – sometimes associated with pantheism – as an 
insensitive, wicked outlook.’568 Bela Egyed argues that Schopenhauer has two main 
objections to Spinoza’s ethics. One is that the connection between Spinoza’s ethics 
and ontology is tenuous, leaving ‘good and evil as merely conventional’ and 
Spinoza’s ethics, as a result, empty and abominable.569 The other is precisely that 
Spinoza is a pantheist and therefore an optimist.570 Egyed quotes Schopenhauer on the 
relationship of his own philosophy to this worldview: ‘“it is true that I have that ‘one 
and all’ in common with the Pantheists but not their ‘all is god’… they are thus put in 
the position of having to sophisticate away the colossal evils of the world” (World II 
643).’571 
One thing this quotation suggests is that we should not read too much into the 
religious language Schopenhauer adopts in his account of salvation – he remains a 
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staunch atheist.572 Indeed he makes it explicit that when it comes to one who denies 
the will it is ‘immaterial’ whether ascetic conduct ‘proceeds from a theistic or from an 
atheistic religion.’573 More significantly, it is worth asking whether Spinoza really is 
an optimist of the type Schopenhauer finds so objectionable. ‘If it is possible to call 
Spinoza a “pantheist,”’ Egyed argues, ‘he can by no means be called an 
“optimist.”’.574 He points out that Spinoza makes no claim as to whether the inner 
nature of the world is good or evil.575 I would add that this, of course, is consistent 
with Spinoza’s view that good is relative to the interests of the person judging. 
According to Egyed what really underlies Schopenhauer’s accusation against Spinoza 
is the latter’s ‘belief that through an understanding of the way in which God’s 
attributes are expressed in finite individuals (modes), human individuals can come to 
know and, as a result, acquiesce in the order of things, of which they, too, are an 
essential expression.’576 Egyed’s point here seems to be that Schopenhauer would 
object to the idea that the order of things is something to acquiesce in, though he 
might also reject the claim that we can come to understand that order. Egyed goes on 
to make this case too, noting that ‘Schopenhauer might reply that it is optimistic to 
claim that it is possible to know the complex of causes constituting us with any degree 
of certainty’.577 While for Spinoza ‘[a]s our knowledge grows, the less contingent the 
world appears to us’, Egyed’s belief is that for Schopenhauer reality is ‘fraught with 
unpredictability’.578 
Once more, then, what underlies Schopenhauer’s rejection of a Spinozan 
position seems to be an epistemological pessimism, although I would suggest the 
question of the meaningfulness of reality plays a role here too. For the rationalist 
Spinoza – as we saw in the very first chapter – the world is fully comprehensible, the 
order of ideas paralleling the necessary connections that hold between things. 
Schopenhauer, by contrast, is at pains to point out the irrationality of the will and the 
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meaninglessness of the world. Schopenhauer may be wrong to dismiss Spinoza as a 
thoughtless optimist who has to turn a blind eye to suffering because of a dogmatic 
belief in a good God. He may, too, struggle to convince on the notion that the ultimate 
nature of reality is cannibalistic and self-contradictory. The particular question of 
meaningfulness, though, strikes me as a little more finely balanced. Perhaps 
Schopenhauer should have toed the more cautious Kantian line that we can’t know 
about the nature of reality as it is beyond the forms of intuition, and so can’t 
pronounce it irrational or meaningless. But equally, Spinoza might be overreaching in 
his appeal to the rationalist doctrine that for everything that exists, it must be possible 
to find a reason.579 Part of what explains this divergence, perhaps, is that 
Schopenhauer envisages a starker division between the will and its (determined, law-
governed) manifestations than does Spinoza between substance and its expressions. 
 
3.2 The Self 
 
In the previous section, we saw that the content of the knowledge which 
induces salvation is quite different in the cases of the two philosophers, revealing 
Schopenhauer’s metaphysical pessimism about the nature of reality and Spinoza’s 
comparative optimism. I would argue that another key difference between the two 
accounts of salvation concerns the relationship between salvation and the self. In this 
section I will set Spinoza’s optimistic model of blessedness as the fulfilment of the 
self against Schopenhauer’s picture in which salvation involves denial and an escape 
from the self. I will also try to draw out what more this tells us about each thinker’s 
understanding of the nature of the self. 
For Spinoza, as we know, when enjoying the intellectual love of God we are at 
our most active, our freest, our most joyful, our wisest and our most capable. Our 
relations with others are strengthened and we feel ourselves to be more at home in the 
universe.580 There is (inevitably, given parallelism) a simultaneous flourishing of 
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body and mind581 and although it gives us power over the damaging passions, it does 
not involve a complete flight from emotion.582 By engaging in understanding through 
the use of reason we are effectively perfecting ourselves; we are ensuring that the 
most perfect part of our nature makes up the greatest part of ourselves possible, and 
thus grasping a greater share of eternity.583 All finite individuals have a conatus and 
through the intellectual love of God we human beings fulfil that drive to self-
preservation by expressing and strengthening what is most essential to us – the 
intellect – and by storing up adequate knowledge so that we are, indeed, to a certain 
extent immortal.584 For Spinoza, then, ‘[t]he greatest satisfaction of mind there can be 
arises from this third kind of knowledge’ and ‘he who knows things by this kind of 
knowledge passes to the greatest human perfection, and consequently (by Def. Aff II), 
is affected with the greatest Joy’.585 This is blessedness. 
Schopenhauerian salvation, by contrast, is rather about the suppression than 
the fulfilment of self. In the first place, the route to salvation is brutally painful, as 
opposed to the joyful and strengthening process it is for Spinoza. Suffering is 
compared to a painful cure;586 the knowledge which precipitates asceticism ‘has 
revealed itself to them in the excess of pain’;587 the ascetic process itself is a self-
torture that we must struggle against ourselves to maintain. Thus as Christopher 
Janaway puts it ‘for Schopenhauer value is ultimately snatched from the jaws of 
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nihilism’ only through a cure – denial of the will and loss of metaphysical 
individuality – ‘potentially as radical and unnerving’ as the condition itself.588 
Second, and because of this, while Spinoza’s free man increases his body’s 
capacity and power as he gains in wisdom, the Schopenhauerian ascetic sets out to 
punish and destroy the body which is the expression of his will. Schopenhauer tells us 
‘he resorts to fasting, and even to self-castigation and self-torture’ and the body’s 
‘vigorous flourishing and thriving’ is precisely what he avoids in case it should 
‘animate afresh and excite more strongly the will.’589 He denies the will, denies his 
desires, seeks out what is opposed to his will.590 Thus while to achieve blessedness is, 
for Spinoza, to fulfil your conatus, according to Schopenhauer salvation can only be 
attained by thwarting the will to live. 
 This means, in turn, that salvation requires an overthrowing or abandonment 
of the self. To achieve salvation I must deny my will, and my will is myself: 
‘salvation, deliverance from life and suffering, cannot even be imagined without 
complete denial of the will. Till then, everyone is nothing but this will itself’.591 Even 
more explicitly: ‘salvation is to be gained only… through a changed way of 
knowledge… as from without. This means that salvation is something quite foreign to 
our person, and points to a denial and surrender of this very person being necessary 
for salvation.’592 As we saw in section 2 of this chapter, the knowledge that facilitates 
salvation comes from without, like an act of grace, rather than through our own efforts 
of understanding. It alters us completely,593 though not through a change of character 
but a complete withdrawal from it – and therefore from the self as such. 
 Finally, for Spinoza blessedness involves the recognition of one’s own 
integration into reality, an expansion of the most essential aspect of the self and 
establishing that part of the self as immortal. On the other hand, Schopenhauerian 
salvation brings withdrawal from reality, destruction of the self and death envisioned 
as a release or escape. For the ascetic ‘if death comes… it is most welcome, and is 
cheerfully accepted as a longed-for deliverance.’594 
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 We saw in the first chapter that Schopenhauer and Spinoza share what I called 
an embedded-self thesis. The differences in their respective accounts of salvation and 
its relation to the self reveal ways in which their understandings of the self as such 
also diverge. To some extent, this is a direct function of metaphysical optimism or 
pessimism. For Spinoza, our integration as finite modes into reality as such is to be 
celebrated, and the more we come to understand it the more we love God and are 
blessed. For Schopenhauer, our embedding in the masochistic will is to be mourned 
and salvation offers an escape. There may, though, be a question for Schopenhauer to 
answer about who it is that makes this escape, given that a person is her intelligible 
character and it is this character – her will – which is somehow transcended in 
salvation: I explore this further in sections 3.2 and 3.4.1 below. 
 The self’s integration is one characteristic of the embedded-self thesis, the 
other is the refusal to follow Descartes in identifying the self with the intellect. It may 
be that this refusal is somewhat muddied for each philosopher by his theory of 
salvation. In Schopenhauer’s case, identifying the self with the knowing subject might 
in fact seem to offer him the best chance of plausibly explaining how one can 
transcend one’s will and achieve a kind of immortality. Again, I discuss this possible 
interpretation of Schopenhauerian salvation in what follows. Nonetheless, 
Schopenhauer’s official line is that the essence of the self is the will. As Janaway puts 
it, our ‘unique inner consciousness of our own will when we act gives us the key to 
understanding our essence: it is that we are active and strive towards ends.’595 For 
Spinoza, too, an individual’s conatus is its essence: ‘[t[he striving by which each thing 
strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing.’596 At 
the same time, though, his focus in the account of salvation seems to be squarely on 
the intellect and at EVP33S he tells us that blessedness consists in the perfection of 
the mind. 
 Does blessedness, then, really constitute a flourishing of the whole self for 
Spinoza? The focus on the mind rather than the body may seem to reverse what 
Nadler calls Spinoza’s ‘explanatory materialism’ – his supposed failure to explain the 
mental equivalent to the individuation of physical modes.597 Given that he thinks 
mental and physical systems run in parallel, perhaps Spinoza is entitled explain 
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salvation as it occurs in one of those attributes and leave us to work out the 
equivalent. And his account does at least seem to be more holistic than 
Schopenhauer’s with respect to the affects. While Schopenhauerian salvation involves 
quashing all desires as such, joy continues to be felt within the state of blessedness 
and Spinoza acknowledges the good in the affects of love, cheerfulness and so on. 
However, the immortality Spinoza envisages is simply the eternity that belongs to 
adequate ideas as such, which perhaps troubles that holism in two ways. First, 
Spinoza himself says that his account of eternity concerns ‘the mind’s duration 
without relation to the body.’598 Second, it is precisely an account of eternity – of the 
timelessness of adequate ideas – so that Spinoza’s own reference to duration is 
somewhat misleading. Whether a person’s conatus would truly be fulfilled simply by 
attaining eternal ideas or whether it is also a striving for the self’s real endurance is a 
moot point in Spinoza scholarship.599  
 Meanwhile, there are readings of Schopenhauer which offer a more optimistic 
– indeed, Spinozist – interpretation of what becomes of the self in salvation. Julian 
Young reminds us that the nothingness which remains after the abolition of the will 
‘“is in fact a heavenly ‘nothing’”’ and that ‘“beyond the ‘dream’ of individuality is a 
divine Oneness: ‘pantheistic consciousness’”’.600 Robert Wicks similarly refers to the 
‘universalistic mode of awareness’ which is ‘instantiated through either an aesthetic, 
moral, or ascetic attitude’ and is available to the ‘small minority’ who ‘are not fated to 
such an unfulfilled life’ as are most of mankind.601 Here, then, we have quite 
explicitly the claim that the ascetic self might be a more fulfilled self, as well as the 
idea that salvation involves (a sense of) pantheistic oneness and finally that there 
might be some kind of positive state awaiting the ascetic beyond the abolition of the 
will. This returns us to the question, raised in section 1.3 of this chapter, of whether 
Schopenhauer really can offer a full account of immortality incorporating, as Julian 
Young argues in ‘Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Death and Salvation’, invulnerability to 
death and the promise of a blissful state. 
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3.3 Immortality Revisited 
 
It is interesting to note that almost all of the references Young makes in 
discussing Schopenhauer’s treatment of immortality and bliss are to Volume II of The 
World as Will and Representation. This might help to explain the seeming distance 
between his reading of Schopenhauer on these subjects and the interpretations offered 
by Janaway and Jacquette. Certainly, Schopenhauer uses the latter parts of Volume II, 
chapters xli, xlviii and xlix in particular, to elaborate upon his account of salvation. 
However, if Janaway and Jacquette understand Volume I correctly, and Young is right 
to see the promise of a post-death bliss made to an experiencing subject in Volume II, 
this would suggest a real incompatibility between the two volumes. Indeed, the 
elaborations of Volume II might have to be seen as inconsistent with central tenets of 
Schopenhauer’s systematic philosophy, as set out in the first volume, having to do 
with the ideality of time and the relationship between the will and the knowing 
subject. In my view, Volume II does not make such drastic revisions. On page 494 of 
that volume, Schopenhauer asserts that though one’s ‘true inner being is 
indestructible’, precisely because of the ideality of time ‘we cannot attribute 
continuance to it’ and on 495 he emphasizes that it is not the intellect but the will to 
which this indestructibility should be attributed.602 
If time is dependent upon a knowing subject, then on the death of the knowing 
subject there is no more duration through which one's inner being could continue. 
This is the position that Jacquette takes.603 Of course, if it turned out that one’s inner 
being was the knowing subject then this would be untouchable by death and so its 
continued duration would not be paradoxical. This brings us, then, to the question of 
the relationship between the will and the knowing self and that which is our essence 
and which is untouched by death, which might be enlightening with reference to the 
apparent dispute between Young and other interpreters. Young writes 
 
according to idealism, life and the world are, ultimately speaking, a ‘dream’. But a 
dream requires a dreamer who is not part of the dream, a transcendent subject. It 
follows that death is no more than the end of the dream (or nightmare), that our real self 
is untouched by it.604 
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It seems natural to think of Young’s one who dreams the dream that is life as 
Schopenhauer’s knowing subject, for whom alone the phenomenal world exists.605 
Young goes on to claim that the self that lies beyond the dream is ‘the true ‘I’… the 
transcendent self… beyond both birth and death.’ If the real self, the transcendent 
subject is, for Young, the knowing subject, then his position must be that it is as 
knowing subjects that we are immune to death. This, however, Schopenhauer 
explicitly denies – and, in fact, most explicitly of all in Volume II: ‘[a]ll philosophers 
have made the mistake of placing that which is metaphysical, indestructible, and 
eternal in man in the intellect. It lies exclusively in the will’.606 
 It is not as intellects, as knowing subjects, that we are untouched by death. As 
Schopenhauer goes on to say ‘the intellect is a secondary phenomenon’.607 The 
intellect, like the body, is a manifestation of the will. And although phenomenal 
objects are dependent upon the knowing subject, the subject is itself, in a sense, also a 
feature of phenomenal reality. Object and subject, Schopenhauer makes clear as early 
as §2 of Volume I, are two halves of the world as representation: ‘each exists with the 
other and vanishes with it.’608 The consequence of this is, as Jacquette puts it, that 
death of the phenomenal individual means ‘total annihilation of the … subject’.609 Of 
course, Young is talking specifically of the rare phenomenon of salvation, and 
perhaps the death of the ascetic should be seen as an exception to this rule. 
Schopenhauer certainly does characterise this particular kind of death as exceptional, 
but if anything this seems to be because the death of the ascetic is a more rather than a 
less effective obliteration!610 To repeat, then, the knowing subject does not survive 
death. One’s inner being is not intellect, but will and it is this will which is untouched 
by the death of the phenomenal individual. 
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The words which I have quoted from the start of Young’s chapter do not 
directly contradict this. I have said that it seems natural to think of the ‘dreamer’ or 
‘transcendent subject’ that he calls the ‘real self’ as the knowing subject, but Young 
himself does not explicitly make this claim. What would the consequences be were 
we to take Young here to be identifying the real, death-defying self with the will 
rather than the intellect? We could retain the idea that it is Schopenhauer’s idealism 
which makes possible the consolation that death is not an absolute annihilation. 
Young states that ‘Schopenhauer satisfies his own meta-philosophical requirement by 
appeal to… idealism’.611 Again, the more natural way to read this might be as 
suggesting that it is the haver of the ideas that constitute phenomenal reality – the 
subject of representation – which is the real, transcendent self. However, this 
consolation remains attributable to idealism even if the real self is understood to be 
the will. This is because it is Schopenhauer’s distinction between the phenomenal 
world of representation and the noumenal will which allows him to maintain that our 
inner nature as will is unaffected by death, this distinction constituting 
Schopenhauer’s spin on Kant’s transcendental idealism. 
On the other hand, Young’s notion that there is a ‘subject’ who survives death 
and enjoys a post-death state is surely overstretched on this alternative account – even 
more so, his talk of ‘one’s post-death existence’, which intimates that it is the same 
individual to whom this consolation is offered who will persist. If it is only as will 
that ‘we’ survive, that is really just to say that the will is timeless and unaffected by 
the passing away of one of its phenomena. Admittedly each of us is will, will is our 
inner being, but as Jacquette stresses nothing that is unique to each of us survives: 
‘[t]he part of me that survives death… is no different from but exactly the same as the 
pure willing part of you that survives death.’612 In the service of reassuring us that 
death does not amount to annihilation Schopenhauer himself seems to me to 
underscore the very meagreness of this picture of immortality, pointing out in Volume 
II that the aspect of ‘me’ which continues after death is precisely what was already 
there before my birth.613 
We are left with the consolation that death is not absolute, but what survives is 
neither a knowing consciousness nor ‘me’ as a distinctive individual. What, then, 
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becomes of the ideas of salvation, of the specialness of the ascetic’s death and of a 
blissful, post-death state? If we read these first paragraphs from Young as consistent 
with the view that the surviving ‘self’ is simply the will then his position draws much 
closer to the more standard one typified by Jacquette, but at the cost of any real sense 
of consolation. This is not offered by way of a criticism of Young: he himself goes on 
to say that the will is ‘fundamentally evil’ and that ‘if that is what our true self is then, 
far from receiving “consolation” in the face of death, to realise the character of one’s 
true self is to descend into a realm of cosmic self-disgust.’ Worse still, if my inner 
nature is will not only should I feel horror at it, but I should recognise that suffering is 
inescapable: ‘death merely transforms personal into cosmic suffering’. Young 
concludes, therefore, that ‘if the will is the thing in itself then there can be no doctrine 
of “salvation” in Schopenhauer’s philosophy.’614 For Young, this is primarily because 
if the noumenal is will then any post death state could have no positive value – but I 
think there are other problems too. If all that remains after death is the will, it is 
indeed hard to see how a post-death experience could be positive, but equally hard to 
imagine who the subject of that experience could possibly be. Jacquette, of course, 
can offer no better consolation and he too concludes that there can be no ‘meaningful 
form of salvation’ through death in Schopenhauer’s philosophy.615 
Jacquette despairs of the possibility of Schopenhauerian salvation, Young does 
not. Young’s conclusion is conditional and he follows up his judgement that there 
could be no doctrine of salvation were will to be understood as noumenal by 
reminding us that the The World As Will clearly does offer such a doctrine.’616 For 
Young, this contradiction between two of Schopenhauer’s credos is resolved when, in 
Volume II, Schopenhauer resiles from his claim that the thing in itself is will and 
accepts it is unknowable, leaving room for the possibility that ultimate reality is not 
evil and that salvation can be attained.617 Philosophy can tell us no more, but art and 
the writing of mystics illustrate the blissful state that is available to an ascetic. It is not 
clear to me that Volume II’s retrenchment fully revives the doctrine of salvation. The 
thing in itself might be unknowable, but it remains the case that the most profound 
insight we do have into the nature of reality depicts it as the ever-hungry will – this 
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seems unpromising regarding the possibility of a blissful state. If reality is, as Young 
believes Schopenhauer would have it at the end of book four, ‘at bottom, “divine”’,618 
that it manifests as will seems somewhat mysterious. 
There remains, too, the question of what it is of me that survives death. Young 
does indeed (as the early passages of his chapter suggested) seem to believe that a 
knowing subject survives, and quotes Schopenhauer’s description of the condition of 
an ascetic as depicted by Raphael and Correggio: ‘only knowledge remains, the will 
has vanished’.619 However, in Volume II Schopenhauer states that knowledge, 
consciousness and the intellect end with the brain’s death.620 If this is not to be a 
straight contradiction, it must be because in the former passage Schopenhauer is 
attributing this blissful state to the ascetic before the moment of his or her 
phenomenal death. I think this probably is the case: the description quoted by Young 
is supposed to be of ‘those who have overcome the world, in whom the will… has… 
freely denied itself, and who then merely wait to see the last trace of the will vanish 
with the body that is animated by that trace.’621 This, then, does not seem to offer a 
promise of immortality or a blissful post-death state. On the other hand, it does appear 
in the context of Schopenhauer’s encouragement that the nothingness that follows the 
ascetic’s death might be a blessing. Certainly, Young argues that Schopenhauer is 
promising something more than the this-worldly ascetic detachment familiar from 
Stoic ethics; for Young’s Schopenhauer ‘salvation has to possess an ultimately 
“transcendent” character’.622 
What, then, of the consolations – immortality and a blissful post-death state – 
that Young took it to be Schopenhauer’s philosophical project to offer? In terms of 
immortality, it seems that it is only the will that is immune to death.623 However, an 
individual is identified with her intelligible character, and the intelligible character is 
will and so unaffected by the death of the phenomenon. The death of the ascetic is, 
according to Schopenhauer, a special case. In that one case, we see ‘the world melt 
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away with the abolished will, and retain before us only empty nothingness.’624 The 
possibility of a blissful post-death state appears to hang on the possibility of that 
nothingness being, as Young would have it, divine. What Schopenhauer offers as an 
indication that this might be so is a picture of a blissful state of pure knowing prior to 
death. While his claim that the intellect is a secondary manifestation of will that dies 
with the phenomenon seems to undermine any promise that this could continue after 
death, Schopenhauer does, however, describe how the aesthetic genius ‘becomes the 
subject purified of will’, his ‘superfluity of knowledge having become free’ from the 
will.625 The only glimpses this life can give us of such a post-death state (those 
coming from aesthetic experience, from the mystics and from the artists who painted 
them) indicate it as a state of knowing. If Schopenhauer does not envision a kind of 
knowledge that can transcend the will, it is difficult to see what this state of salvation 
could be or how there could be any kind of subject to experience it – leaving the 
prospect of the consolation of a blissful post-death state utterly remote. 
Ultimately we may have to conclude that there is a tension, perhaps a 
contradiction, between Schopenhauer’s ethical project and his own metaphysical set-
up. He does seem committed to the idea that salvation is available to a few, at least. 
The World As Will and Representation ends on a positive note: the state of the ascetic 
is blissful, the nothingness which follows his death is to be welcomed not feared. But 
if the essential nature of reality is will, various complicating factors seem to follow. 
First, if ultimate reality is will and intellect is secondary, we are left with the question 
of what kind of experiencing subject of a post-death state there could be. Second, if 
all that survives after our death is will, no personal immortality (except in very 
attenuated sense) is available. Third, even if the will is not noumenal, that the deepest 
level of reality we know is the ‘evil’ and constantly striving will hardly bodes well for 
our post-death existence as will being blissful. It is presumably only the ascetic who 
can aspire to a blissful post-death state; through death the ascetic destroys the will and 
escapes it entirely. Philosophy cannot speak of the nothingness beyond the will, but 
the idea that it could be experienced as blissful doesn’t seem merely beyond the scope 
of philosophical understanding but in contradiction with Schopenhauer’s metaphysics. 
It seems the best chance of finding consolation in Schopenhauer’s philosophy is to 
read him as making the following claims. We are all indestructible by death in the 
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sense that we are, essentially, will. It is possible that, despite the secondary nature of 
intellect, the ascetic’s knowledge survives death. This death destroys the will so the 
post-death state would be nothingness. This at least assures an escape from painful 
willing, but given that nothingness is relative, may offer more than mere obliteration. 
I turn now to investigate whether we can make sense of this claim that the ascetic’s 
death destroys the will. 
 
3.4 Two Final Paradoxes 
 
3.4.1 The Abolition of the Will 
 
 Schopenhauer claims that the death of the ascetic differs from other deaths in 
as much as it touches the will and not just the phenomenon. Through ascetic practices, 
particularly starvation, the will is denied to such an extent that even the last glimmer 
of it is extinguished.626 According to Schopenhauer, ‘such a completely resigned 
ascetic ceases to live merely because he has completely ceased to will.’627 Sometimes 
he puts it the other way round: when the ascetic dies, his will also flickers out. So at 
WWR I 390 Schopenhauer says the will of the ascetic is ‘completely extinguished, 
except for the last glimmering spark that maintains the body and is extinguished with 
it.’ Either way, a ‘complete abolition’ of the will is achieved.628 Ascetic suicide 
through starvation is to be distinguished from other suicides which in fact represent an 
affirmation of life and of the will and in which, more significantly, only the 
phenomenon is destroyed and ‘the thing-in-itself remains unaffected’.629 In the case of 
salvation, on the other hand, ‘[i]t is not merely the phenomenon, as in the case of 
others, that comes to an end with death, but the inner being itself that is abolished.’630 
Schopenhauer is clear, then: in this one case, will as well as phenomenon is destroyed 
with death.   
 The difficult question here concerns what, precisely, is abolished and for 
whom – Schopenhauer isn’t as explicit as he might be in answering this. Some of 
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what he says seems to suggest that the successful ascetic destroys his will, and the 
world is abolished for him. He writes, for instance, that ‘for him who ends thus, the 
world has at the same time ended’.631 When he says we ‘see the world melt away with 
the abolished will, and retain before us only empty nothingness’, Schopenhauer is 
describing what we see when we ‘turn our glance’ to the experience of those who 
have denied the will.632 
Of course, the problem here is that the will is one, and can’t be divided into 
parts. If the ascetic truly destroys his will, he destroys the will as such – and with it 
the whole phenomenal world which is its manifestation. Indeed Schopenhauer insists 
that ‘the whole phenomenon of the will… the universal forms of this phenomenon… 
all these are abolished with the will. No will: no representation, no world.’633 Again, it 
may be that Schopenhauer thinks of these as abolished for or relative to the ascetic – 
that for him what remains is nothing, but I fail to see that he can be entitled to this 
qualification. Perhaps his remark that ‘the rest of nature has to expect its salvation 
from man who is at the same time priest and sacrifice’ represents an 
acknowledgement of this: it is the ascetic who can achieve denial and hence abolish 
the will and its phenomena, releasing them from their suffering.634 
The defender of Schopenhauer seems to be left with an unpalatable choice. If 
she agrees that the abolition of the will in one individual would entail the abolition of 
the whole, she needs to explain the continued existence of the world since 
Schopenhauer appears to believe that there have been ascetic saints who have 
achieved full denial and the abolition of the will.635 Further, if anyone is ever to attain 
this state even in the future, it is presumably right to say that on Schopenhauer’s 
account the world couldn’t currently exist. He tells us past and future come into being 
with the first representing subject, they must surely also disappear with the abolition 
of the will.636 Given the current existence of phenomenal reality, the conclusion must 
be that no-one has attained and no-one ever will attain Schopenhauerian salvation. 
The alternative for Schopenhauer’s defender is to show that the denial and abolition 
of the ascetic’s will need not destroy the will as such. It may be that this option would 
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seem the more appealing: Schopenhauer does after all (as we saw in chapters two and 
three) need individual wills to be separable from the will as such in order to make 
viable his accounts of moral responsibility and non-phenomenal individuation 
respectively. 
 
3.4.2 The Appearance of Freedom 
 
 We have seen that Schopenhauer’s account of salvation raises a number of 
metaphysical paradoxes. The last one I would like to touch on concerns the 
appearance of freedom in the phenomenal realm. Schopenhauer emphasises that this 
is a unique and remarkable occurrence, calling it ‘the transcendental change’.637 
Denial of the will constitutes ‘the one and only point where its [the will’s] freedom 
enters directly into the phenomenon’.638 In section 70 Schopenhauer directly 
addresses the charge that the phenomenon of denial of the will is inconsistent with his 
theory of determinism via motives. He argues that the philosophical contradiction 
between his determinism and his claim that the will can be suppressed and motives 
become inactive simply reflects a real (presumably, ontological) contradiction arising 
from the encroachment of the freedom of the will on necessity.639 These 
contradictions can be resolved, he argues, because the withdrawal of the will from the 
power of motives ‘does not proceed directly from the will, but from a changed form 
of knowledge’.640 Schopenhauer reminds us that this happens as if by grace, not from 
an internal impetus but as from without.641 
 It is indeed the worry that Schopenhauer’s account of salvation appeals to a 
willed refusal to will that has occupied some critics. Janaway, for instance, notes that 
one ‘final concern about the denial of the will is whether it is always bound to be an 
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act of will.’642 It is not entirely clear to me that Schopenhauer is able to answer this 
concern fully. For one thing, he at least uses the language of willing and desire 
throughout his account of ascetic denial. For instance, he talks of the ‘voluntarily 
chosen death by starvation at the highest degree of asceticism’ and says that in such a 
case the ‘dissolution of the body, the end of the individual… is welcome and 
desired.’643 It may be that Schopenhauer envisages these choices and desires taking 
place before the moment that freedom brings will-lessness,644 and indeed the question 
of timing seems to be a significant one. This brings me to the second reason for 
doubting the completeness of Schopenhauer’s answer to his critics: the elusive 
mechanics of this unique appearance of freedom in the phenomenal. 
 If with regard to the abolition of the will the key questions were what and for 
whom, here they might be thought of as when and how. Schopenhauer states that it is 
through a changed way of knowing that freedom makes its appearance.645 He also, 
however, describes this knowledge as prompting the process of becoming an ascetic: 
on the appearance of ‘the knowledge of the contradiction of the will-to-live with 
itself’ men ‘have often been seen suddenly to change, resort to resignation and 
penance, and become hermits and monks.’646 But, again, he describes such asceticism 
as ‘deliberate breaking of the will… the voluntarily chosen way of life of penance’.647 
It may be that Bernard Reginster’s distinction between renouncing pursuit of a desire 
and renouncing the desire itself may be useful here.648 Perhaps one could make a case 
on Schopenhauer’s behalf – he doesn’t seem to do so explicitly himself – that the 
ascetic process is characterised by a refusal to pursue one’s desires, it is only when 
freedom breaks in and genuine denial occurs that the ascetic becomes completely 
indifferent to and withdrawn from his or her desires. 
 It may be that Schopenhauer would not wish to characterise the advent of 
freedom and complete denial of the will as occurring at some particular time at all, 
since they are presumably noumenal in nature. But it seems to me that presenting 
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them as happening at some moment later than the onset of asceticism offers the best 
chance of reconciling Schopenhauer’s account of the ascetic process with the idea of a 
freedom which involves total will-lessness. The question of the point at which 
knowledge enters remains unresolved, however. Schopenhauer seems to have it both 
that it is the dawning of insight which prompts someone to become an ascetic and that 
it is the act of grace which explains the appearance of complete freedom and 
withdrawal.649 
 Neither do the final sections of The World as Will and Representation seem to 
me to make it entirely clear quite how knowledge produces the withdrawal from will. 
Schopenhauer emphasises that the knowledge or suffering which produces denial does 
not operate as a determining cause: ‘denial of the will by no means results from 
suffering with the necessity of effect from cause; on the contrary, the will remains 
free.’650 He is less clear, though, on how precisely the relationship between 
knowledge and denial does work. Denial, he says, results from ‘the innermost relation 
of knowing and willing in man’ but he also in the very same sentence says that it is an 
act of grace rather than will because ‘all knowledge and insight as such are 
independent of free choice’.651 We have seen, of course, that knowing and willing are 
intimately related in as much as Schopenhauer differentiates intelligible characters by 
virtue of the metaphysical insight they express. Nonetheless in this one case a person 
can gain a piece of metaphysical insight which seems to come from without and 
precisely isn’t tied to her character or will. 
 Compounding these difficulties of interpretation, Schopenhauer also seems to 
suggest that there needs to be an act of free acceptance of this grace. He writes that 
‘just as she [the Church] still represents it [the effect of grace] as depending on the 
acceptance of grace, so too the effect of the quieter is ultimately an act of the freedom 
of the will.’652 Having intimated that it was free and unmotivated because it came 
from outside, Schopenhauer now seems to suggest that to be free this grace needs to 
be chosen or accepted. He doesn’t say why – it may be that without my act of 
acceptance, it would be hard to see how this could be my freedom – a free act of 
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mine, rather than something that simply happens to me. Finally, then, in addition to 
the questions of when and how freedom enters the phenomenal we can add the 
question of whose freedom this is. This question Christopher Janaway addresses, and 
he insists that for Schopenhauer’s account of denial to be cogent it must precisely not 
be my – the subject’s – freedom. ‘[I]t is not I who turn against the will to life. The 
“agent” here is the will to life, which turns against itself… However,’ Janaway 
concludes, ‘Schopenhauer sometimes writes as if it were.’653 Not only that but there is 
a situation wherein it really is the case that ‘/ must continue to will its denial after all’: 
when the ‘will to life within in me is recalcitrant, and reverts to affirming itself, even 
if it has previously been broken’.654 As Janaway reads Schopenhauer (and as I do too) 
the ascetic continues to be involved in the denial of the will as a self, and continues to 
will his will-lessness. In other words, Schopenhauer does not offer an adequate 
account of when, how and whose freedom enters the phenomenal, nor convince that 
this is not after all a willed refusal to will. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
 There are remarkable correspondences between Schopenhauer and Spinoza’s 
doctrines of salvation. Remarkable, in the first place, that each boasts such a doctrine 
at all: that two thinkers who reject the idea of a divine guiding hand would end their 
philosophies with an augury of salvation; that the parallelist Spinoza should promise 
eternity of the mind; that the pessimist Schopenhauer could aspire to bliss. In each 
case, salvation represents the highest virtue, the greatest freedom and the most blessed 
state we can hope for and is a function of knowledge – specifically, an understanding 
of the nature of reality and our place within it. It is here that Schopenhauer’s 
pessimism makes a difference. While Spinozan blessedness is rarely attained, it can 
be achieved by our own good offices, whereas the knowledge from which 
Schopenhauerian salvation proceeds comes from without, similarly to Christian grace. 
In another way, Schopenhauer’s version is characteristically pessimistic too: where 
Spinozan blessedness constitutes a fulfilment of the self, Schopenhauer’s is a denial 
of and escape from it. For both philosophers metaphysical conundrums arise which 
challenge the coherence of their accounts. The possibility of immortality is difficult to 
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make real sense of in each case, and for Schopenhauer the hypotheses of the abolition 
of will and the appearance of freedom are equally puzzling. Schopenhauer calls 
salvation the transcendental change; perhaps we must conclude that the attempt to 
earth a transcendental element – in particular, freedom for Schopenhauer and eternity 
for Spinoza – in the natural systems which are Spinoza’s reality and Schopenhauer’s 
phenomenal realm threatens the coherence of their philosophies. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
1. FINDINGS 
 
 I would like to finish by briefly recapitulating the argument of each chapter in 
turn, drawing out the major conclusions derived from them. I will then offer a number 
of more general findings regarding Schopenhauer’s Spinozism and the interpretation 
of his philosophy. Finally, I will indicate some directions for future work suggested 
by the foregoing. 
 In the first chapter I maintained that Schopenhauer and Spinoza shared a 
metaphysical position which they nonetheless reached by different routes. I argued 
that each offered a version of what I called the ‘embedded-self’ thesis, according to 
which the self is embodied and integrated into nature, but did so without appealing to 
materialism. I suggested that, in each case, this theory of the self formed a response to 
the standard Cartesian model, over which it boasted several advantages. I noted that 
Schopenhauer subscribed to this thesis in spite of his Kantian transcendental idealism, 
and that investigating this fact further led to interesting conclusions concerning 
Schopenhauer’s philosophical method. In particular, I proposed that the re-emergence 
of metaphysics was better understood as sanctioned by Schopenhauer’s own brand of 
empiricism than any return to Spinozan rationalism on his part. 
 Their adoption of the embedded-self thesis left Schopenhauer and Spinoza 
with a shared problem which I investigated in chapter two. Each, I argued, owed us an 
explanation of how individuals and types of beings were to be distinguished from one 
another – and I concluded that their respective solutions had similar, bipartite 
structures. Individuation within the phenomenal realm is easily explained, for 
Schopenhauer, but for individuals to be more than merely illusory they need to be 
identified in a way that transcends the veil of maya. This Schopenhauer achieved by 
reference to the Platonic Ideas, and I examined a number of interpretive difficulties 
concerning the philosophical coherence of these Ideas, their supposedly ad hoc nature 
and whether they should be read as fulfilling a metaphysical or an epistemological 
function. I interpreted Spinoza as offering a physical account of individuation by 
reference to motion and rest and a metaphysical account in virtue of formal essences. 
Spinozan essences should be viewed, in my judgement, as abstract and infinite but 
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particular, relating to finite modes through a special kind of causality. Analysing 
Schopenhauer’s Ideas along the same lines, I came to the conclusion that they are best 
understood as abstract universals which exist in phenomena, as their essential natures, 
but also have a degree of independence from them. 
 The Platonic Ideas – in particular, the human intelligible character – play a 
crucial role in Schopenhauer’s ethical philosophy. A person’s moral nature is dictated 
by her intelligible character, which is free and thus allows her to be held morally 
responsible. In chapter three I argued that Schopenhauer’s account of the intelligible 
character lacks cogency and so threatens the coherence of his ethics per se – I 
highlighted problems, too, with his motivational pluralism and his insistence on 
compassion as the sole mark of morality. Instead, a defender of Schopenhauer would 
do well to re-examine the resources his philosophy offers for an ethics of self-
fulfilment within determinism, which would mirror Spinoza’s model of the possibility 
of freedom and flourishing through knowledge. 
 It is above all Schopenhauer’s pessimism regarding epistemology which takes 
his ethics so far from that of the Ethics, and something similar is at play in the case of 
salvation. I started my final chapter by showing that each thinker offers an account of 
blessedness or salvation and outlining the substantial similarities between these 
accounts. I suggested that the main differences concerned the attainability of salvation 
and its consequences for the self. I diagnosed these differences as depending on 
Schopenhauer’s epistemological and metaphysical pessimisms respectively. Finally, I 
argued that the attempt to make sense of Schopenhauer’s doctrine of salvation – 
particularly as regards immortality, freedom and the abolition of the will – raised 
questions about how the relationship between self and will in Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy should best be understood. 
 
2. SCHOPENHAUER’S SPINOZISM 
 
 The relationship between Schopenhauer and Spinoza played a slightly 
different role in each chapter. As regards the embedded self, we saw that Spinoza’s 
philosophy really did stand as a precursor to Schopenhauer’s, offering a similar 
alternative to Cartesianism a century and a half earlier. Of course, the most significant 
intervention between these dates as far as Schopenhauer’s thought was concerned was 
the emergence of transcendental philosophy. Schopenhauer’s Kantianism makes the 
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similarities between his account of the self and that of Spinoza all the more intriguing, 
and provokes questions, as detailed above, about the philosophical methodology 
which justifies his rehabilitation of metaphysics. 
 In the second chapter parallels between Schopenhauer and Spinoza again 
became apparent, regarding both the structure and to some extent the content of their 
theories of individuation. The extensive scholarship examining Spinozan essences 
provided a useful resource in analysing an aspect of Schopenhauer’s thought which 
has often been dismissed and in attempting to construct a workable rendering of his 
Platonic Ideas. 
 Chapter three considered the branch of philosophy – ethics – within which 
Schopenhauer most explicitly rejects Spinozism, decrying its optimism, egoism and 
moral relativism. Nonetheless the two philosophers encountered a similar task – 
producing an ethics compatible with determinism – and could have offered similar 
solutions. The main thing preventing this, I argued, was Schopenhauer’s 
epistemological pessimism: his conviction that the kind of knowledge which makes a 
moral difference is innate and unteachable. 
 With the theory of salvation it was again a case of uncovering real and perhaps 
surprising parallels between the versions proposed by the two philosophers. Further 
examination, however, revealed consequential differences between the two models. I 
concluded that Schopenhauer would dismiss Spinoza’s faith in the possibility and 
power of acquiring knowledge as naively optimistic while Spinoza would regard 
Schopenhauer’s characterisation of the will as not merely pessimistic but 
superstitious. Both, in my view, get into difficulties with the encroachment of a 
transcendent element on a naturalistic system – in Spinoza’s case, with the doctrine of 
the eternity of the mind; in Schopenhauer’s, with the mooted appearance of freedom 
in the phenomenal realm 
 There are then, as we have seen, extensive and meaningful commonalities 
between the two philosophies. Schopenhauer and Spinoza share an account of the self 
and its relation to nature which offers a genuine alternative – to Descartes’ model in 
particular. Their two-level explanations of individuation bear comparison and each 
highlights the capacity knowledge has to change us within a deterministic structure, as 
well as the ethical importance of understanding our place in reality. Finally, each 
philosophical system culminates in a vision of blessedness or salvation featuring 
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profound metaphysical insight, joy and the freedom from suffering and arguably too a 
promise of immortality. 
There are also, of course, significant divergences. Most pressingly, the two 
thinkers operate according to different methodologies. I hope to have cast just a little 
more light on these and to have modified to some extent the way they are typically 
understood. For instance, I have argued – following Paul Guyer – that Schopenhauer 
could be read as a more enthusiastic empiricist than Kant and I have suggested that 
Spinoza’s realism can be called into question.655 Connectedly, I would argue that the 
seeming metaphysical chasm between Spinoza’s immanent substance and 
Schopenhauer’s noumenal will need not be seen as quite so gaping. For instance, 
Spinoza’s account of the eternal essences may constitute a challenge to the picture of 
his philosophy as unremittingly naturalistic. Equally, if we accept that 
Schopenhauer’s negative valuation of the malevolent will finds insufficient warrant, it 
becomes more plausible to read him as proposing a combination of monism and 
dynamism much closer to Spinoza’s own model. 
 
3. INTERPRETING SCHOPENHAUER 
 
 Studying Schopenhauer’s Spinozism has provided an opportunity to confront 
and revise certain truisms concerning his philosophy. In particular, chapter one re-
examined Schopenhauer’s methodology and chapter two investigated the allegations 
of metaphysical extravagance and incoherence made against his version of the 
Platonic Ideas. The supposed impossibility of a Schopenhauerian practical ethics was 
considered anew in chapter three while chapter four indicated that even 
Schopenhauer’s pessimism could to a certain extent be called into question in the light 
of his doctrine of salvation. 
 I have argued that Spinoza’s philosophy and the significant body of 
scholarship it has inspired offer resources of great value in coming to understand or 
interpret aspects of Schopenhauer’s thought. In some cases, I have borrowed 
categories and concepts from the Spinoza literature in an attempt to analyse 
                                                 
655
 His division between the eternal perspective characteristic of the third kind of knowledge and the 
inadequate understanding which individuates according to spatio-temporal location seems to bring him 
closer to Schopenhauer’s own idealist position. Indeed Walter Brann mentions that Schopenhauer 
himself sometimes suggested Spinoza could be read as a transcendental idealist who made his own 
phenomenon/thing-in-itself distinction. Brann, ‘Schopenhauer and Spinoza’, 188-9. 
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Schopenhauerian theories in a new way. In others, I have suggested that emphasising 
Schopenhauer’s Spinozism (in contrast to his Kantianism, say) serves to reveal 
underplayed elements of his philosophy. 
 Finally, I would affirm that assessing Schopenhauer’s thought through the lens 
of his Spinozism has helped to indicate or underscore problematic areas of his system. 
For instance, Schopenhauer’s difficulty explaining the status of intelligible characters 
as individuated acts of will came into focus as a result of his resistance to Spinozan 
ethics. Similarly, his comparatively pessimistic model of salvation was seen to depend 
on an unsatisfying account of the fate of both world and self upon the complete denial 
of will. 
 
4. FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
 I believe these conclusions highlight further work that could be usefully 
undertaken both in Schopenhauer studies and more broadly. As regards the 
understanding of Schopenhauer’s philosophy in its own right, particular issues about 
its content have emerged. I would suggest, for instance, that more needs to be done to 
produce a fully satisfactory analysis of his take on the Platonic Ideas. In my view, 
they should not be written off as ad hoc, incoherent metaphysical extravagances until 
a more careful – and perhaps more philosophically technical – examination has been 
performed. On the other hand, there may well be elements of Schopenhauer’s thought 
which should be abandoned. It may be, for example, that the goal of explaining the 
abolition of the will and its blissful aftermath in a way that is consistent and coherent 
is ultimately unattainable. 
 I would argue, too, that a case has emerged for a reassessment of 
Schopenhauer’s relation to various philosophical traditions. I have endorsed Guyer’s 
suggestion that one of the ways in which Schopenhauer deviates from Kantianism is 
in his recognition of additional sources of knowledge. If Schopenhauer is a 
transcendental philosopher he is one whose method is complicated by a customised 
empiricism – this warrants further study. I suspect it may be, too, that a reading of 
Schopenhauer which reinserted him – protesting – into the German Idealist tradition 
would have a fair prospect of taking fuller account of his Spinozism.  
 This in turn suggests future endeavours of more general interest. It seems to 
me that a thorough examination of Schopenhauer’s Spinozism would contribute to a 
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number of wider philosophical projects. While it has not been the primary aim of this 
thesis to try to prove the extent of his Spinozism or to show that Schopenhauer is, say, 
more truly a Spinozist than a Kantian, this might be something interesting to explore. 
In part, of course, it would make for a more adequate understanding of 
Schopenhauer’s own philosophy, but I would argue, too, that the possibility of a post-
Kantian Spinozism is interesting from many points of view. It would therefore be of 
considerable value to assess the extent to which Schopenhauer managed to reconcile 
the two philosophies and what difficulties were exposed. In particular, this might form 
part of investigations into the prospects of post-Kantian metaphysics or a 
rapprochement between transcendental philosophy and naturalism. Both of these are 
areas of contemporary academic interest and each finds an instance in Schopenhauer’s 
Spinozism. 
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